' The petitioners in this revision petition have challenged the judgment and decree dated 22-11- 1983 of the Civil Judge, 1st Class, Faisalabad, as affirmed in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, on 18-12-1984 whereby respondent's suit for declaration that gift deed dated 4-6-1981 executed by Muhammad Asif Siddiqi petitioner No.2 in favour of his wife Mst. Sarwat Siddique petitioner No.1 in respect of Shop P.15, Ward No. 2, Kutchery Road, Faisalabad, was illegal, void and without lawful authority with consequential relief by way of cancellation of aforementioned gift deed, was decreed.
2. The petitioners have contended that gift deed dated 4-6-1981 was validly executed by petitioner No.2 on behalf of the respondent as his duly appointed attorney through general power-of- attorney (Exh.D-1) executed on 9-5-1963. The mere fact that reference to the aforementioned general power-of-attorney was not made in the gift deed and that reference was made to general power-of-attorney dated 3-8-1964 registered at No.537, which was executed by petitioner No.2 in favour of the National Bank of Pakistan under the authority derived from the general power-of- attorney Exh.D.1, did not affect the validity of the gift deed as petitioner No.2 had the authority to execute the gift deed on behalf of the respondent on 4-6-1981 by virtue of general power-of - attorney dated 9-5-1963. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that no formal evidence to prove the execution of general power-of-attorney (Exh.D.1) was required as its execution by the respondent had been authenticated on 9-5-1963 by the Charged' Affairs, Embassy of Pakistan in Turkey, as required by section 33(1) (c) of the Registration Act, 1908.
According to the learned counsel the view taken by the Courts below that the general power-of- attorney Exh.D.1 was authenticated in the Counseller Division of the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington D.C., on 23-9-1982 and that the said authentication was also defective inasmuch as the respondent had not signed the document in the presence of the Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C. was not correct because the Charged' Affairs, Embassy of Pakistan in Turkey had already authenticated the general power-of-attorney executed by the respondent on 9-5-1963 and Exh.D.1 was a photo copy of the said general power-of-attorney which was attested by the Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C. on 23-9-1982. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further contended that the aforementioned general power-of-attorney had been acted upon inasmuch as petitioner No.2 had been dealing with the property of the respondent as his general attorney.
3. There is no dispute that the property subject-matter of the gift was owned by the respondent.
Petitioner No. 1 claims that she has become the owner of the above property on the basis of the gift deed dated 4-6-1981 executed by petitioner No.2 in her favour. According to her, petitioner No.2 was competent to dispose of the property in question on behalf of the respondent by virtue of general power-of attorney (copy Exh.D.1). The respondent, however, has not admitted the execution of the aforementioned general power-of-attorney. The original power-of-attorney has not been placed on the file nor its non-availability has been explained by the petitioner. The petitioners have relied on a Photostat copy of the general power-of-attorney attested by the Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C. As the general power-of-attorney does not fall in the category of public documents, its certified copy cannot be received in evidence without proof of the execution of the original document. Section 33 (1) (c) of the Registration Act, on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners, is applicable to the original power-of-attorney and not to its copy because the original power-of-attorney executed an authenticated in accordance with the aforementioned provisions is recog nised for the purposes of section 32 of the Registration Act which deals with presentation of documents for registration. It is not possible A to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the legal requirement of formal proof of a general power-of-attorney has been dispensed with under section 33 (1) (c) of the Registration Act, because it is only for a limited purpose i.e. for presentation of document for registration by the attorney on behalf of its executant that a power-of-attorney executed and authenticated under clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 33 of the Registration Act is recognised. Where the power-of- attorney has been executed to confer authority on the attorney to transfer or dispose of the property of the executant, it is necessary to prove the execution of the power of attorney by Its executant like any other document. In the instant case, general power-of-attorney, under which petitioner No.2 was given full and complete authority to deal with property in question, did not fall in the category of power-of-attorney to which the provisions of section 33 (1) (c) were applicable.
As the respondent did not admit the execution of the aforementioned general power-of-attorney, it was necessary for the petitioners to produce evidence to prove the execution of the general power-of-attorney by the respondent.
4. It may be noticed that the general power-of-attorney, on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners, was not executed by the respondent for the purposes of section 32 of the Registration Act, 1908, but it was a document which conferred full authority on the attorney to deal with the property of the principal (the executant) in the same manner as the executant himself could deal with it. In other words it was a document which had the effect of assigning right, title and interests in immovable property of the value of more than one hundred rupees and as such fell in the category of document of which registration was compulsory under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. There is no evidence that the original power-of-attorney executed by the respondent in favour of petitioner No.2 was registered in Pakistan. The effect of non-registration of the general power-of-attorney was that it was hit by section 49 of Registration Act, 1908 and as such could not be used by petitioner No.2 as valid authority for transferring the disputed property on behalf of the respondent to petitioner No. 1.
5. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the general power-of-attorney executed by the respondent on 9-5-1963 in favour of petitioner No.2 had been acted upon prior to the transfer of the disputed property to petitioner No.1 through gift without any objection by the respondent is without much substance because the original general power-of-attorney, referred to above, has not been placed on record and the defect of its non-registration is not cured by the respondent's above conduct. During the hearing of the appeal, the petitioners had requested the Court to allow them to place certain documents on the file by way of additional evidence, but their request was turned down by the Court mainly on the ground that the request for additional evidence had been made at a belated stage after fourteen years of the institution of the suit. In the application submitted by the petitioners to the learned appellate Court for additional evidence, it was not stated by them that they wanted to produce the original power-of-attorney executed by the respondent in favour of petitioner No.2, dated 9-5-1963. Apart from the reasons given by the learned appellate Court in his order dated 27-2-1984 whereby the petitioners' aforementioned application was disposed of, the original general power-of-attorney cannot be allowed to be admitted in evidence on account of its non-registration. The other documents mentioned by the petitioners in their application for production of additional evidence were sought to be placed on the record by the petitioners to show that petitioner No. 1 had been acting as attorney of the respondent in the past. As noticed above, in the absence of the original power-of-attorney, the conduct of the parties for the purpose of proving the execution of C the aforementioned document by the respondent was not relevant. The learned appellate Court had, therefore, rightly refused to allow the petitioner's request for production of additional evidence.
' In view of what has been stated above, there is no merit in this revision petition which is accordingly dismissed in limine.
Revision declined.