' A.O. RAZIUR REHMAN (MEMBER).-- The appellant was appointed as Lower Division Clerk, at Mirpur Khas by the Executive Engineer(E), WAPDA Operation Division, Mirpur Khas, on 10-11-1980. On 11-4- 1981, a trap case was started against the appellant and he was arrested. Simultaneously, he was suspended and transferred to Tando Allahyar. After some time, i,e, on 2-9-1981, he was charge- sheeted by the Executive Engineer(E), Mirpur Khas, for the alleged offence of demanding, from a consumer, on 11-4-1981, illegal gratification to the tune of Rs,1,200 for reducing the amount of electricity bill from Rs, 2,664.97 to Rs,264.96 and for accepting of Rs,400 as part payment of the bribe money. The appellant replied to this charge-sheet on 17th September, 1981. But, no action seems to have been taken on this reply and nothing happened until 27-7-1982, when an order was passed on 27/31-7-1982, which was received by him on 5-8-1982, removing the appellant from service, under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. Against this order, he came in appeal before us on 4-9-1982. The appeal having been admitted for hearing, by an order, dated 22-1-1983, it was finally heard on 30-4-1984 and is being disposed of by this order.
2. The appellant's contention, as discussed in his Memo. Of appeal is that he was falsely implicated in the trap case which has not yet been processed and still continues to be pending, although it was registered as far back as 11-4-1981, and that, on the basis of the same case, he was charge- sheeted and the charge-sheet also has no been processed further and action taken against him under the Efficient and Discipline Rules, which shows that he was innocent and no case could be made out against him. Instead of this, action was taken again him under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, removing him fro service, without assigning any reason. He contends that this is not case of termination simpliciter, but removal from service on the ground of misconduct, which had been alleged but not proved. It is further contended that, having decided to proceed against the appellant under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, the Authority could not change over to section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act and punish him without assigning any reason.
3. As against the above, the stand of the respondent is that action under section 17(1-A) is not connected with the charge-sheet issued to the employee earlier but is an action taken independently, in consideration of the general bad reputation of the appellant at a very early stage of his service career, when he had put in only 5 months of service, and was still on probation and could have been removed from service, even without resort to section 17(1-A), as laid down at Serial 5 of the terms and conditions of his appointment.
4. We have heard the parties at length and perused the documents on record. We have carefully examined the matter, both on grounds of merits and lap.
5. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant had come before us without exhausting his departmental remedy. It was also pointed out by him that, to cover up this lacuna, the appellant had made an unsigned and undated representation, which was received in the Head Office of WAPDA on 12-9-1982 and, the date of the impugned order being 27-7-1982, the departmental appeal, received on 12-9-1982, was late by approximately 15 days. We do not find any merit whatsoever in this objection raised on behalf of the respondents and must confess that we are amazed that such a point should at all have been raised by a responsible person. There is no provision for appeal under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act and, therefore, the objection that the departmental remedy has not been exhausted is not only without any basis at all but positively ridiculous and totally frivolous. It appears that neither the legal Adviser of WAPDA nor the learned counsel appearing for the Authority had considered the merit of the objection raised by him before forwarding the case. They would be advised to avoid, in future, objections of this nature, which can only be called vexatious and wasteful of the time and energy of the parties and the Tribunal.
6. So far as the merit of the appeal is concerned, there is no doubt that the appellant has been recovered under section 17(1-A) without assigning any reason. But, as averred by the respondents, in the written objections, and by the learned counsel for the respondent, the order was not passed without reason. As stated by the learned counsel for the respondent, the action taken was the result of the cumulative effect of the complaints made against the appellant. The appellant was first arrested on 11-4-1981, in a trap case, and charge-sheeted on the basis 'of the same. Although the matter was not pursued further departmentally, and the criminal case also does not appear to have made much progress, the fact, nevertheless, remains that, prima fade, a charge against him was on record at the time impugned order was passed. Subsequently also, it appears that, although the appellant had been transferred to Tando Allahyar, after his charge-sheeting, an allegation was made that he had indulged in forgery, by making false entries in documents, thus causing loss to WAPDA and wrongful gain to a consumer. On the basis of this, action was taken by the Executive Engineer, on the advice of the Superintending Engineer, to terminate the services of the appellant. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Authority, who passed the impugned order.
7. Having considered the pros and cons of the matter, we are of the view that, although action under 17(1-A) was taken after the appellant had been trapped, in a bribe-taking case, and later charge-sheeted, and this could not be done by way of resort to action under 17(1-A), the subsequent development, which was brought to the notice of the Authority in another case of criminal nature, involving forgery on the part of the appellant, the action taken under 17(1-A) could be justified on the basis of the reputation earned by the appellant during the short period of his service. The first case against him, which lad to his arrest had occurred only within five months of his appointment. The second incident took place after about one year from the date of this occurrence. Thus, within a period of one year and a half of his appointment, it was clear that the appellant had earned for himself a bad reputation and, according to the guidlines, provided in the instructions to the subordinate offices, entertained in the O.M. On the subject issued by the General Manager (Administration), cases of all employees who had established reputation of being corrupt, or who were reasonably considered to be corrupt, were to be put up for action under section 17(1-A). The appellant's case was one which should have been put up, as the case of an employee who was reasonably considered to be corrupt. If, therefore, the case was actually put up under section 17(1-A), and the Authority decided to terminate his services or to remove him from service under the said section, it cannot be said that the action was taken arbitrarily or without sufficient reason.
8. As observed by the Tribunal in Appeal No, 433(L) of 1982 (Mumtaz Hussain v. Chairman WAPDA), decided on 19th May, 1983, although it is not necessary for the Authority to assign any reason for action taken under 17(1-A) it is necessary that reason should exist for the action taken. In the instant, case we are satisfied as to the existence C of the reason and do not, therefore, find any justification for impugning the said order.
9. In the light of the above, we uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal.
10. No order as to costs.