' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSH1D KHAN, C. J.-In order to fully appreciate the true nature and import of the questions of law and facts raised in these appeals, by leave, moved against the judgments of the High Court recorded on 9-8-1982 (Civil Appeal No, 22 of 1982) and 10-8-1982 (Civil Appeal No, 21 of 1982), let us set out in brief the relevant facts.
2. A co-operative business concern was established with the name of Muzaffarabad District Central Co-operative Store as early as in the year 1949. Late Haji Muhammad Usman, the father of the appellants Muhammad Ashraf and others (in appeal No 21 of 1982) and Abdullah Jan, the father of Mst. Rehana Yasmin and others (in appeal No, 22 of 1982); with some other persons, became partners in the said business concern. The business concern was registered under the Co- operative Societies Act, 1925. The Co-operative Store 'conducted its business from 1949 to 1953 when it decided to join another business concern, namely, Muzaffarabad Timber Trade Corporation (M. T. T. C.) as its partner with an investment of Rs, 50,000. The new business concern was registered on the 21st of November, 1983. Subsequently the Co-operative Store, it appears, was unable to continue its business satisfactorily and the same was wound up in the year 1961.
' In the year 1969, the Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies, namely, Ch. Muhammad Latif, was appointed as a Liquidator under the provisions of Co-operative Societies Act. During the liquidation proceedings, as it appears from pages 3 and 4 of the award, the following persons submitted their claims in approximate terms :-
(1) Ghulam Nabi Butt Mashkoor, Naib-Tehsildar.
(2) Abdul Aziz Vogra,
(3) Aziz Dedi, sister of Fateh Muhammad Vogra.
(4) Abdul Qadir Dhaman (deceased) through widow Farzana Dedi.
(5) Kh. Fateh Muhammad son of Kh. Wali Joo.
(6) Syed Mehram Shah'.
(7) Syed Muhammad Akbar Shah,
(8) Kh. Abdus Samad Ganai,
(9) Muhammad Ismail Ganai.
(10) Kh. Habib Joo Dhaman,
(11) Kh. Fateh Muhammad Dhaman,
(12) Kh. Usman Joo Dhaman,
(13) Haji Wali Joo Chaudhry,
(14) Ch. Shamas
(15) Sardar Shah.
(16) Haji Muhammad Usman.
(17) Abdus Subhan Haji:
(18) Kh. Faqir Joo.
(19) Sale and Supply Co-operative Society, Panjkot.
(20) Munshi Muhammad Usman. {{TABLE}} Some of the members, however, could not file their claims and the Liquidator included them as claimants. The said Liquidator _made his award on 20-10-1970.
3. In all 23 persons were claimants but the liquidator certified the claims of the following twenty persons to the extent indicated against their names : Rs, Widow Aziz Dedi 19,794.19 Samad Joo Ganai 3,964.02 Fateh Joo s/o Ali Joo 12,031.37 Kh. Muhammad Usman Vogra 5,587.19 Abdul Aziz Vogra 11,698.82 Fateh Joo Vogra 8,084.51 Kh. Abdur Rehman 11,983.37 (8)1 Sale and Supply Co-operative Society Panjkot . 2,500.08 Faqir Joo Chikari 1,658.22 Lassa Joo Pandit 1,658.98 Muhammad Ismail Ganai 16,558.12 Syed Mehram Shah 1,593.30 Kh. Ghulam MOhammad Mir 1,655.99 Ch. Shams Din 16,981.37 Muhammad Subhan Haji 16,981.37 Fateh Joo Sheikh 17,053.00 Abdullah Joo Sheikh 33,614.81 Habib Joo Dhaman 17,053.00 Lassa Yoo Mir 21,733.37 Reserve Fund 12,635.86 ' The total amount of the claimants comes to Rs, 2,34,820.94. {{TABLE}}
4. Under the award four persons (partners of the firm) ; namely, Haji Muhammad Usman, Kh.
Abdallan Jan, Ch. Wali Joo and Muhammad Usman Dhaman were made liable to make good the claim of the claimants to the extent that Haji Muhammad Usman was to pay an amount of Rs, 1,75,977.41 while Kh. Abdullah Jan, Ch. Wali Joo and Muhammad Usman Dhaman were to pay Rs, 49,305.01, Rs, 235.50 and Rs, 258.38 respectively. It appears that Ch'. Wali Joo and Muhammad Usman Dhaman felt satisfied with the award as they did not challenge the validity of the award.
