' The present applicants alongwith other ten applicants had filed such matters in Court No.IV, Karachi on 23-12-1981 which were admitted on 6-1-1982. Eight of these matters were disposed of by the said Court on 26-9-1982 and the remaining six matters were transferred to this Court. Two matters being Applications Nos. 56/82 and 57/82 filed by Saeed Mohammad and Mohammad Hanif, respectively, have been disposed of by this Court. The present four matters are sought to be disposed of by this order.
2. Briefly the facts are that the National Advertisers Limited, Karachi had secured an order on 26-12- 1979, for the manufacture of sixty thousand sets of give-aways of a special type. The payment for these special type brass give-aways was to be made by the Saudia in U.S. Dollars. The total cost of these sixty thousand give-aways was calculated in Pakistani rupees at rupees eighty-one lacs, which was to be paid in instalments, some of which were to be advance payments. The National Advertisers entrusted this work to Messrs Mushtaq & Sons, the respondents herein, who engaged labour for this purpose. It appears that the respondents manufactured thirty thousand sets of give- aways and received payment therefor. However, for the balance of thirty thousand sets of give- aways, certain problems arose as delay for indefinite periods occurred in the payment of advances for those number of sets. In consequence of this indefinite delay in the receipt of advance payments from Saudia through the National Advertisers Limited, the respondents laid off their workers by notice, dated 7-8-1981. The lay off was for a period of eleven days from 7-8-1981 to 17-8-1981. As even after the lay off the expected advances were not received by the respondents for the balance of thirty thousand give-aways to be manufactured by them, the respondents resorted to retrenchment and by notice, dated 12-10-1981, retrenched 14 workers. In the retrenchment notice served upon the workers concerned it was specifically stated that the retrenchment was being made on the principle of "first come last to go". The retrenchment notice further provided for one month's notice as provided under clause (1) of Standing Order 12 and also held out an assurance to the retrenched workers that they would be given first priority in employment under Standing Order 14 if the work re-started and fresh recruitment is made.
3. The respondents contested the matter and filed their Reply Statement through their partner of the firm, Mr.M.Anwar Mushtaq, alleging therein that the management had declared lay off w.e.f. 7- 8-1981 for 11 days due to lack of order from buyer and less work in hand. A notice to this effect was exhibited on the notice the same day. The complaint before National Industrial Relations Commission and the compromise petition were admitted while all other allegations with regard to anti-trade union activities or victimisation were stoutly denied. It was explained that the retrenchment notice was issued to less than 50$ of total workers of the respondent-factory strictly on the basis of "last come first go". The respondents had also taken the legal plea that the applications were not maintainable at law and are time-barred. They had also alleged that the principles of estoppel and waiver were attracted.
4. The parties led evidence in all the four matters. By way of affidavits only in Case No.53/82 (Mohammad Umer v. M. Mushtaq & Sons). The respondent has been cross-examined but in all the remaining matters the applicants did not attend the Court to examine the respondent. Hence in their matters the word of the respondent goes unchallenged.
5. The applicants have admitted in their cross-examination on various dates when they were examined by this Court, in these petitions that the permission for closing down the factory was allowed to the respondent factory by Sind Labour Court No.IV, Karachi vide order dated 23-8-1982.
This order has been produced in the present petitions as Exh.3/A. The applicants also admitted that this order Exh.3/A was not challenged by them by way of a revision. The applicants categorically stated before this Court that all the other workers have left the factory after receiving their legal dues except the petitioners.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that when the factory has been legally closed down the question of the re-employment would not arise. It has been contended by the counsel for the respondents that the co-workers who had filed petitions alongwith the present applicants had been disposed of by Sind Labour Court No. IV, Karachi on 26-9-1982. Against which appeal was filed by the workers which too was dismissed by the learned Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 14-4-1983.
7. I have gone through the order passed by my learned brother Mr.Rana Bhagwandas on 23-8-1982 whereby he had allowed the close down of the factory. I have also gone through his order dated 26-9-1982 which was challenged before the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and dismissed the appeal filed by the workers on 21-4-1983.
' As already mentioned, the applicants have not come forward for cross-examination nor have been able to establish their cases. They have not challenged the word of the respondent. The case of the present four applicants stands on the same footing as that of the other co-workers namely Pervez Iqbal, Khan, Muhammad Mushtaq, Zafar Ahmed, Abdul Hamid, Dost Mohammad, Bondo Khan, Syed Usman and Mohammad Miskeen and I am in agreement with my learned brother that no fault can be found with the action of respondents in terminating the respect of said workers who have resigned from the employment of the respondents.
' Now I come to the other set of workers who stand represented by the petitioner. The objection has been raised by the learned Representative for the respondents as to the jurisdiction of this Court to grant of injunction/interim order. Even the maintainability of the main application under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969 has been challenged.
' Since both these points are crucial I propose to decide them first. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner cannot resort to section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969. Consequently this Court could not pass any ad interim order in the shape of injunction or status quo. He has placed reliance on PLD 1973 Kar. 189 a Division Bench Decision. Reliance has next been placed on 1981 PLC 737 and 1982 PLC 444. He has also placed before me the recent decision of the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi given on 25-1-1984. It is argued by Mr. Samiullah Khan that in these authorities the law has been settled that the Labour Courts will have no jurisdiction to entertain any application under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969 nor can it pass any interim order for restraining the respondents to take a particular action. The Authority reported in PLD 1973 Kar. 189 pertains to an individual case and not a case of C.B.A. Admittedly, the petitioner is a registered C.B.A. Hence could come under section 34 of I.R.O., 1969. Had it been a case of an individual worker they said authority would be applicable. The other two authorities viz. 1981 PLC 737 and 1982 PLC 444 are in respect of matters under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 and of individual grievances. As already mentioned the instant case before me is of a Collective Bargaining Agent and not of an individual worker. These authorities, too, are, not favourable to the respondents and are not applicable to the present case.
The last and final authority which has been relied upon is the decision given by the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi on 25-1-1984 in Petition No. 124 of 1983. In that decision I find that it pertains to a case of an individual worker who had come for relief before the said Court and my learned brother relied on the said authorities rightly in modifying his earlier order. This decision does not help the respondent at all. Thus I find that this Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate into the matter and could pass an interim order.
' The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this proposition has placed reliance on the authority reported in PLD 1975 Kar.
858. It is argued by Mr. Ch.Rashid Ahmad, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that this Court was within its means to pass an interim order and the maintenance of status quo was justified as the respondents were acting against the union as a whole and depriving its members of secured and guaranteed rights. I have carefully gone through this authority. The authority reported in PLD 1973 Kar. 189 has been referred and it has been settled that passing of interlocutory order to maintain status quo was within the jurisdiction of Labour Courts. The said authority pertains to a union hence applicable in this case.
' On the merits of the application I find that the letter dated 4-1-1984 on the one hand speaks of absorption of service and on the other hand it speaks of resignation and fresh appointment. It is also contended by the learned counsel of the petitioner that in fact the new Company i.e. Pak Suzuki Company Limited his stepped into the shoes of the Awami Autos only in respect of the Motor assembly plant. The office including the staff is the same. The machinery is the same. The premises is the same. So much so that the Management is the same. Hence forcing the workers to resign from Awami Autos and seek fresh appointment in its counter-part indicates the mala fides of the respondent. All these issues can be considered only when the matter proceeds. The petitioner thus have a prima facie case and in case the earlier order is vacated the petitioner will be seriously prejudiced. 1, therefore, confirm the earlier order and direct that it shall continue till disposal of this matter.
' In order to make it clear, I once again mention that this order of status quo shall not apply in case of the workers who have already resigned and sought fresh appointment. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.