' Muhammad Saleem Akhtar has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded the Deputy, Inspector-General of Police, Multan Range, Multan and Superintendent of Police, Sahiwal, as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal, the appellant has prayed that the impugned orders, dated 31-1-1980 and 8-12-1979, passed by respondents Nos, 1 and 2, be set aside and he be re-instated as S.H.O. With all back benefits.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was charge-sheeted by the Superintenent of Police for various lapses mainly with his efficiency also imputing him with ulterior motives. No inquiry was held in this case but the Superintendent of Police taking proceedings under rule 6(3), found the explanation of the appellant unsatisfactory and dismissed him from service vide order, dated 8-12- 1979. Aggrieved against this order the appellant went in appeal before the Deputy Inspector- General of Police, who vide his detailed order, dated 31-1-1980, came to the conclusion that the penalty of dismissal upon the appellant was harsh and the lapses on his part require a lenient treatment. The lenient treatment met out to him was that he was reduced from the rank of Sub- Inspector to Assistant Sub-Inspector with reduction of pay from Rs,350 to Rs,330 and removal of his name from list 'B'. He filed revision petition before the Inspector-General of Police, which was rejected on 7-1-1982, as time-barred. Hence this appeal.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney assisted by representative of the Department and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has mainly relied on the judgment of the learned Deputy Inspector-General of Police and has submitted that the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in his impugned order has categorised the appellant as honest officer, without any controversy about his integrity. It has been argued that the author of the judgment has also observed that the lapses attributed to the. Appellant, were common in nature and thus the Superintendent of Police, should not have taken extreme view about such lapses. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that when an officer who has been considered honest throughout his service and was a son of Police Officer who died voluntarily in discharge of his duties, should not have been punished in a way, he has so been punished and the view taken by the learned Deputy Inspector- General of Police was also harsh. He has also pleaded while elaborating defence so put forward by the appellant that he did what was possible for him to do with regard to each and every charge so levelled against him and due to the circumstances beyond his control, he was not able to achieve the things which the authorities wanted him to achieve. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that due to his extraordinary performance, the appellant within a period of six years of his service, was raised to the rank of Sub-Inspector and unfortunately it was the first lapse for which he was proceeded against by the S.P. Learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn my attention to the brilliant record of service of the appellant that he earned 36 class III and one class II certificates and cash award of Rs,1,055 within a short period of six years.
6. On the other hand learned District Attorney has submitted that he would first of all resist the appeal as being hopelessly time-barred, a mention of which has been made by the Inspector- General of Police, Punjab, Lahore, while rejecting his revision petition. Learned District Attorney has submitted that the appellant is lucky enough as he has been re-instated in service and has justified the action of D.I.-G. As an action, full of mercy and taking into consideration the background of the appellant's family as well as integrity. According to the learned District Attorney no exception could be taken to the order of the D.I.-G. Police which is just and fair.
7. I have given my anxious thought to the arguments so advanced by the parties and have very carefully perused the judgment of the learned D.I.-G. To find. What was working in his mind while dealing with the case of the appellant so came before him. There can be no second opinion about the fact that the 0.1.-G. Found this young A.S.-I. And honest officer in service and a rare quality hardly found under the changed circumstances of our society. It is also an established fact on the record that the learned D.I.-G. Took into consideration the fact that the father of the appellant died in his boots while serving the Police Department. It also cannot be denied that the learned D.I.-G.
Had himself found that the lapses attributed to him have been mostly explained but of course there were certain facts with regard to delays in writing case diaries and finalization of investigation in some other cases etc. Which according to him were lapses on the part of the appellant. With all this material on the record by the author of the judgment, the question would remain whether the .Quantum of punishment so visited upon the appellant was justified or not. I have anxiously considered this point in my mind over and over again and I am of the considered opinion that a person with uncontroversial integrity in the Police Department, with a family background of act of valiance of his father, should have been visited with lesser penalty. Allah Almighty has got hundreds of tributes of His qualities but the paramount qualities of Almighty Allah are 'Raheem 'Kareem' and 'fogiving' and if I would have found the appellant of .Doubtful integrity, I would have told him that he should thank his star that he is still in service but once I have satisfied myself about his honest dealing in service I honestly feel that he deserves much lesser penalty than with what he has been visited. As it is within my competency to substitute myself in place of the departmental authority and also can vary and modify the sentence of a civil servant, therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the appellant deserves better treatment at the hands of his superiors.
8. In view of the settled law in this respect and the analysis of the case, as given by me above, I vary the punishment by restoring him to the rank of S.-I. But with censure and stoppage of two annual increments without cumulative effect. Resultantly the impugned orders, dated 8-12-1979 as well as 31-1-1980, are set aside and appeal is accepted to the extent so given above. There will be no order as to costs.