However, the award was unsuccessfully challenged by Haji Muhammad Usman and Kh. Abduiiah Jan by way of appeals to the Government (appellate authority) and then by way of two writ petitions before the High Court which were dismissed in limine vide orders dated 9-8-1982 and 10- 8-1982 respectively. Hence these appeals, by leave, to assail the said judgments of the High Court.
5. This is the background out of which the dispute has arisen. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length. Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, the learned counsel for the appellants in Haji Usman's appeal raised the following points of objections :-
(i) that the procedure adopted by the Liquidator was without jurisdiction as it offended the provisions of sections 50 and 50-A of the Co-operative Societies Act of 1925. The recovery of the amount of the claim in the opinion of the learned counsel is being effected by the Liquidator without the sanction of the Registrar which offends the provisions of section 50 of the Co-operative Societies Act ;
(ii) that the facts of the present case show that it is a case of arbitration as stipulated under section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act and not that of liquidation under section 50-A of the Co-operative Societies Act. It was a dispute, in his view, of settlement of account simplicitor between the Store and M. T. T. C. And as such the appointment of Liquidator was uncalled for ;
(iii) that the Liquidator has travelled beyond his authority in sending the report to the Registrar as it is. Not covered under any of the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. The powers of Liquidator, the learned counsel maintained, are enumerated under section 50 of the Arbitration Act and no provision under this section empowers the Liquidator to send the report to the Registrar ;
(iv) that the Liquidator without the prior sanction of the Registrar was not competent to have liquidation proceedings as stipulated under section 50 of the Co-operative Societies Act ;
(v) 'that even if we assume, for the sake of arguments, that the Liquidator was competent to send the report to the Registrar, he could not confirm or give approval to his own report (which was made by him earlier as a Liquidator on the Certificates of Deputy Registrar) as no one can be a Judge in his own cause ;
(vi) that the Liquidator had no powers to order the payment. It was only the Registrar who was competent to do so under section 50-A of the Co-operative Societies Act and that too after the examination of conduct of the parties';
(vii) that the claim was time-barred as the store was wound up in 1961 and Liquidator was appointed only during the year 1969 ; and
(viii) that the winding up. Of the store was improper.
6. Raja Muhammad Hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection that the appeals before this Court and the writ petitions before the High Court were incompetent because all the necessary parties (claimants) in both the petitions have not been impleaded either before the High Court or in the appeals before this Court as respondents. . On this short ground the appeals, without adverting to the merits of the objections raised by Mr. Saraf, in the estimation of the learned counsel, become incompetent and entail dismissal. Elaborating the point he submitted that claims of twenty persons have been verified by the Liquidator vide his award dated 20-10-1970 and all of them are necessary parties but out of them only-eleven have been impleaded in Haji Usman's case and seven-in case of Rehana Yasmin in both the Courts, i. e., High Court and Supreme Court. In his view writs were untenable as no effective writ could be issued in both the cases in the absence of necessary parties. In support. Of his view point he has referred as to Rawalpindi Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi v. The Government of Pakistan and others (1), Teoomal v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Sanghar and another (2). In Rawalpindi Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi v. The Government of Pakistan and others it has been observed :- "Mr. Zainul Abedin has made an oral prayer at the Bar for permission to implead the transferees as respondents. This prayer, however, cannot oe allowed in view of the circumstances of the case, namely, that the fact of the transfer of these properties was clearly within the knowledge of the Trust, having been clearly .Mentioned in the final refusal of the Central Government which is impugned in the present proceedings. Even details of the value of the properties transferred under the Settlement Law were indicated and the nature of the buildings standing on the area was fully described. The Trust was, therefore, all along aware that the area in dispute 'stood transferred to various persons, but no steps were taken to implead those persons as parties in the present proceedings. The writ petition has been pending since 1963 and it is indeed too late in the day to grant permission to bring new parties on the record after the lapse of nearly seven years."
' In Teoomal v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Sanghar and another it has been held : "On a parity of 'reasoning, in view of the fact that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to proceedings under Article 98, it is reasonable to hold that the authority whose order is impugned would be a necessary party as such as those derive any benefit under the orders....
Clearly, therefore, the authority whose action is impugned would be required to be served with notice and the writ can issue only against such party."
