' By this petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 the petitioner seeks the quashment of the judgment and decree dated 15-7-1976 passed by respondent No.1, the Vlth Additional District Judge, Karachi in Family Appeal No.94 of 1976, declaring the same to be of no legal effect and restoration of the judgment and decree dated 8-3-1976 passed by respondent No.2, the XVIII Civil Judge and Family Court, Karachi in Family Suit No.591 of 1975.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that at Karachi on 12-10-1974 the petitioner was married with respondent No.3 in lieu of prompt dower of Rs.25,000 payable on demand. After few weeks respondent No.3 started beating, assaulting and insulting the petitioner. The differences, however, were patched up through some well-wishers of the family.
Again, after some months the trouble started between the petitioner and respondent No.3, with the result that the petitioner was driven out of the house.
3. On 27-3-1975 the petitioner filed a Family Suit being F.S.No.591 of 1975 in Court of VIII Civil Judge and Family Court for Dissolution of Marriage, Maintenance and Recovery of Prompt Dower of Rs.25,000 which was, however, transferred to XXVIII Court of Civil Judge and Family Court. Respondent No.3 filed his written statement in which he made coutner- allegations against the petitioner. He stated on the contrary that the plaintiff under influence and instigation of her parents made the life of the Defendant miserable, caused mental tortures and ruined reputation, kept him out of job, whereby the Defendant became indebted to his friends, rendering him nearly to starve". With regard to claim for dower he stated that he had promptly paid the dower of Rs.25,000 to the petitioner by cheque dated 22-10-1974 drawn on Habib Bank Limited, Azizabad Branch, Karachi which was encashed by the petitioner on 9-11-1974.
4. After the filing of the suit respondent No.3 divorced the petitioner on 28-3-1975. The divorce was confirmed on 26-7-1975. In view of this development which took place during the pendency of the suit, the petitioner on 3-3-1976, before her evidence was recorded, filed an application before respondent No.2 (XVIII Civil Judge and Family Court, Karachi) stating that in view of the divorce having been confirmed, she abandons her claim for maintenance and the only issue in respect of dower amount remains to be decided by the Court.
Accordingly, the suit proceeded only in respect of the claim for dower. Petitioner and respondent No.3 examined themselves. Respondent No.3 also examined one witness, the manager of the bank.
The learned Family Judge decreed the suit in the sum of Rs.25,000 towards dower by his judgment dated 8-3-1976 against which an appeal was filed in the Court of respondent No.1 who reversed the finding of respondent No.2 and set aside the judgment and decree by his judgment dated 15-7- 1976. The petitioner has now challenged it in this Constitutional Petition.
5. I have heard Mr.Ahmed Said Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Shaikh Aijaz Ahmad, learned counsel for respondent No.3.
6. Mr.Qureshi contended that the learned Additional District Judge has misread the evidence and has failed to consider the other material evidence. In support of the contention that this Court in its constitu tional jurisdiction can upset the finding of fact, he relied on the cases reported as Madan Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bepari and 3 others PLD 1969 SC 617, Miss Nasreen Fatima Awan v. Principal, Bolan Medical College, Quetta and 4 others PLD 1978 Quetta 17 and Muhammad Yahya v. Mishab-ul-Haq and others 1982 SCMR 269.
7. In the first case PLD 1969 SC 617 the Honourable Supreme Court observed as follows:- "The legal position does not admit of any doubt that a concurrent finding of fact reached by the lower Courts will not be disturbed by the High Court in a second appeal even if it disagrees with that finding on its own view of the evidence, although the concurrent finding of the lower Courts may appear to be grossly erroneous, unless, as laid down in subsection (c) of section 100, the error or defect discovered is of a substantial character pertaining to the procedure as provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force which may possibly have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case upon its merits. Interference would also be justified if the decision of the lower Court is found to be contrary to law or some usage having the force of law or has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law. If the finding of fact reached by the first appellate Court is at variance with that of the trial Court, the former will ordinarily prevail, although it would not possess the same value or sanctity as a concurrent finding. Such a finding by the lower appellate Court will be immune from interference in second appeal only if it is found to be substantiated by evidence on the record and is supported by logical reasoning, duly taking note of the reasons adduced by the first Court which have been disfavoured in the contrary finding. The finding being at variance with that of the trial Judge, the two will naturally come in for comparison for their comparative merits in the light of the facts of the case and the reasons on which the two different findings have respectively proceeded. If the finding of the first appellate Court cannot be supported on the evidence on record or if it has failed to take into account a material piece of evidence or if it does not reveal a logical basis for differing from the finding of the trial Court, or is otherwise found to be arbitrary or capricious, it will have to be rejected in second appeal."
8. In the second case PLD 1978 Quetta 17 the relevant portion relied on by the learned counsel is as under:- "The next point that deserves consideration is whether the impugned orders are liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 199 of the Constitution. We are conscious of the legal position that this Court does not normally undertake appraisal of evidence nor does it readily displace findings of fact. A traditional slowness of the High Court to disturb finding of fact has become a succinct rule governing the exercise of powers in these cases.
However, it would be laying too broad a proposition, if it is stated that this Court cannot at all interfere with the decision on facts recorded by administrative tribunals. A wealth of case-law is available on the point. There have been instances when the High Courts have travelled into the realm of facts in exercise of its constitu tional jurisdiction. The High Courts have interfered when findings based on insufficient evidence, misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material evidence, erroneous assumption of facts, patent error of law, consideration of inadmissible evidence, excess or abuse of jurisdiction, arbitrary exercise of power and unreasonable views on evidence has been taken."
9. In the third case 1982 SCMR 269 the relevant portion as relied on by the learned counsel is reproduced below:- "In seeking leave to appeal the learned counsel contended that the High Court could not reassess the material on merits as that was not its function while exercising constitutional jurisdiction. But we see no merit in this contention as in assessing the legality of the orders the High Court has necessarily to examine the conclusions drawn from the material placed before the Settlement authorities. As would appear from the order of the High Court, the conclusions drawn by the Settlement authorites against the respondents were wholly unjustified as they were not borne out from the material on record. Therefore, the conjectural inferences drawn could not in law, suffice to deprive the respondents of their valuable preferential right to get the transfer of the disputed land. It is not a case where there was some evidence to justify the inferences for in that case the High Court would not be justified to interfere. Accordingly, the order of the High Court is unexceptionable."
10. The three decisions, referred to above, as relied on by Mr.Ahmed Said Qureshi, in my humble view, are of not much help to the petitioner as they are distinguishable for one reason or the other.
The observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in PLD 1969 SC 617 were made on appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of East Pakistan Dacca in Civil Appeal from appellate decree wherein the scope of jurisdic tion of the High Court in IInd appeal was considered. The second judgment PLD 1978 Quetta 17 though passed in Constitutional Petition, mainly relates to the power of the High Court to interfere with the decision of facts recorded by Executives. In the third decision 1982 SCMR 269 the ratio decidendi as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the finding of facts of the Special Tribunal seems to be that in a case where there was some evidence to justify inferences drawn by the Special Tribunal, the High Court would not be justified to interfere.
11. As would appear from the facts of this case the learned Additional District Judge whose judgment has been assailed has discussed the evidence produced by the parties and has come to the conclusion as under:- "I have minutely compared the signatures of the respondent on the cheque Exh.D-4 and receipt of the cheque Exh.D-1 with her specimen signatures taken in Urdu and in English, and also her signatures on the plaint, affidavit, special power-of-attorney, application giving the list of L.Rs. and of witnesses and other miscellaneous applications and Vakalatnama signed in favour of different advocates and also the Nikahnama and I find that there is -great resemblance in the signatures and these signatures definitely-tally with each other. Accordingly, I hold that cheque Exh.D-4 and the receipt of the cheque Exh.D-1 bear the signatures of the respondent and the respondent has definitely received the payment of her dower amount."
12. The grievance of Mr.Ahmed Said Qureshi that the learned Additional District Judge has omitted to consider circumstantial evidence is of no avail. In this respect, he referred to the Police Report lodged by respondent No.3 on 17-11-1975. I am afraid, merely the omission to consider this piece of evidence will not render the judgment as without jurisdiction simply because the said report lodged by respondent No.3 with the police against the petitioner does not make a mention of the payment of dower amount. In any case that report was not exhibited in evidence. The High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction is not supposed to act as a Court of Appeal and take upon itself the duty to decide controversial question of fact under writ jurisdiction. Moreover, I find no misreading of evidence on the question of decree by the learned Additional District Judge.
13. Mr.Shaikh Aijaz Ahmad, learned counsel for respondent No.3 in support of his contention that this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction will not interfere the finding of fact, placed his reliance on the cases reported as Leemon v. Mst. Kazbano and 2 others PLD 1982 Kar. 449; Aurangzeb v. Ejazul Hassan Khan and another PLD 1984 Pesh. 49
14. In the first case PLD 1982 Kar. 449 it has been held that the High Court does not act as a Court of facts and cannot take upon itself the duties of Family Court.
15. In the second case PLD 1984 Pesh. 49 reliance was placed on the following observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case reported as Faqir Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Ismail and others PLD 1982 SC 451:- "The question of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199, has come under consideration in a number of cases of this Court and it has been repeatedly held that if a Court or Tribunal set up under the ordinary law has the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect, or is not at which the High Court would have arrived, does not render the decision without jurisdiction."
16. It is well-settled that where a Court or a tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines that question, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. It would, therefore, be wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision as contained in Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 empowers the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong on a point of fact or of law. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction as that of a Court of IInd Appeal which would be against the underlying principles of the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution.
17. For the reasons discussed above I find no force in this petition which is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.