' The facts necessary for adjudication of the question of law, raised in this writ petition are, that Riaz Malik, the first respondent brought an ejectment petition for eviction of the second respondent, namely, Chanan Din, from the house in dispute. The latter contested it and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. This plea prevailed with the learned Rent Controller and he dismissed the ejectment petition. However, the landlord succeeded in appeal, and the second respondent was evicted by the learned Addl. District Judge. He challenged the validity of the ejectment Order by means of Writ Petition No.1086/83 but the parties therein compromised. The second respondent asserted that he accupied only the ground floor and the first floor, was, in possession of his sister, namely, Mst.Gulzar Begum (the present petitioner) on the basis of his own rights. By way of a compromise, he agreed to hand over the possession of the portion said to be in his possession, to the landlord, provided a period of 6 months was allowed to him. This offer was accepted by the first respondent, without prejudice to his right against Mst. Gulzar Begum. The writ petition was dismissed on 12-4-1983.
2. It appears that after the expiry of the time limit of six months, the landlord applied for execution of ejectment order, against the second respondent. The petitioner, who presumably, was, not unaware of the ejectment proceedings, launched against her brother, then appeared on the scene, and moved an objection petition under Order XXI, rules 99 to 103, C.P.C., stating inter alia that the ejectment order was callusive and that she held the house in dispute as sole owner thereof. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the objection, as incompetent. For his this decision, he relied upon Abdul Hamid v. Abdul Waheed etc. 1983 CLC 3075, in which I maintained that after the amendment of section 17 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance by the Punjab Ordinance, IX of 1979 with effect from 12-9-1979, the forum to which the execution of the ejectment orders has Been assigned, not being a civil Court, but merely a special Tribunal the objection petition does not lie.The petitioner then went in appeal but the learned first appellate Court concurred with the decision of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal on 31-7-1983.
3. The orders passed by the authorities below have been called in question through this writ petition.
4. The question falling for determination in this case is, whether the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction to entertain and hear the objections petition. The decision of this question largely depends upon the true interpretation of section 17 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. This section was amended by section 6 of the Punjab Urban Rent. Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1979. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, this amendment is in consequential; the ejectment order is executable by the Rent Controller as a decree of a civil Court and, therefore, all the provisions of Order XXI, C.P.C., relating to issue of warrants, execution thereof, by breaking open the doors and hearing of objections of a person other than the judgment-debtor, not bound by* the ejectment order, are fully attracted. He heavily relied upon Malik Muhammad Shafi V.
Muhammad Saleem PLD 1982 Lah 702 wherein a learned Single Judge has taken the view that wider section n, an ejectment order has to be executed by the Rent Controller as a decree of a civil Court and, therefore, he is deemed to be a 'Court' and the person against whom an ejectment order is passed, a 'judgment-debtor'. In the opinion of the learned Judge, if a person other than the judgment-debtor, claims to be the owner, of the property in dispute, his objections in this behalf, can be adjudicated upon by the Rent Controller. The learned counsel also referred to M/s. Bambino Ltd. v. M/s. Selmor International Ltd. and another PLD 1983 SC 155 to urge, that in executing an ejectment order, the Rent Controller can follow any equitable procedure including the provisions of Order XXI, rules 100 and 101, C.P.C. to investigate the claim of a party, other than the judgment- debtor, dispossessed from the immovable property. It, therefore, was, vehemently argued, that the Rent Controller should have held an inquiry into the question of petitioner's title but he illegally declined to exercise the jurisdiction lawfully vested in him. Likewise, the order of the learned Addl.
District Judge, was, also dubbed as illegal.
5. For discovering the true import of the amendment, section 17, as existing, before and after the amendment, is set out below: Before Amendment: "Every order made under section 10 or section 13, and every order passed on appeal under section 15 shall be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were decree of that Court."
' After Amendment: "Every order made under section 10, section 13, section 13-B and every order passed in appeal under section 15 shall be executed by the Controller as if it were a decree of a civil Court."
' Evidently, the amendment, does not tamper with the mandate given by the unamended section 17, that an ejectment order shall be enforced as a decree of a civil Court. The presumptive character of the ejectment order, in this respect, remains unaltered. However, there is a change in the forum entrusted with the execution of the ejectment order, and the 'Civil Court' replaced by the 'Rent Controller'. This variation, is, of undesigned. It is indicative of the intention of the law-make to take away such execution from the civil Court and confer it on a special Tribunal, which as held in Khadim Mohyuddin v. Rehmat All L D 1965 SC 459 while performing its functions, under the Ordinance kloes not act as a Court and at the most acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. I may say with utmost respect, that in Malik Muhammad Shafi's case the attention of the learned Judge, was, not pointedly invited to the effect of the amendment, resulting in change of jurisdiction.
