' In this regular second appeal, the appellants have challenged the judgment and decree, dated 21-1-1979 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sheikhupura, whereby the appeal preferred by Mst. Munawar Begum respondent. No. 1 was accepted and the judgment and decree, dated 2-2- 1978 passed by the trial Court dismissing her suit, were reversed and her suit was decreed.
2. Facts of the case which led to the institution of the suit out of which this regular second appeal has arisen, are that Muhammad Din son of Malik Ahmad Yar, caste Arain, resident of Sharaqpur, District Sheikhupura, was the owner of some urban immovable property as well as agricultural land situated in Sharaqpur and Nizampura, Tehsil Ferozewala, District Sheikhupura. He had two wives both by the name of Chiragh Bibi. His relations with one of his wives, who was the daughter of Hafiz Ghulam Farid, were not cordial. So with a view to deprive her from getting any share in the property after his death, he executed a will on 14-1-1930 and got it registered on 16-1-1930 whereby he declared that after his death, his wife, Mst. Chiragh Bibi daughter of Bhola alone would succeed to her entire property and that after her death, the said property would devolve upon his daughter Mst. Munawar Begum to the exclusion of all other heirs. He also stated in the will that in case a male child was born before his death, the property mentioned in the will would go to him. He, however, died on 15-1-1943 before any male child was born. After his death, the agricultural land situated in Sharaqpur and Nizampura was mutated in the name of his widow Mst. Chiragh Bibi daughter of Bhola. In 1945, Mst. Chiragh Bibi made a gift of the urban immovable property and the agricultural land situated in Sharaqpur to her four daughters Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No. 1, Mst.
Ghulam Fatima appellant No. 1, Mst. Wazir Begum appellant No. 2, Mst. Noor Begum (since deceased) and to her grandson Muhammad Afzal by means of registered gift deed, dated 8-10- 1945 and Mutation No. 3032, dated 20-11-1945. On 11-1-1966 Mst. Chiragh Bibi transferred the agricultural land situated in village Nizampura to Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No. 1 by way of Tamleek and after delivery of its possession, got Mutation No. 731 sanctioned by the Assistant Collector, Grade II, Ferozewala on 11-11-1967. Mst. Wazir Begum appellant No. 2 challenged the aforementioned order of the Assistant Collector in appeal before the Collector, Sheikhupura, who vide his order, dated 15-7-1970, remanded the case for fresh decision. On 23-10-1970, the Assistant Collector, Grade II, Ferozewala, after considering the respective contentions of the parties, came to the conclusion that since Muhammad Din deceased was not legally competent to make a will in excess of one-third of his property without consent of the other heirs, Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No. 1 was entitled to get only one-third share of the land situated in Nizampura and that the rest of the land would go to the other heirs of Muhammad Din deceased. Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No. 1 challenged the above order of the Assistant Collector, Grade II, Ferozewala, in appeal, but without success. Her revision petition against the impugned order was also dismissed by the Additional Commissioner vide his order, dated 20-10-1973.
3. On 8-4-1974 she instituted a suit for declaration that she was the owner of the land situated in Nizampura as it had been validly transferred to her by Mst. Chiragh Bibi. She contended that her father Muhammad Din deceased was governed by custom under which he was legally competent to dispose of his property which was self-acquired in any manner he liked. Mst. Chiragh Bibi, to whom the entire property was bequeathed by Muhammad Din deceased by means of registered will, dated 16-1-1930, was entitled to remain in possession of the suit property during her lifetime and the question of its devolution on the heirs of Muhammad Din deceased, did not arise. A usual prayer restraining the appellants, who claim to be the other heirs of Muhammad Din deceased under Muslim Law, from interfering with her possession over the land in question, was also made by her.
4. The suit was contested by Mst. Wazir Begum appellant No. 2 (daughter), Abdul Rahman and Muhammad Sadiq appellants Nos. 3 and 4, respectively collaterals of Muhammad Din deceased.
