1. ' Appellant Muhammad Ashfaq is a tenant in shop No. K-1-A/3-A at Okhai Memon Co-operative Housing Society, Lyari Quarters, Karachi, belonging to the respondent Suleman, at the rent of Rs.40 p.m., since 1968. The respondent retired from service as a Lecturer in the University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, in December, 1980, on attaining the age of 60 years. On his retirement, he called upon the appellant to hand over to him vacant possession of the Rent shop within two months for his own use. The appellant did not vacate the premises. The notice was given to the appellant somewhere in the month of May 1981. The respondent filed ejectment application No. 3953/81 under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises, Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), on 12-9-1981. The appellant resisted the application. He contended that no notice for vacating the premises was served upon him. He also contended that the respondent/landlord did not need the rented premises for his own use. Both the parties filed their own affidavits in evidence. The learned Controller/Senior Civil Judge XIII, Karachi, passed order of ejectment on 29- 7-1984. The appellant has preferred this appeal against the order of ejectment.
2. ' The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that notice under section 14 of the Ordinance was not served on the appellant before filing of the ejectment application and therefore the ejectment application could not be maintained. He has further urged that the respondent owns other shops and is in possession of at least one of those shops and he does not bona fidely require the rented shop for his own use. He has made reference to certain parts of the affidavits filed by the parties in evidence and placed reliance on the cases reported in 1983 CLC 468; PLD 1983 Kar. 445 and 1982 CLC 1444. He has next urged that the appellant has filed an extract of P.T.I. pertaining to the building where the rented shop is situated and it may be considered as additional evidence. He has cited 1984 CLC 110 as the supporting authority.
3. ' On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that notice under section 14 of the Ordinance was served on the appellant by registered post and the postal receipt and the acknowledgment receipt thereof were produced in evidence. He has further contended that the respondent is not in occupation of any other shop and he needs the shop in occupation of the appellant for his own use. He too has made reference to certain parts of the pleadings and the affidavits of the parties. He has placed reliance on the cases reported in 1983 CLC 1274; PLD 1983 Kar. 445; 1983 CLC 2274; 1983 CLC 349 and ,PLD 1983 Kar.
4. 514.
5. ' The question of ejectment in this case rests purely on the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance, which provides for summary ejectment of a tenant if the conditions laid down thereunder are fulfilled. It provides immediate relief to a landlord who is a widow or a minor whose both parents are dead, or a salaried employee due to retire within next six months or has retired, or a person who is due to attain the age of 60 years within the next six months or has attained the age of 60 years, to ask for possession of the rented premises if required for his personal use by giving notice to the tenant to deliver to him vacant possession of the rented premises within specified time which should not be earlier than two months from the receipt of the notice. In the instant case, it is not denied that the respondent comes within the category of the persons who can seek immediate relief of getting rented premises vacated under the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance. But the dispute is about the service of the notice for delivering vacant possession and requirement of the respondent to have the rented shop vacated for his personal use. The respondent did state in the ejectment application that he had given requisite notice to the appellant for vacating rented shop and reiterated that fact in his affidavit and filed a copy of the notice, a postal receipt of its despatch to the appellant and the acknowledgment receipt. The appellant made denial of the service of the notice in the written statement as well as in his affidavit and disowned the signature on the acknowledgment receipt. The learned Controller held that the notice despatched in the name of the appellant on the address of the rented premises by registered post is presumed to have been delivered to the addressee i.e. the appellant. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a case reported in 1983 CLC 2274. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the appellant made specific denial of the service of the notice and he disowned the signature on the acknowledgment receipt and therefore mere filing of the postal receipt and the acknowledgment receipt did not prove the service of the notice. He distinguished the case reported in 1983 CLC 2274 by arguing that there was evidence in that case of the postman that he had delivered the notice to the addressee but no such evidence was led in this case. Of course, there lies the distinction between the facts of that case and this case as pointed out by the learned Counsel, but the evidence of the respondent that he had despatched that requisite notice to the appellant by registered post A.D. stands corroborated by the evidence of the postal receipt and the acknowledgment receipt and it can be presumed that the communication had reached the addressee in normal course and there is no evidence in rebuttal except bare denial by the appellant. Accordingly, the learned Controller rightly inferred that the notice despatched to the appellant by registered A.D. must have reached him in ordinary course.
6. ' It may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the respondent, while arguing the question of service of notice under section 14 of the Ordinance on the tenant, has contended that it is not necessary that the service of the notice must precede the filing of the application for ejectment and non-compliance of service of notice would not defeat the application in a case where order for ejectment is passed after two months of the filing of the ejectment application and he has placed reliance on a case S. Riazul Hassan v. Zamirul Hach reported in 1983 CLC 2274, wherein reliance was placed on a case Wali Muhammad v. Hamida PLD 1981 Kar. 794 and also on a case Mir Mustafa All Khan v. Mst. Safia Maqsood 1983 CLC 349. With utmost respect, I do not subscribe to that view. It is provided under subsection (1)of section 14 that a person entitled to invoke the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance has to give notice to the tenant in writing informing him that he or she needs the rented premises for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the, premises within specified time which shall not be less than two months from the receipt thereof. The cause of action for filing ejectment application accrues to the landlord if the tenant fails to deliver possession of the rented premises within the period specified in the notice as provided in subsection(3)of section 14 of the Ordinance. In my opinion, the requirement of notice has to be fulfilled before the landlord files the ejectment application under section 14 of the Ordinance.
7. ' As regards the personal requirement of the respondent for getting the premises vacated, he has stated that on his retirement he wants to do business and he has no other shop in his occupation for doing business there. The contention of the appellant that the respondent owns other shops in the same building and one of the shops there is actually in occupation of his son does not disentitle the respondent from getting possession of the rented shop for doing business there himself. The embargo on the landlord to his entitlement for getting rented premises vacated contained in subsection (2) of section 14 of Ordinance would operate only if the landlord himself is in occupation of a premises owned by him in any locality and not by his children. The cases referred to by the learned Counsel had distinguishing features. In the case reported in Syed Isr.ar Alam v. S.M. Hussain 1983 CLC 468, it was held that a landlord's need for getting rented premises vacated under the provisions of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is subject to judicial scrutiny in order to find whether it is genuine. In the instant case, the respondent has brought out that he genuinely needs the rented shop for doing business there after his retirement and his statement of oath stands unshaken. In the case reported in Mst. Hajra Bai v. Mst. Aisha Bai 1982 CLC 1444, it was held that a landlord has to establish his personal requirement for seeking ejectment of the tenant on that ground. This case was examined in the light of the provisions of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 relating to ejectment of a tenant on the ground of bona fide personal requirement of the landlord. The provisions of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 are analogous to the provisions of section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and not to the provisions of section 14 of the latter Ordinance whereunder the instant case has been filed. In this context, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a case of Muzafer. Ali v. Toqeer Alam Ashhar and others reported in PLD 1983 Kar. 445 wherein it was held that a landlord fulfilling conditions of section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is entitled to have resort to remedy provided therein subject to limitations imposed by the proviso. In this case, the respondent does fulfil conditions of section 14(1) of the said Ordinance and there are no allegations that his case is covered by the proviso to the said section. It would thus appear that the respondent's case that he needs the rented shop for his own use is sustainable and the findings of the learned Controller does not call for interference.
8. Appeal rejected.