' This is an appeal preferred against the decision dated 14th May, 1984, recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur, dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant for his re-instatement in service.
2. The appellant was recruited as a Technician on 17th January, 1983 on three months probation. His services were terminated vide order dated 16th April, 1983 although the said order was conveyed to him on 21st April, 1983. He is alleged to have worked on 17th April, 1983 and proceeded on sick leave thereafter.
3. The case of the appellant is that the order of termination was signed after the expiry of the period of probation and was anti-dated as 16th April, 1983 and thus he had on 17th April, 1983 become permanent on completing probationary period which ended on 16th April, 1983. The authority of the Resident Manager who signed the order of termination has been challenged as the appointing authority was the Personnel Manager, Rawalpindi. The case of the respondent is that approval of the Personnel Manager, Rawalpindi was obtained on 14th April, 1983 on telephone and on receipt of letter of approval Exh. R-7, letter of termination Exh. R-6 was issued on 16th April, 1983.
4. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the letter Exh. R-7 dated 14th April, 1983 could not have been received in the Mills on 16th April, 1983 and that it was prepared afterwards. He also says that the plea that on 14th April, 1983 oral approval to terminate the services of the appellant was obtained on telephone is untrue. He also argues that it stands proved that the appellant worked on 17th April, 1983 and since the order of termination of services was delivered after the expiry of the period of probation, the appellant stood confirmed on 17th April, 1983 and thus the order of termination is void. He also contends that there was no written report against the appellant about his performance and that this is wrong that his performance was not up to the mark. The other point raised is that the termination order violates the provisions of Standing Order 12 (3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 for not containing explicit reasons.
Lastly it is argued that since the reason was that the performance was not satisfactory, it amounted to misconduct, so according to Standing Order 12(5), following of procedure given Standing Order 15 (4) was necessary. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant admitted in cross-examination that no one bad enmity or difference with him. The learned counsel infers from this that there was no mala fide on the part of the respondents in terminating the services of the appellant. For the same reason it is submitted that the order of termination Exh. R-6 or the letter of approval Exh. R-7 were not anti-dated. This is noteworthy that no earlier report about the working of the appellant was made. If it had been in existence, it would have been brought on the record. The learned trial Judge should have been on his guard before framing a final opinion whether letter Exh. R-6 and the endorsement Exh. R-6/3 were actually made on 14th April, 1983. Exhs. R-6/1 and R-6/2 too carry the date as 14th April, 1983.
The evidence is that reports are not made about the performance of workers and at the end of the probationary period assessm ent is made. It is said that a meeting was held on 14th April, 1983. If there was necessity of reports Exhs. R-6/1 and R-6/2, they would have been made much earlier and not on the date on which meeting was held. No minutes of the meeting of 14th April, 1983 were prepared and produced. Even no proceedings of the said meeting were brought on the record to show that actually a meeting was held. Since the appellant was challenging the genuineness of the termination order, the case should have been documented. For calling the meeting, notices would have been issued to the members who attended. The notices would have been entered in the despatch register. The record of the meeting must have been prepared and maintained but nothing was brought on the record. The learned lower Court did not touch the evidence of P. W. 2, who said that the appellant worked on 17th April, 1983 from 7-30 a. m. To 4-15 p. m. It was not suggested that he had friendship with the appellant or he was deadly against the Management.
Only this was suggested that he had given statement under any influence. Influence, if any, was not disclosed, nor its particulars were suggested. Such a vague suggestion was not sufficient to discredit the witness. The learned lower Court has not said that P. W. 2 is a false witness. If the appellant, as stated by P. W. 2, did work the whole day on 17th April, 1983, it could not be said that he was pot traceable and in late hours refused to accept the letter of termination.
' If on 17th April, 1983 any letter of termination had been in existence and offered to the appellant, P.
W. 2 could not be ignorant about it because any such letter could be offered to the appellant through the said witness. This is not the case of the respondent that the letter of termination was offered to the appellant in the presence of P. W. 2 nor any such question was put to him. To falsify the statement of the witness the despatch register in which the letter of termination must have been entered should have been produced. The despatch register in which letter Exh. R-7 must have been entered at Head Office, Rawalpindi and the receipt register of the Mills in which the said letter may have mentioned, were very important documents to show that the proceedings of 14th April,.
1983 were genuine. If no employee of the respondent such as P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 had supported the appellant, the above-mentioned registers and record may not have been considered necessary for the just decision of the case. The envelop Exh. P. 7/1 in which Exh. P. 6 was sent shows that the letter of termination was despatched to the appellant on 19th April, 1983 because the seal of the Post Office of the Mills carries the said date (19th April, 1983). In the absence of receipt and despatch registers referred to the above, it is doubtful if in reality Exh. R-6 was passed on 16th April, 1983. In the absence of despatch register of Head Office, Rawalpindi and receipt register of the Mills, it is doubtful to say that the approval was in reality despatched from Rawalpindi on 14th April, 1983 and that it reached the Mills at Goth Machhi on 16th April, 1983. If this is not proved that before 17th April, 1983 the appellant was decided not to be confirmed, he stood confirmed on 17th April, 1983.
The case, therefore, needs further enquiry in order to give opportunity to both the parties to produce relevant documentary evidence.
5. As a result, the appeal is accepted and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned trial Judge, the case is remanded for redecision in the light of the observations made above after giving proper opportunity to the respondent to produce documentary evidence and any other evidence of its choice. The appellant also shall have a right to produce evidence of his choice.
' As the case has been remanded the other points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant have not been answered, may be raised before the learned lower Court. . Case remanded.