Mst. Chiragh Bibi widow of Muhammad Din deceased and her daughter Mst. Ghulam Fatima, who were also impleaded as defendants in the suit, however, did not contest the suit. Similarly, Fazal- ur-Rahman one of the collaterals of Muhammad Din deceased also did not controvert the claim of Mst. Munawar Begum. The contestant defendants inter alia pleaded that the suit for declaration, instituted by Mst. Munawar Begum, was not competent as she was not. in possession of the disputed land; that the will executed by Muhammad Din deceased was not acted upon and as such had become inoperative; and that even otherwise it was not a valid will, as according to the rule of custom followed by Muhammad Din, he was not legally competent to bequeath more than one-third of his property. According to the contestant defendants, the disputed land was to be distributed amongst the heirs of Muhammad Din deceased according to Muslim Law in view of the enforcement of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. They also questioned the right of Mst. Chiragh Bibi to transfer the land in dispute to Mst. Munawar Begum by way of Tamleek.
5. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for the disposal of the suit:-
(1) What were the terms and the conditions of the will executed by Muhammad Din on 16-1-30?
(2) Whether Muhammad Din was competent to will away his entire property, if not, to what extent he could will away his property?
(3) Whether the said will was not acted upon and has become invalid?-
(4) Whether Mst. Chiragh Bibi defendant No. 1 was in possession and enjoyment of the suit land as legatee under the said will?
(5) Whether Mst. Chiragh Bibi, defendant No. 1, was competent to Tamleek the suit property, if so, to what extent?
(6) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property?
(7) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property?
(8) Relief.
' After considering the evidence produced by the parties in support of their respective contentions and submissions made by their counsel, the trial Court decided issues Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 7 against Mst. Munawar Begum respondent. Issue No. 3 was found in favour of the contestant defendants while issue No. 6 was decided against them. As the execution of the will by Muhammad Din deceased and its contents were not challenged by the contestant defendants, the trial Court found that issue No. 1 did not require determination. As a result of the above findings, Mst. Munawar Begum's suit was dismissed with costs. In appeal, the Additional District Judge, however, reversed the findings of the trial Court on issues Nos. 2 to 5 and passed a decree in favour of Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No. 1 as prayed for by her.
5. At the outset it may be pointed out that Mst. Ghulam Fatima appellant No. 1 was not legally competent to file the present appeal as she had not contested the suit and had admitted the claim of Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No.
1. The learned first appellate Court had decreed the suit of Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No.
1. The right of the other appellants to challenge the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court in the present appeal is, however, not effected by Mst. Ghulam Fatima joining them in the appeal, becuase the real contest is between the appellants Nos. 2 to 4 and Mst. Munawar Begum respondent No.
1. Mst. Ghulam Fatima was a necessary party in the present appeal as she was also a party in the suit before the trial Court. Since she had admitted the claim of respondent No. 1 during the trial of the suit, she should have been impleaded as a respondent in the appeal but the fact that she has joined the other appellants who had contested the suit in the trial Court, in filing the present appeal is not of much consequence because even if she had been impleaded as a pro forma respondent, it would not have made any difference and the decision in this appeal would have been binding upon her which would be the case even when she has joined the other appellants as an appellant.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the finding of the learned first appellate Court on issue No. 2 and has submitted that Muhammad Din deceased did not possess unrestricted right to dispose of his property by means of a will as he being Arain by caste was governed by the rule of custom followed by the Arains of Lahore District as it is admitted by the parties that Arains of Sharaqpur District Sheikhupura are also governed by the same rule of custom as is followed by the Arains of Lahore District. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the answer to the question contained in Section VIII of the Customary Law of the Main Tribes in the Lahore District compiled by G.C. Walker, Settlement Officer, in 1894. The question and answer are reproduced as under:- "Question.-- Can a proprietor by verbal or written directions dispose of his property after his death?
' Answer.-- To this question the Jats anwser that a man can dispose of his self-acquired property of whatever value by verbal or written will, but such will must be supported by reliable evidence. No man can so dispose of his ancestral property. Rajputs say that a man may dispose of his property of whatever kind, movable or immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, by written statement to take effect at his death; but not by verbal will.
' The Arains say the same as Rajputs but limit the testator's powers to one-third only of his property.
Dogars say they have no custom of disposing of property by will to take effect after a man's death."
