' Muhammad Yar, Ex-Peshi Qanungo, has made this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, wherein he has impleaded the Deputy Commissioner, Bahawalnagar, and the Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division, Bahawalpur, as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal, the appellant has prayed that the impugned order, dated 9th March, 1983 passed by the respondent No, 1 and the appellate order, dated 29th December, 1983 passed by the respondent No, 2 be set aside as these are unlawful and against the facts of the case.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant while working as Qanungo Consolidation was served with a show-cause notice, dated 23th December, 1982 for wilful absence. He submitted a reply to the show-cause notice which was considered by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (General)/Authorised Officer, Bahawalnagar. The appellant was served with an other show-cause notice, dated 11 th January, 1983 by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (General), Bahawalnagar.
The appellant submitted a reply to this second show-cause notice to the above Authorised Officer.
He made his recommendations to the respondent No, 1, Deputy Commissioner, Bahawalnagar, who heard the appellant in person. The appellant was found guilty of wilful absence for availing leave for 31 days without sanction and the penalty of reduction of his salary by two stages was imposed by the Deputy Commissioner (respondent No, 1) vide his order, dated 9th March, 1983. The appellant made an appeal to the. Commissioner, Bahawalpur which was considered and rejected vide his order, dated 29th December, 1983. Hence this appeal.
4. I have heard the parties i,e, Sh. Abdul Qayum, counsel for the appellant and Mr. A.G. Humayun, District Attorney assisted by the representative of the Department, on behalf of the respondents.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that feeling frustrated and restless by constant mental torture due to the intrigues of the departmental people the appellant sought solace and serenity in seclusion by reverting to Almighty Allah. The best suited period for this sublime purpose was the holy month of Ramadhan wherein purification of heart and soul could be achieved. Therefore, the appellant applied for earned leave for 28 days from 28th June, 1982 to 25th July, 1982. This leave was duly recommended by the Incbarge of the appellant and the appellant availed of this leave for a noble cause as this leave was due to him. Thus, leave should have been sanctioned by his superiors in a routine and the appellant should have not been punished for the same. This punishment is unjustified, unlawful and be quashed.
6. On the other hand the learned District Attorney has referred to the parawise comments submitted by the respondents and has resisted the above arguments of the learned counsel. He has submitted that the appellant had a long service, knew the departmental rules, regulations and it was within his knowledge that he could not avail this leave without proper sanction of the competent authority. Thus, he absented from duty which has been acknowledged by him as is clear from the detailed impugned order, dated 9th March, 1983 passed by the respondent No, 1.
Hence, the appellant has been guilty of misconduct, has been punished correctly and no exception can be taken against the impugned orders.
7. I have given my anxious thought to the arguments of the parties and have also gone through the record of this case. This is a fact that the appellant had applied for earned leave from 28th June, 1982 to 25th July, 1982, went on leave without getting sanction from the competent authority, presuming sanction of this leave of his own accord which was not fair on the part of the appellant and is also against the Rules. ##TS# # Earned leave cannot be availed in anticipation without prior sanction of the competent authority. Thus, the appellant absented himself from duty and is guilty of the misconduct. Hence, the impugned orders are correct, lawful orders and no exception can be taken against the same.
8. The upshot of the above discussion of the case is that there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed as such. There are no orders as to costs.