7. In the written arguments filed by Raja Muhammad Hanif in case Muhammad Ashraf v. Azad Government', apart from the above criticism another objection is raised that respondents Nos. 7, 9, 14 and 16 are dead and the appellant, Haji Muhammad Usman (deceased) had not impleaded all their legal representatives in this Court or in the High Court which fact also entails dismissal of this appeal. Kh. Samad Joo, Gannie, deceased, according to Raja" Muhammad Hanif, left the following legal representatives :-
(1) Muhammad Rafique,
(2) Manzoor Ahmed,
(3) Shabir Ahmed, sons.
(4) Aziza Bi,
(5) Taj Bibi.
(6) Shamim Akhtar, daughters,
(7) Zaibunisa, widow.
(1) PLD 1970 Lah. 760 (2) PLD 1981 Kar. 349 ' But out of them only one, namely, Muhammad Rafique has been impleaded in this Court as a party. Similarly, respondent Kh. Habib Joo Dhaman, according to the learned counsel, has left the following heirs :-
(1) Fateh Muhammad,
(2) Ghulam Rasool, sons, and
(3) Mst. Aisha Begum widow.
' But out of them only one, namely, Ghulam Rasool is impleaded as a party. Likewise Kh.
Muhammad Subhan Haji is dead but his legal representatives, namely,
1. Mabboobur Rehman, 2.
Tariq Iqbal, sons,
3. Jamila Bibi,
4. Azima Bibi,
5. Robina, daughters, have not been impleaded as respondents. The learned counsel further maintained that Kh. Fateh Joo is dead but he is impleaded as respondent and his legal representatives, namely,
1. Abdullah Joo Sheikh,
2. Abdur Rehman sons, and 3. Khanem Bibi, daughter, have not been impleaded as respondents. In his view the omission of the appellant not to implead all the legal representatives of the persons referred to above and impleading the dead man is sufficient to reject the appeal as being incompetent.
8. On merits, he argued that as the points now argued, except point Nos. (ii), (v), and (viii), by Mr. Saraf in support of the appeal have neither been raised nor argued before the High Court, they cannot now legally be taken into consideration. Reference was made to Ghulam Muhammad and, another v. Muhammad Ashraf and another (1) and Mst. Saleema Begum and others v. Aulad All Shah and others (2).
9. The basic question, without adverting to other objections, that we are called upon to answer is as to whether all the claimants in both the matters were necessary parties before the High Court and if the answer is in affirmative whether without impleading them the writ petitions could proceed. It would also require consideration as to whether omission in Haji Usman's case to implead all the legal heirs of the deceased claimants, referred to above, and impleading a dead claimant, namely, Kh. Fateh Joo, as a party is fatal to the case. It may be observed that the respondents had made the appellants conscious of their omission as early as 2i years, on 7-11-1982, that the appellants have not impleaded all the necessary parties. But despite this the appellants kept mum and slept over the matter and cared not to take any step to rectify the illegality, if possible; in this Court. Here it needs to be stated that the appellants' counsel in Haji Usman's case did not controvert that all the parties were not impleaded and all, the heirs of the deceased claimants have not been impleaded. All that is being submitted on the point is that they are not necessary parties and the deceased, even by impleading one of their heirs are duly represented. In alternate it is submitted that if the omitted parties or all the heirs of the deceased are considered necessary parties the Court may in exercise of its inherent powers, implead them as such. So far non-impleading of all the legal representatives of the deceased claimants is concerned, the learned counsel has, however, nothing substantial to argue.
10. It has been argued by Mr. Saraf and later on by Kh. Shahad Ahmed that if the parties omitted are deemed necessary parties, equity demands that they may be now impleaded as such by the Court. We regret we cannot agree with them. It is settled principle of law that the necessary parties should be impleaded, by the person seeking the redress within the A period of limitation and such parties cannot he brought on the record
(1) PLD 1981 SC (A J & K) 118 (2) PLD 1981 SC (A J & K) 128 after the expiry of such period specially so when party seeking implement is guilty of negligence.
However, where a party is remotely interested in the fate of the petition and as such is only a proper party, its non implement would not be fatal to the proceedings. This View prevailed in Atiar Rahman v. M. A. Bari and others (1). Likewise, it d9es not require any deep argument that if all the heirs of the deceased party are not impleaded it would be said that such a party has not been properly repre-4 scented and the party who omits to cannot escape the legal con-1 sequences.