' Reference has also been made by the learned counsel for the appellants to question No. 106 and its answer contained in the Customary Law compiled by R.C. Bolster, Settlement' Officer, in 1916.
Question No. 106 and the relevant portion of its answer are reproduced as under:- "Question 106.-- Can a proprietor make, by word of mouth or in writing, a disposition of his property to take effect after his death?
' Answer 106.-- All tribes (except Rejputs, Arains and Dogars).- A man can dispose of his self- acquired property of whatever value by verbal or written will, but he cannot so dispose of his ancestral property.
' Rajputs say that a man may dispose of his property of whatever kind (ancestral) or acquired by a written deed but not by verbal will.
' The Arains say the same as Rajputs, but limit the testator's power to one-third of the whole property."
' According to the learned counsel for the appellants the statement of general custom in paragraph 58 of the Digest of Customary Law by Rattigan (13th Edition) on which reliance has been placed by the learned first appellate Court that "acquired property, whether movable or immovable is ordinarily alienable according to the will and pleasure of the last full owner" is of no avail in the present case because the point for determination in the instant case was whether Muhammad Din deceased could dispose of his property by will and if so to what extent. Paragraph 58 of the Digest of Customary Law referred to above deals with the general power of a full owner to dispose of his acquired property. It does not specifically relate to the power of disposal of property by the full owner by means of a will. Answers to the questions specifically dealing with the power of the full owner to dispose of his property by means of a will as contained in the two compilations of Customary Law of Lahore District by the Settlement Officers only are relevant for the purpose of determination of the question arising in the present case.
7. Learned counsel for the respondents has conceded that Muhammad Din was governed by the rule of custom followed by the Arains of Lahore District but he had unrestricted powers to dispose of his self-acquired property in accordance with the rule of custom as stated in paragraph 58 of the Digest of Customary Law by Rattigan. According to the learned counsel for the respondents the unrestricted power of disposal of the acquired property by a person governed by custom includes the power to dispose of the property even by a will. The answers recorded in the two compilations of the Customary Law of Lahore District are not reliable and should not be accepted as basis for determining the question whether Muhammad Din deceased was legally competent to dispose of his property by executing a will because these answers are inconsistent with the general rule of custom as stated in paragraph 58 of the Digest of Customary Law by Rattigan. In this connection he has referred to the decisions in Muhammad v. Mst. Jewni AIR 1934 Lah. 363 and Ghulam Muhammad v. Ralli AIR 1931 Lah.
461. According to the learned counsel for the respondents entries in the Riawaj-i-Aam which are not supported by instances do not have much evidentiary value and in support of his above contention he has referred to the decision in Mst. Rani v. Giyan Singh AIR Lah.
31. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the Arains of Lahore District possess unrestricted power to dispose of their property by will, which is in accord with the general custom as stated in paragraph 58. In support of his above contention he has cited the judgment in Karam Bakhsh v. Chiragh Din 66 Punjab Record 1911 at page 256 where the transfer of self-acquired property by means of a will in favour of some sons to the exclusion of another son by an Arain agriculturist of Tehsil Kasur, District Lahore was held to be valid.
8. As regards the evidentiary value of the entries in the Riwaj-i-Aam, the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the judgment of Privy Council in Beg v. Allah Ditta AIR 1916 P C 129 which was followed in Labh Singh v. Mst. Mango AIR Lah. 241 and Bhajna v. Mt. Bheoli AIR 1932 Lah. 177 to show that the entries in the Riwaj-i-Aam regarding a custom was a prima facie proof of that custom and the onus lay on the other side.to rebut it. Learned counsel for appellant has also referred to Kahn Singh v. Gopal Singh AIR 1927 Lah. 677 and the judgment of the Privy Council in Mt.
Vaishno Ditti v. Mt. Rameshri AIR 1928 P C 294 to show that the initial presumption in favour of the entries in the Riwaj-i-Aam is not effected even though the entries were unsupported by instances.
