' The order dated 28th May, 1984 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 7, Gujranwala has been challenged, whereby the complaint brought by the appellant under section 47 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 has been dismissed.
2. The pay of December, 1980 was not paid to the appellant and he brought a case on that account before the learned lower Court which is said to be pending. It is urged that in the pendency of the case in the Court the respondent has ordered that the period of absence be treated as leave without pay. The stand of the appellant is that the respondent has committed an offence under section 47 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 by making such a decision in the pendency of the case of the recovery of the amount in the Court.
3. Obviously no violation of the provision of section 47 has been made. The petition for the recovery of the pay for December, 1980 is not an Industrial dispute as defined in section 2 (xiii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The period of the alleged absence has been treated as leave without pay. Apart from it an industrial dispute can be raised, as required by section 43 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, in a particular manger by a C. B. A. Firstly, the petition brought by the appellant for the recovery of the nay for the month of December, 1980 has not been brought by any C.B.A. Secondly an industrial dispute is raised by raising demands by the C. B. A. And if no settlement is made, the matter goes to the Conciliator. If no decision is arrived at, the Conciliator issues certificate of failure and then a petition under section 32 (1-a) to the Labour Court by the C.B.A. Is made. Admittedly, neither any demand was raised nor any dispute was taken under section 32 (1-a) by any C. B. A. To the Court after the failure of any conciliation proceedings. So, no industrial dispute was pending, nor the deduction of pay of December, 1980 had any connection with any industrial dispute. So, section 47 has not been violated and no offence has been committed by the respondent. The learned lower Court, therefore, rightly dismissed the complaint.
4. Even otherwise no appeal lies against the dismissal of a complaint. Section 38 provides that a sentence passed under section 36 (5) (d) may be set aside in appeal. The appeal could have been treated as a revision but for the reasons given above the complaint was rightly dismissed, so there is no ground to interfere.
5. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed in limine.