Besides, a claim against a dead person surely cannot be entertained. So far as equity is concerned, we have not to see the equity' only in favour of one party but we are expected to safeguard the interests of other party too. It may be that the appellants may suffer because of the dismissal of these appeals on this ground but on the other hand we c cannot implead them now because the persons in whom a right had come to reside and who have been left out would be dragged to this Court after a number of years for no fault on their part. This view prevailed in Muhammad Ibrahim v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and 'another (2). In that case it was held that the Court is bound to be equitable] With both the parties. It may be stated here that the \ provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the proceedings under section 42 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim ConstlitiiticnAa,.1974, and the persons adversely affected by the quashing -of an order in a proceeding under section 42 of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, are necessary parties and E no, effective order for quashment can be made, for, that would not bind the persons, who have been benefited by the impugned order, as it is well-settled principle that in such circumstances a Court will not making ineffective order or an order which can be flouted in a proceeding under section 42 of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974. So was held in 'Hussain Bakhsh v.
Settlement Commissioner (3) This view was also owned in 'Abdul Ghani v. Settlement Commissioner' (4).
11. On a parity of reasoning, in view of the 'fact that the provisions of the Code of Civil Produre are applicable to the proceedings under section 42 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, it is reasonable to hold that all Orties who derive any benefit of the orders are necessary parties. We are, accordingly, of the view that the omitted parties were necessary. Parties and in their absence or without notice to them, no order or direction could be issued to them.
12. In these circumstances, in the present case, the High Court could not issue an effective writ in favour of the appellant in both the cases, as all the claimants were not before it in the writ petitions.
Apart from the above, the High Court could not effectively adjudicate upon the matter when; all the legal heirs of the dead claimants have not been impleaded. Likewise,; the inclusion of dead person as non-petitioner was also fatal to the writ petitions.
13. Of course the provisions as contained in Order XLI, Code of Civil. Procedure allow that where it appears to the Court at the hearing that any party who was a party to the cause in the Court, from whose judgment or decree appeal is preferred and who has not been made a parity to the appeal,, the Court is competent to implead such a person in the appeal provided of course he is interested in the result of a e appeal. In that case
(1) PLD 1968 Dacca 17 (2) PLD 1966 (W. P.) Lah 396
(3) PLD 1970 SC 1 (4) 1971 SCMR 98 the Court may adjourn the hearing to a future date to be fixed by the Court and direct that such a person be made the respondent. But this proposition does not apply here because the persons omitted to be impleaded here were not even impleaded as a party in the High Court. However, in the situation referred to above, the question would still arise as to whether all the legal representatives of the deceased persons or other persons who are left out would be considered as interested party after limitation has run out against them. Our view is that they cannot be so considered as valuable right has accrued to them-and naturally they cannot be said .To have any interest in the appeal. Some more case-law on the point. In `Leguduva S. Krishnasrtami lyer v.
Sankarappa Naidu' (1) it was held that a person against whom an appeal has abaltd is not a party interested in the result of the appeal within the meaning of Order XLI, rule 20 and the Court has no jurisdiction to add him as a party to the appeal. It was also held that the provision as contained in Order XLI, rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure, was not intended to override the provisions of Order XXII.
The right obtained by a respondent when appeal abates against him is a valuable right and should ordinarily be respected. The facts of that case were that the petitioner before the High Court was a joint decree-holder in a suit while the respondent was the judgment-debtor. Against an order passed in execution on 21st of October, 1932, the judgment-debtor, i. e., the respondent before the High Court, filed an appeal within time wherein he omitted to implead the petitioner, i. e., one of the decree-boulders, as respondent. The respondent, thereafter, made an application before the Court for permission to add the name of the petitioner as respondent. The application was granted by the lower Courts but the order passed in this behalf was reversed by the High Court, as mentioned above.
14. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in `Labhu Ram and others v. Ram Partap and others' (2) found that when once time for an appeal -has run out, it is not possible for an appellant subsequently to implead those defendants who were not originally impleaded as respondents in the appeal. The Full Bench has also gone to the extent of balding that an order for impleading a patty against whom limitation has run out cannot be made even under Order I, rule 10 or under section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, by the appellate Court. It was further held that since specific provision regulating the procedure in cases where a party had been omitted from being impleaded in appeal Was available, the provisions like one contained in section 151, being residuary in character, cannot be availed of for such purposes, The facts of that case v Jere that a suit for perpetual injunction in respect of a drinking well, which was claimed to be joint, was filed by Ram Partap and nineteen other persons against Labhu Ram and his descendants. The learned trial Court decreed the suit in the terms mentioned in the judgment on 14-1-1939. Boat the parties, the plaintiff as well as the defendants. Filed appeals against the said judgment and decree. At the time of the hearing of the appeals, preliminary objection was raised on behalf of Ram Partap and others that appeal of Lablm Ram and others could not proceed as Krishen Kunor and Inder Kumar, two necessary parties had not been impleaded therein as respondents, because the decree had been passed jointly in their favour along with other plaintiffs which had become final. Consequently an application under Order XLI, rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure, was made on behalf of Labhu Ram and others along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act
(1) AIR 1935 Mad. 175 (2) AIR 1944 Lab. 76 seeking the rectification of the mistake by adding the said two persons as respondents in the appeal. The learned District Judge, after hearing the arguments, dismissed the appeal. Of Ram Partap and others being incompetent having been improperly constituted. It was contended before the Full Bench that even if the two persons, referred to above, were necessary parties and omitted from being impleaded as such in the appeal, the mistake could be rectified by the District Judge under Order XL1, rule 20 or under Order I, rule 10 read with section 107 or at any rate under section 151, Code of Civil Procedure that the delay in making the application could be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act ; that in any circumstances the appeal of Labhu Ram and others having been filed after the presentation of the appeal of Ram Partap and others could be treated as cross-objections under Order XLI, rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure ; and that even otherwise the District Court could of its own accord grant the relief prayed for by Labhu Ram and others under Order XLI, rule 33, Code of Civil Procedure. All the aforesaid contentions, except for treating the appeal of Labhu Ram and others as cross-objections raised before the 1-ull Bench, were repelled. It was held that none of the provisions as referred to above were attracted to the facts of the case to be availed of by Labhu Ram and others and the party against whom time bad run out could not be impleaded as respondent in the appeal. Since the appeal preferred by Labhu Ram and others before the District Judge was treated as cross-objections having been filed under Order XLI, rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, the case was remanded to the District Judge for its decision as such in accordance with law.. On this point we have also Tazi Mehar Din v. Mst. Murad Begum and others' (1). In that case it has been observed :- "A defendant against whom the right of appeal had become barred was not a person interested within the meaning of 0. XLI, r. 20, Civil Procedure Code.
' The plaintiff-appellant was guilty of extreme negligence and on account of this negligence had allowed the limitation to expire against the defendant sought to be added as a respondent in the appeal and consequently had created a position for him to say that he has no interest in the result of the appeal and as such his case is taken out of the ambit of Order XLI, rule 20 ; the special provision under which he could be brought on the record as a respondent.
' An appellate Court has no power to add as a respondent a person who was a party to the suit and against whom the appeal is barred. Section 151, Civil Procedure Code would not: enable the same Court to make the addition although prohibited otherwise. Section 151, Civil Procedure Code too cannot be invoked in such cases.
' It is a residuary section and not an overriding provision of law. In other words, it comes into play only where no specific provision is made to meet an exigency that arises and cannot be relied upon to enable a Court to disregard a clear provision of law and to perform an act which may otherwise be illegal."
' Similar view was taken in 'Allah Dad and others v. Nawab and others' (2) wherein it was held that the provisions as contained in Order XLI, rules 4 and 33 are enabling provisions and the Court cannot exercise its powers under the said provisions in favour of those persons or against them when they were not made parties to the appeals. In order to exercise the powers
(1) PLD 1951 B J 1 (2) PLD 1960 Lab. 277 contained in the said two rules of Order XLI, all persons affected by the order must be before the Court. It was observed that it would be totally wrong to hold that an appellate Court can proceed to hear the case if all the necessary parties are not before it. Besides, where any one of the appellants or the respondents dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record, all persons interested in the result of the appeal being not before the Court, the appellate Court cannot proceed to exercise powers vested in it by Order XLI, rules 3 and 33. It was further held that the said provisions did not nullify the provisions of Order XXII, rules 3 and 4 and would not indirectly prevent an appeal from being abated. In that case during the course of appeal pending in the High Court, Allah Dad from the appellants' side died on 21st of June, 1959, and Nur Hussain from the respondents' side also died about 2i years before the appeal was heard. No application for bringing their legal representatives on record was made within time and consequently the appeal stood abated under the relevant provisions of Jaw. No application was also made till the hearing of the appeal for setting aside the abatement order under Order XXII, rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure.