9. The property which forms the subject-matter of the will executed by Muhammad Din deceased on 14-1-1930 was admittedly non-ancestral property. There is also no dispute that Muhammad Din deceased was legally competent to dispose of his property during his lifetime in any manner he liked, as he enjoyed unfettered power of disposal of self-acquired property in view of the general custom stated in paragraph 58 of the Digest of Customary Law by Rattigan. But whether Muhammad Din deceased was entitled to dispose of his acquired property by means of a will has to be considered independently of the general power of disposal of non-ancestral property by a full owner stated in paragraph 58 of the Digest of Customary Law. Although customary law ordinarily recognises no distinction between a transfer inter vivos and the one to take effect on death of the transferor, where unrestricted power of transfer is recognised to exist, yet the rule of custom followed in the matter of disposal of property by will is not uniform and varies from tribe to tribe and place to place. It is for this reason that the custom of making wills by the persons governed by custom has been dealt with separately in the Digest of Customary Law under paragraph 56(b) where reference has been made to the questions and answers dealing with the power to make will as contained in the compilations of customary laws of various districts of the Punjab. In the case of Lahore District reference has been made to answers to questions Nos. 106 to
109. Question No. 106 specifically deals with the disposition of property of a proprietor to take effect after his death. Answer to this question has already been reproduced in paragraph 6 of this judgment. In the case of Arains, it is stated that the testator's power to dispose of his property is restricted to one-third of his property. Even in the earlier compilation of Customary Law of Lahore District by G.C. Walker, the answer of the Arains was that the testator's power to dispose of his property was limited to one-third only of his property. The main objection against the statement of custom as recorded in the two compilations of customary law of Lahore District is that it is unsupported by instances, but as noticed in the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, the mere fact that the statement of custom recorded in the Riwaj-i-Aam is not supported by instances, does not rebut the presumption which arises in favour of such entry being a prima facie proof of the custom stated therein. It is only when the entries in the Riwaj-i-Aam unsupported by instances are inconsistent with the general rule of custom and adversely affect the rights of females that the initial presumption in favour of these entries being prima facie proof of the custom stated therein becomes weak and can be easily rebutted. In all the three cases cited by learned counsel for the respondent, the special custom as recorded in the Riwaj-i-Aam was not only inconsistent with the general custom, but also adversely affected the rights of women, who had no opportunity of appearing before the revenue authorities. In the case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Ralli AIR 1931 Lah. 641, the entry in the Riwaj-i-Aam of the Jullundur District to the effect that the collaterals excluded the daughters from inheriting landed property whether ancestral or acquired of their father, was found to be inconsistent with the general custom among Arains in regard to the acquired property and as such it was held that the presumption in favour of the entry in the Riwaj-i-Aam was weak and could be easily rebutted. Similarly in Muhammad v.
Jewni AIR 1934 Lah. 363 special custom recorded in the Riwaj-i-Aam of Jhelum District making no distinction between ancestral and self-acquired property and given preference to the collaterals against the daughters in the matter of succession to such property, was not followed as it was not only inconsistent with the general custom but also adversely affected the rights of women. For similar reasons entries in the Riwaj-i-Aam of Sialkot District, whereby daughters were excluded from inheriting the non-ancestral property of their father by his collaterals, were considered of not much value especially when the special custom stated therein was not found to be supported by instances. In the instant case, answer to question No. 106, recorded in the compilation of the customary law of Lahore District of 1916 to the effect that among Arains the testator's power is limited to one-third of the whole property, does not adversely affect the rights of woman. It cannot be rejected merely because it is not supported by instances. The contention that the entries in the compilation of customary laws of the Lahore District dealing with the power of disposal of self- acquired property by Arains by means of will embody a special custom which is inconsistent with the general rule of custom as stated in paragraph 58 of Digest of Customary Law by Rattigan, is without substance because as noticed earlier paragraph 58 does not deal with the power of disposal of property by means of will, which matter has been separately dealt with in the said Digest under paragraph 56(b).
10. The case of Karam Bakhsh 1911 Punjab Record 66 cited by learned counsel for the respondents where the will made by an Arain of Lahore District in respect of his self-acquired property in favour of some sons to the exclusion of another son, was upheld, does not appear to be relevant because the question for determination in that case was whether the father was competent to bequeath his property to some of his sons where he had given to his one son his share of the family estate during his lifetime. In other words, the real issue in that case was regarding distribution of the property by the father amongst his sons. It may not be out of place to mention here that the question whether an Arain was competent to dispose >of his property after his death by making a will dealt with under section 8 of the Customary Law of the Main Tribes of the Lahore District by G.C.
