1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.-- This order will dispose of Civil Review Petitions Nos. 21-R and 22-R of 1980, which arise out of the common judgment of this Court, dated 16th , January, 1980, by which Civil Petitions Nos. 1089 and 1090 of 1976, were dismissed.
2. In seeking review of the order, the learned counsel for the petitioners has urged the following grounds:- (1)That this Court erroneously committed the same error as was committed by the High Court in deciding the disputed questions of fact and in doing so, it acted beyond the scope of Article 199 of the Constitution. The sum and substance of this contention was that it were the settlement authorities who could have gone into those questions as they had the jurisdiction to decide them.
3. Nonetheless, the High Court set aside the concurrent finding of fact that there existed an industrial concern which was in the possession of one of the petitioners. Further,- the High Court decided the petitions on the. Grounds which were never raised before the settlement authorities, such as, that it acted on a memorandum of the Settlement Commissioner, addressed to the Additional Settlement Commissioner wherein the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, not treating the disputed property as a big mansion, was conveyed and in doing so it drew unwarranted inferences from this memorandum. Again, the High Court set aside the concurrent finding of fact as it misconstrued the judgment of the Custodian of Evacuee Property and held that there was no mention in it of any industrial concern whatsoever. The third limb of this submission was that not only this Court but also the High` Court should have remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner if the Courts felt that the questions in dispute were not properly decided.
4. (2)That this Court misread and misapplied Para. 15(4) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita--tion) Act to the facts of this case whereas it was Para. 15(3) which was applicable.
5. (3)That this Court erroneously held that the allotment order, dated 5th of September, 1952, was ineffective.
6. (4)That in deciding the question of laches, this Court erroneously held that the petitioner had acquiesced in the order, dated 28th May, 1969, admitting the petitions to a regular hearing and leaving the question of laches open as he failed to challenge it in this Court within the prescribed period of limitation.
7. (5)That delay per se could not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the petition unless it was accompanied by conduct likely to cause prejudice to the other side; and as there was none, Laches could not be pressed into service.
8. (6)That the High Court acted beyond its jurisdiction in transferring the whole of the bungalow to Abdur Razzaq in the context of the finding of the Settlement Commissioner that a portion of it was used as an industrial concern.
9. (7)That this Court erroneously concurred with the reasons and the findings of the High Court, which were based on wrong assumptions of fact and law, and belied by the material on record.
10. (8)That this Court erroneously ignored the fact that the Settlement Commissioner in fact refused to transfer the industrial concern to the petitioners under a misconception that it could not be transferred on an application which was not prescribed for the transfer of such converted property.
11. (9)That admittedly, the Settlement Inspector did not associate the petitioners before submitting the report, dated 7th of May, 1960, which was acted upon ex parte by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner while passing the order, dated 9th of May, 1960, and therefore, such an order offended against the requirement of law, on which ground alone the transfers, in favour of the occupants, could not be sustained.
12. (10)That the High Court and this Court fell into an error in holding that the petitioners failed to apply for the review of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, conveyed by the memo dated 15th April, 1960.
13. (11)That the Settlement Commissioner wrongly relied on the instructions in transferring the bungalow as one unit and in doing so, it arbitrarily set aside the division of the property without inspecting it.
14. (12)That this Court had erroneously held that the petitioners had not applied for the transfer of the industrial concern; and that in any case, his representation to the Additional Settlement Commissioner amounted, in law, to an oral request for its transfer which could not be ignored; and further, the High Court erred in holding that the petitioners had no locus standi to challenge the transfer of the disputed industrial concern to Abdur Razzaq.
15. While rejecting the claim of Muhammad Sharif Puri (the petitioner in Civil Petition No.1089 of 1976), in regard to the transfer of the portion of the main bungalow which allegedly housed an industrial concern, namely, an Ice and Cold Storage Factory, the High Court held that the delay of 271 years, in filing the writ petition was fatal. Nonetheless, the High Court examined the merits of the case and concurred with the finding of the Settlement Commissioner that he had failed to apply for its transfer as an industrial concern and, therefore, he had no locus standi to question the transfer of that portion to Abdur Razzaq, under Settlement Scheme No.1. This Court also examined the question of laches and the merits of his entitlement 'and the further question as to whether there existed any industrial concern in the bungalbw and reached the conclusion, upon an examination of the record, that the opinion of the High Court was unexceptionable. This conclusion sufficed to non-suit the petitioner Muhammad Sharif Puri (the petitioner in Civil Petition No.1089 of 1976); and as for the claim of Akhtar Iqbal Puri (the petitioner in Civil Petition No.1090 of 1976), that he had converted the portion of the main bungalow into an industrial concern, the fallacy of such claim was evident from the fact that in his L.H. Form he had claimed the transfer of the portion of the bungalow as a house on the basis of his father's possession and subsequently, to substantiate his claim, an application dated 6th of May, 1960, was surreptitiously produced, for the first the, from the record before the High Court seeking its transfer as an industrial concern. After examining the record, this Court concluded that his claim was confined to the transfer of the annexe on the back of the main bungalow as an industrial concern, and not the portion of the bungalow as an industrial concern; and for that matter, even as a "converted property".
16. The counsel for the petitioners argued at great length in support of the above submissions and respondent No.5 also entered appearance to contest the review petition. In fact, the raising of these submissions was an attempt to obtain a reversal of the opinion formed by this Court in regard to the merits of the claims of the petitioners and the question which falls for consideration is as to whether it would be proper for us to examine them afresh.
17. It is now well-settled that the exercise of review jurisdiction does not mean a rehearing of the matter and that as finality attaches to the orders, a decision, even though it is erroneous per se, would not be a ground to justify its review. Accordingly, in keeping with the limits of the review jurisdiction, it is futile to reconsider the submissions which converge on the merits of the decision: However, the learned counsel for the petitioners pointed to an error in the order which related to the contents of the application dated 6th of May, 1960, allegedly filed for the transfer of the industrial concern in regard to which it is stated in the order that "he had made no claim to the transfer of the major portion of the bungalow as an industrial concern or as converted property" which was not correct. This application saw the light of the day, for the first the, in the High Court whose authenticity was seriously canvassed before it; and as would appear from the order of the High Court, it was seriously urged that as the petitioner had failed to prove that he had filed the L.H.
18. Form for the transfer of the portion of the annexe in which he had installed an industrial concern, he thereafter changed the entire complexion of his claim by smuggling "into the record" an application dated 6th of May, 1960, seeking the transfer of the portion of the bungalow as converted property in accordance with. The Press Note, dated 3rd of May, 1960, after the decision of the Settlement Commissioner, dated 9th of November, 1966. The High Court, after giving detailed reasons, held that the petitioner had "not been able to produce or refer to any document to rebut this assertion of the respondent" but expressed no firm opinion as to its authenticity and left the issue to be decided in the remand proceedings.
19. While upholding the order of the Settlement Commissioner, dated 9th of November,' 1966, remanding the case of Akhtar Iqbal Puri for demarcating the actual factory area either in the annexe or servant quarters from any other open space or part of .The main bungalow to which he was not entitled, the High Court again clarified that the remand order should be confined only to the annexe and the servant quarters as directed by the Settlement Commissioner. In effect, there-- fore, as the order of the Settlement Commissioner was upheld, no question could have arisen as to the entitlement of Akhtar Iqbal Puri on the basis of the application, dated 6th of May, 1960. In the light of this conclusion, no other inference is possible except that it was only the question of the authenticity of the document which remains to be decided in the light of the observations made in the judgment and the contentions urged against its authenticity as it was a serious matter involving grave consequences.
20. This error is wholly inconsequential not only for the reasons mentioned above but also because the counsel for the petitioners was not able to enlighten us with any certainty as to in which portion of the bungalow this industrial concern was housed which materially reflects against the bona fides of the claim.
21. Accordingly, I see no merit in these petitions which are dismissed.