The said contention was repelled and it was held that the said provisions did not nullify the provisions of Order XXII and could not be invoked in case of an incompetent appeal.
15. The same view was taken in Qasim Khan and another v. Mst. Malkai and others (1). In that case Qasim Khan plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge Peshawar for partition of property against Mst. Malkai and others.', The suit was decreed on 8th of April, 1957, but the judgment and decree was reversed by the learned Additional District Judge, Peshawar, on 26th of October, 1959 on the appeal of Mohib Ali one of the defendants in the trial Court. Qasim Ali the plaintiff later on filed second appeal in the High Court but he omitted to implead Mohib Ali on whose appeal the case had been decided against the plaintiff. He, therefore, filed an application before the High Court on 24th of October, 1962, for impleading Mohib Ali as respondent in the appeal against whom limitation had run out. It' 4as argued before a Division Bench of the High Court that the provision as contained in Order XLI, rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure, conferred sufficient and wide powers upon the Court to order a person to be made a party to an appeal if he was interested in the result thereof and since Mohib Ali according to the learned counsel was interested in the result of the appeal, the Court was competent to order for his being impleaded as party. The High Court while relying upon `Labhu Rdm and others v. Ram Partap and others' and V. P. R. V. Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache and, others (2) held that since period of limitation had expired so far as Mohib Ali was concerned, he could not be considered to be interested in the result of the appeal and as rule 20 of Order XLI, empowered the Court to implead only an 'interested party', a party against whom period of limitation had run out could not be impleaded as such in the appeal. The application as such was dismissed and since the appeal was incompetent on account of absence of necessary party, the same was also dismissed.
16. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Jamil v. The Chairman, Industrial Court, West Pakistan and another (3) affirmed the view as taken in Qasim Khan and another y. Mst. Malkai.
(1) PLD 1963 Pesh. 58 (2) AIR 1927 P C 252
(3) PLD 1964 SC 559 ' The facts of the case were that the award was given on the 27th March, 1962, and it was published in the Gazette on 7th of April, 1962, the employer was not impleaded as a party. The appellant later on filed a petition on 19th of February, 1963, for adding the employer as respondent, after the Court, on 13th February, 1963, had inquired suo motu why the employer had not been added as a party.
His addition as party was permitted subject to all just exceptions. It was held by the Supreme Court that since the employer had acquired a valuable right, it should not be taken away from him in the circumstances of the case. The Court, of course, had power in a proper case under Order XLI, rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure, to allow a necessary party to be added as a respondent but such power being discretionary should not be exercised in case of extreme neglect. The case reported as V. P. R. V. Chocklaingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache was referred to in this respect.
17. In the present case, as discussed above, the appellants (in Haji Usman's ca e) or their predecessors-in-interest are guilty of extreme negligence in not impleading the legal repesentatives of Kh. Samad Joo Ghannie, Kh. Habib Joo Dhaman, Kh. Muhammad Subhan Haji and Kh. Fateh Joo as respondents within time. They are also guilty of impleading a dead claimant, namely, Kh. Fateh Joo, as respondent. The principle as laid down in Muhammad Jamil v. The Chairman, Industrial Court, West Pakistan and another being fully attracted to the facts of the present case, the appellants cannot press into service the provision contained in Order XLI, rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure. Similarly, in a case where limitation has run out against a particular party, which has not been impleaded as such in appeal, the same being no more interested in the result thereof, cannot be impleaded under rule 20 of Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure.
18. Respectfully agreeing with the view taken in the authorities, as referred to above, the appeals under the said provisions of Order XLI, rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure, are hereby rejected because the High Court could not issue an effective writ even if it were satisfied about the genuineness of the case on the whole. It was joint liability of the four persons to make payment to all the claimants and if any one of the claimants is left out, no order adversely affecting his interest can be passed behind his back as the finding in his favour has attained finality.
' For the foregoing reasons we see no force in these appeals which stand rejected with costs without adverting to the merits of other objections raised.