Walker which was compiled in 1894 was not considered by the Court in the afore mentioned case and as such the decision in the case cannot be accepted as an instance in support of the custom that the Arains of Lahore District had unrestricted power to dispose of self-acquired property be means of will.
11. The view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that Muhammad Din deceased possessed unrestricted power to dispose of his entire property by will in view of the general rule of custom stated in paragraph 58 of the Digest of Customary Law by Rattigan cannot be supported, because, as noticed above, the subject of transfer of property by will has been separately dealt with in the aforementioned Digest in paragraph 56(b), where under the heading "Existence of the Custom of making Wills" reference has been made at page 648 to questions 106 to 109 and the answer given by the tribes of Lahore District. According to the answer given by the Arains the power to dispose of property by will is restricted to 1/3rd of the whole property. Muhammad Din deceased, therefore, did not possess unrestricted power to dispose of his property by will. According to the custom followed by his tribe, he could dispose of only 1/3rd of his property by will. The learned trial Court has rightly concluded while deciding issue No. 2 that Muhammad Din deceased was not competent to bequeath more than 1/3rd of his property. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge under issue No. 2 is accordingly set aside and that of the learned trial Court restored.
12. The appellants contention in para. 2 of their written statement that the will executed by Muhammad Din deceased was not acted upon, which gave rise to issue No. 3 in the suit, becomes irrelevant after the finding under issue No. 2, that Muhammad Din deceased's power to make will was restricted to 1/3rd of his property, as the object underlying the above contention was merely to show that the will dated 16-1-1930 (Copy Exh. P.1) executed by Muhammad Din deceased was invalid which object is achieved to some extent after the finding under issue No.
2. The fact that the agricultural land left by Muhammad Din deceased in Sharaqpur and village Nizampura was mutated in the name of his widow Mst. Chiragh Bibi would not establish that she had got the land on the basis of a valid will executed by her husband on 16-1-1930 especially when there is no reference to the said will in the orders whereby the land was mutated in her favour. The existence of will Exh. P. 1 at the time of attestation of mutation of land in her favour was immaterial as she had to succeed to the estate of her deceased husband as a widow under custom. Similarly the transfer of agricultural land of Sharaqpur and the urban immovable property by Mst. Chiragh Bibi to her four daughters and grandson would also not validate the will executed by Muhammad Din deceased in respect of his entire property because according to the rule of custom, followed by him his power to make will was restricted to 1/3rd of his property. Mst. Chiragh Bibi had succeeded to the entire property of her husband as his widow under custom. Her legal competence to transfer the aforementioned property as a widow or on the basis of the general authority conferred on her by her deceased husband in the will, dated 16-1-1930 to modify or cancel the will is not relevant for determining the validity of the will because the transfer made by her has remained unchallenged.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the finding of the learned first appellate Court that Mst. Chiragh Bibi was in possession of the suit land as legatee under the will executed by her deceased husband as according to the learned counsel the said will was valid only to the extent of 1/3rd of the property of the testator. There is considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. It has been found that Muhammad Din deceased could not legally bequeath more than 1/3rd of his property. His widow Mst. Chiragh Bibi got the agricultural land left by him not on the basis of the will executed by him as there is no reference to any such will in the mutations sanctioned in her name. She, being the widow of Muhammad Din deceased the last full owner, was entitled to succeed to his property under custom. The finding of the learned first appellate Court that she was in possession of the suit land as legatee under the will, dated 16-1- 1930 is, therefore, not sustainable and accordingly set aside.
Consequently the finding of the learned trial Court under issue No. 4 is restored.