6. Section 17 was examined in Fazal Begum v. Y M C A PLD 1979 SC 18 and it would be useful to refer here to the following observtions made by Muhammad Akram, J: "In coming to this conclusion, however, I am not unmindful of the provisions contained in section 17 of the Urban Rent Restric tion Ordinance, 1959. It, inter alia, lays down that every order made under section 15 shall be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. It implies that although an order passed in appeal under section 15 is not by itself a decree yet for the limited purpose of execution only it shall be treated as if it were a decree of that Court. It does not clothe the ejectment order passed under it with the full effect of a decree for all other purpose......................................
'I ' It needs no emphasis that an ejectment order, in reality is not a decree but section 17 requires it to be treated as a decree for the specific purpose of executing the same. Section 17, thus, introduces a statutory fiction. But this fiction cannot be stretched too far and the 'Rent Controller' deemed to be the 'Civil Court'. Such a supposition will negate the amendment and reduce it to an aimless exercise by the law-maker.lt is to be kept in mind that when a statutory provision imports such a legal fiction, then its effect must be confined to the limits disclosed by its context and a wider effect cannot be given thereto. If this principle is applied, section 17, on its true construction, does not permit to clothe the Rent Controller with the status of a Court.
7. This Court can well ascertain the purpose of amendment and the material changes made in the rights of the parties thereby. Rules 99, 100 and 101 of Order XXI, C.P.C., empower the Court to investigate the rights of a person other than the judgment-debtor who resists the decree-holder, in obtaining possession of the immovable property, against which the decree is to be executed, or in execution of the decree is dispossessed. Before the amendment, the civil Court having jurisdiction in the area,executed the ejectment order as if it were a decree of that Court but after the amendment as already observed, the ejectment order is executed by the Rent Controller though as a decree of a civil Court. There can be no doubt that the Rent Controller is not a Court but merely a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. A close examination of these provisions of the C.P.0 and section 17 as amended, amply indicates that under this amendment the right of a third party to file objections to the execution of the ejectment order,before the forum executing it as a decree, is intended to be taken away. The language of the amended section is quite plain and clear. The Court, is, therefore,bound to give effect to the plain language of the statute. The consequences that may flow from the enforcement of the amendment, are, not its concern. If such an effect is given, a party other than the judgment-debtor, ceases to be possessed of the right to file objections, before the Rent Controller, against the execution of the ejectment order.
8. This inference is also fortified by another argument. The existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. If a person other than a tenant is, arrayed before him, his jurisdiction cannot be extended to adjudicate upon the rights of such person and give him any relief. The power to pronounce upon the rights of a third party, is, a very substantive power and unless such a jurisdiction is expressly conferred on the Rent Controller, he has no authority to exercise it. Only a Court of general jurisdiction is competent to make such a determination. This reasoning also provides an answer to the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel that the Rent Controller can choose to follow any procedure, not opposed to equity, and make use of any of the provisions of the C.P.C. Since an ejectment order has to be executed by him as if it were a decree of a civil Court, any departure from the relevant provisions of C.P.C. is not permissible. Of course,the provisions relating to the filing and hearing of the objections, stand excluded. In the execution-proceedings, therefore, the Rent Controller, cannot have a free hand to follow any procedure, particularly, when the very ground on which an objector comes before him, is founded on the negation of the existence of relation-, ship of landlord and tenant.
9. The petitioner's reliance on the case of Mis. Bambino Ltd, remains to be discussed. In that case, the Supreme Court, examined section 22 of the Sind Rental Premises Act, 1977 under which an order passed by the Rent Controller orf an appellate Authority has to be executed in such a manner, as may be determined by the Controller, or as the case may be,by the Appellate Authority, The observations made by the Supreme Court, in that precedent, are, with reference to section 22,but this section is altogether different from section 17 of the Ordinance. This authority, therefore, has no bearing on the instant case.
10. This abolition of the remedy before the executing Court, of a person not bound by the ejectment order, may lead to hardship but as there is no ambiguity in the language of the Statute, the Court, there fore, cannot be influenced by such a consideration. The, question, as to whether or not such a person, can file a Civil suit, and that the Rent Controller, has the same powers as enjoyed by an executing Court to gobehind--the- decree and refuse execution, if the decree in found to be void, or incapable of execution, are not in issue this case therefore, have not men touched upon.
11. In this view of the matter, the Tribunals below rightly refused to take cognizance of the petitioner's objection-petition.
12. For all these reasons this writ petition is dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs.