' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Mirza Ghias-ud-Din Baig has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, against the order whereby the appellant was dismissed from service with immediate effect. He has challenged the order of the General Manager (Distribution), WAPDA, dated 5th January, 1981, by which his appeal was dismissed. He has impleaded Member (Power) WAPDA Lahore, Chairman, WAPDA, WAPDA House, Lahore, and the General Manager (Distribution) WAPDA, WAPDA House, Lahore, as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the impugned dismissal order dated 6th October 1980 and final order dated 5th January, 1981, be set aside and respondents be directed to re-instate the appellant in seer vice with consequential benefits, as well as to pay him full wages for the suspension period.
3. Brief facts of the case. Are that the appellant was appointed as L.D.C. On 10th January, 1949 in the Pakistan P.W.D. Electricity Branch Government of the Punjab and was promoted as Senior Clerk. The services of the appellant were transferred to WAPDA vide notification, dated 23rd March, 1959 thereafter the appellant was promoted as Assistant, Junior Superintendent and Senior Superintendent and was further promoted as Revenue Officer in N.P.S.-16 in July, 1975. The appellant while working as Revenue Officer in WAPDA was placed under suspension vide office order, dated 19th May, 1976, on account of a criminal case. The appellant was subsequently suspended by WAPDA by order, dated 24th July, 1976. While the appellant was still under suspension he was convicted by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central) Sargodha Division, vide judgment dated 22nd July, 1980. However, be filed appeal before the High Court which was pleased to admit the same and allowed the appellant to be released on bail. The appellant had also filed against his dismissal before the General Manager which also stood dismissed. The appellant went before the Federal Service Tribunal in appeal vide Annexure 'IV dated 19th January, 1981, which ultimately was disposed of on 15th April, 1984, by Mr. Justice Shah Abdur Rashid, Chairman and Brig. Abdur Rashid, S. I. (M) (Retd.) Member, on the admission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant was initially an employee of the Government of the Punjab and was working on deputation with WAPDA, therefore, the Federal Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear his case.
Learned Chairman and Member were pleased to dispose of the appeal with direction that the appellant was at liberty to claim relief from the proper forum. Hence this appeal.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney and have also perused the reply of the Irrigation and Power Department as well as the stand of the learned counsel Mr. Khalid Iqbal, Advocate, appearing on behalf of WAPDA.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant's appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal was disposed of on the sole ground that he was held as employee of Irrigation Department of the Provincial Government on his plea as well as on the contention made by the learned counsel for WAPDA that he was still an employee of the Provincial Government. Armed with this order of the learned Federal Service Tribunal, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the only -forum before which he has now come, would be Punjab Service Tribunal, therefore, the impugned order be set aside as being without jurisdiction. However, with regard to the point of limitation, it has been submitted that he was duly heard by the Federal Service Tribunal before which forum he was in time and has come before this Tribunal after his appeal has been so disposed of in the year 1984. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the period spent before' a forum with a bona fide manner that the said forum was competent to hear his appeal may be condoned under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act read with section 5 of the Limitation Act.
6. In order to ascertain whether the appellant Was born on the cadre of the Irrigation Department of the Punjab Province, comments were called from the said Department in its comments submitted that the appellant was transferred en-bloc alongwith the post alongwith other employees of the Electricity Department w,e,f, 1st April, 1959 vide notification dated 28th March, 1959, of Government of West Pakistan. According to the learned District Attorney the appellant was not confirmed in any capacity while he was serving the Government of Punjab and aid not hold lien with the Punjab Government. It has been stated that the appellant was never repatriated by WAPDA, therefore, the Punjab Government did not come into picture as the appellant did not hold lien in the Department. This being so the contention of the learned counsel for WAPDA before the Federal Service Tribunal would be misconceived and without any legal effect.
7. We have also examined the point of laches raised on behalf of the learned counsel for WAPDA, while arguing the case against the appellant on the ground that when he was being tried by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, it was his duty to contest the jurisdiction of the said Special Judge Anti-Corruption (Central), if he believed that be was, basically an employee of the Provincial Government. According to the learned counsel for WAPDA the appellant being convict person, could be dismissed from service by the authority under the Delegation of Powers Rules of 1970, when it was found that he had been convicted by the Court of competent jurisdiction for moral turpitude.
8. Without going into the merits of point of limitation raised by the learned counsel for WAPDA we are satisfied that the appellant does not hold lien with the Provincial Government, therefore, he would be employee of WAPDA for all intents and purposes. In the light of the above we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has no lien with the Proving Government and does not come within the definition of civil servants for the purposes of this Tribunal. Resultantly the appeal is dismissed on the point of jurisdiction. There will be no order as to costs.