14. Mst. Chiragh Bibi, who died after the decision of the suit by the trial Court, transferred the disputed land to Mst. Munawar Begum respondent by way of Tamleek presumably on the authority available to her under the will executed by her husband Muhammad Din on 16-1-1930. In the will (copy Exh. P. 1), Muhammad Din deceased had declared that after his death his wife Mst. Chiragh Bibi would become the owner of his entire property and that after her death the said property would pass on to Mst. Munawar Begum his youngest daughter. lie had also declared that like him Mst. Chiragh Bibi would also be competent to modify or cancel the will. It may be said that it is in exercise of the above authority given to her in the will that she decided to transfer the suit land to Mst. Munawar Begum respondent who even otherwise is the ultimate beneficiary under the will. But the power derived from the will cannot extend to the disposal of the entire land as the will has been found to be valid only to the extent of 1/3rd property of the testator. After excluding the property which was transferred by Mst. Chiragh Bibi in 1945, the remaining property of Muhammad Din deceased, which is the suit land, will have to be dealt with in accordance with the will. In other words only 1/3rd share in the suit land would have devolved on Mst. Munawar Begum under the will after the death of Mst. Chiragh Bibi. So to the extent of 1/3rd share in the suit land, Mst. Chiragh Bibi could validly transfer in favour of Mst. Munawar Begum on the basis of authority available to her under the will. With the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1962, the life estate enjoyed by Mst. Chiragh Bibi in respect of the suit land was terminated with the result that she was entitled to succeed to 1/8th share in the suit land as a widow of Muhammad Din deceased vide proviso to section 5 of the Act. She was legally competent to transfer her aforementioned share also to Mst. Munawar Begum. Thus the transfer of the suit land effected by Mst. Chiragh Bibi by way of Tamleek in favour of Mst. Munawar Begum respondent can be held valid to the extent of her 1/8th share in the land as also 1/3rd share which Mst.
Munawar Begum would have got under the will. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the will executed by Muhammad Din deceased is invalid as it has been made in favour of an heir, namely, Mst. Munawar Begum. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on Ghulam Akbar and others v. Mst. Irshad Begum and others PLD 1963 SC 543 and has contended that since there is no rule of custom supporting the will in favour of an heir recourse will have to be had to the personal law. He has also referred to Mst. Qaiser Khatoon and 12 others v. Maulvi Abdul Khaliq and another PLD 1971 SC 334 in this behalf. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the customary law is silent on the point as to whether a will can be made in favour of an heir or not because question No. 108 in the Customary Law of the Lahore District compiled by R C. Bolster specifically deals with the point and the answer given by all the tribes to this question is that where wills are permitted, a person making a will has a right to leave a legacy to one of his heirs without the consent of the rest. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are, therefore, not relevant in the present case. Under custom Muhammad Din deceased was legally competent to bequeath 1/3rd of his property in favour of an heir.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to section 4 of the West Pakistan Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 and has submitted that since the will executed by Muhammad Din makes provision for more than one legatee succeeding to his property one after the other Mst.
Munawar Begum would not be entitled to get any benefit under the will after the death of Mst.
Chiragh Bibi who was legatee in enjoyment when the aforementioned Act was enforced. There is not much force in the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellants because Mst.
Chiragh Bibi during her lifetime had validly transferred the testator's property to the extent of 1/3rd which the next legatee, namely, Mst. Munawar Begum respondent was to get after her death. The provisions of section 4 of the aforementioned Act are, therefore, not applicable.
16. In view of what has been stated above the finding of the learned first appellate Court under issue No. 5 is set aside and the finding of the learned trial Court on the said issue is modified and it is held that the transfer of the suit land by Mst. Chiragh Bibi in favour of Mst. Munawar Begum respondent to the extent of 1/3rd share which she had to get under the will and 1/8th share to which Mst. Chiragh Bibi shall be deemed to have succeeded on the commencement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 is valid.
17. The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal succeeds partly, Munawar Begum respondent No. 1, shall, in addition to 1/3rd share in the suit land given to her as a legatee under the will, be entitled to get the share of deceased Mst. Chiragh Bibi in the suit land on the basis of the transfer effected by the latter in her favour during her lifetime and shall also be entiteld to succeed to the remaining land as an heir of Muhammad Din deceased alongwith his other heirs according to Muslim Law. The decree passed by the learned first appellate Court is modified accordingly.
' In view of the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.