1. ' In this petition for leave to appeal, which is meant to discredit the judgment passed by a learned single Judge of the High Court on 10-11.1983, I have heard the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions.
2. ' After giving my earnest consideration to the arguments advanced at the bar and minutely going through the available record, I am unable to find out any faulty approach made to the issue of `Khula' decided against the respondent by all the Courts below ; including the High Court.
3. ' It has come in evidence that a `Jirga' in the year 1978 clinched the controversy and it was decided that the respondent would pay an amount of Rs, 650 to the father of the appellant as maintenance allowance for the period the appellant stayed with her father and thereafter the appellant would reside with the respondent. The learned Sub-Judge as well as the learned District Judge found that this amount was paid to the father of the appellant but despite that the appellant chose to stay back from her husband (respondent).
4. ' It has also been found by all the Courts below that the respondent neither maltreated his wife nor conducted himself in a way which may have caused humiliation to the appellant. Besides, Mst.
5. Barkat Jan, in her statement before the trial Court, dated 24t1- December, 1983, has admitted in cross-examination that she was unhappy with the respondent only because when respondent left the house of her father where the couple was residing he took his chattels to the house of his parents. This is the only grievance which she bas against the appellant. Otherwise before the aforesaid incident she had no grievance against the respondent and had all along been happily living with the respondent. It would thus appeal that there is no ground to disturb the concurrently concluded finding of the Courts below, on, the point of `Khula'.
6. ' Kh. Muhammad Saeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner, criticized the approach made to the issue of `Khula' by all the Courts below. In the estimation of the learned counsel there is sufficient material on the record to believe that the spouses would not be able to live within the limits ordained by God. In support of the submission he has referred me to Muhammad Yusuf v. Mst.
7. Kaisar Jar, (1).
8. ' I have minutely gone through this judgment. This judgment is altogether distinguishable and in fact goes against the contention raised by Kh. Muhammad Saeed. The judgment observes :- "This is not equivalent to granting a right to wife to come to the Court at any time and obtain a 'Khula' if she is prepared to restore the benefits she has received. There is an important limitation on her right. It is only if the Judge apprehends that the limits of God will not be observed, that is, in their relation towards one another, the spouses will no obey God, that a harmonious married state,
(1) 1984 CLC 1465 as envisaged by Islam, will not be possible that he will grant a di"-solution. The wife cannot have a divorce for every passing impulse. The Judge will consider the rift between the parties is a serious one though he may not consider the reasons for the rift."
9. In the instant case all the subordinate Courts have recorded well reasoned out finding and held that the rift between the parties is not a serious one as to order separation on 'Khula'. I, therefore, do not incline to disturb the concurrently concluded finding of fact regarding 'Kb ula' by A the Courts below.
10. ' It is to be remembered that leave cannot be granted as a matter of routine ; unless some serious question of law is not made out. Besides, it is also significant that where a suit filed by the husband for restitution of the conjugal rights has been decreed and the wife's suit claiming dissolution of marriage stands dismissed by the trial Court (as is done in the present case) it would be said that it was the wife who sought severance of the marital tie and.Not the husband and, therefore, in the circumstances if the divorce is ultimately agreed upon by the parties it would be only `Mubaraat.
11. And not `Khula'. Mst. Ghulam Sakina v. Umar Bakhsh and another (1) supports this view.
12. ' For the reasons stated above no good ground exists for the acceptance of this petition for leave to appeal, which stands dismissed.
(1) PLD 1964 SC 456