' The relevant facts for the decision of this writ petition are that plaintiff-petitioner's suit for pre- emption was earlier dismissed by the trial Court on 11-7-1980 due to closure of his evidence on the ground of default to produce the same in spite of repeated opportunities. The plaintiff-petitioner preferred appeal against that order which was accepted by the learned District 'Judge on 5-7-1980 and remanded th.e case with a direction to readmit the suit and dispose it of in accordance with law after affording at least one adjournment to the plaintiff to produce his evidence at his own instance. Consequently, the suit was readmitted by the trial Court on 22-9-1980 and adjourned it to 22-12-1980 for recording the evidence of the parties. On that date the plaintiff-petitioner closed his affirmative evidence. The defendant-respondent's evidence was recorded on 20-7-1981 and the case was adjourned to 14-11-1981 for recording the evidence of the plaintiff-petitioner in rebuttal. As he produced no evidence, the case was once again adjourned to 22-11-1981 giving him the last opportunity. On 22-11-1981 the Presiding Officer was on leave and the case was postponed to 16-12- 1981 and then to 6-1-1982 on which date the plaintiff-petitioner's rebuttal evidence was closed. On the last date of hearing i.e. 6-1-1982, the plaintiff-petitioner applied under Order XVIII, rule 2, C.P.C. seeking permission for producing additional evidence but it was declined on 1-1-1982. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a revision before the District Judge, Vehari which was ultimately dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, on the grounds, that the petitioner's counsel while making a statement about the closing of his evidence did not reserve his right to produce the documents mentioned in the application under Order XVIII, rule 2, C.P.C; that the suit being of pre- emption it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prosecute his case with diligence but his conduct throughout had been negligent and replete with instances of carelessness and that the ing permission to produce additional evidence, being discretionary with the lower Court cannot be lightly interfered with in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. He relied on Shakir Ali Khan and others v. Tauhid Ahmad Khan, etc. 1981 SCMR 149 in this regard.
2. Through this constitutional petition the validity and the legality of the learned Additional District Judge's order, dated 6-1-1982 affirming the trial Judge's order, dated 1-3-1982 has been challenged. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also perused the documents appended with the petition. It is pertinent to note that the suit of the petitioner is pending since June, 1978 wherein he claimed the superior right of pre-emption on the basis of his being collateral of the vendor. But it is amazing that the copies of the predegree tables, which the petitioner wanted to produce as additional evidence before the trial Court were obtained years after the institution of the case and particularly after closing his evidence. The slackness on the part of the petitioner appears to be culpable. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the discretion exercised by the two Courts below refusing permission to produce additional evidence cannot be termed to be arbitrary or illegal. The impugned orders do not suffer from jurisdictional defect. Therefore, I do not feel inclined to exercise my extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. The result is that this petition fails being without merits and the same stands dismissed in limine.
Writ refused.