MIAN BURHANUDDIN KHAN, J.-- Leave was granted by this Court vide order dated 2-3-1973 on the ground that in another revision application No. 439/11 of 1972, the Central Board of Revenue has taken) a different view to the one adopted in the present cases. The points raised in the petition relates to the interpretation of sections 19, 167(8)(a) and 167(8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as well as of subsection 3(1)(2) and (3) of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act of 1950 on which there is a conflict of judicial opinion, which require a final determination by this Court. This judgment will, therefore, dispose of both the afore-mentioned appeals as common question of law and facts are involved in these to appeals.
2. Appellant is a limited company, engaged in the business of manufacturing sugar at Mardan. In May, 1965 the appellant purchased bonus vouchers for importing centrifugal machines and for this purpose, they applied to the Assistant Controller, Imports & Exports, Peshawar for issuance of import licence through National & Grindlay Bank, Peshawar. Alongwith their application they enclosed bonus vouchers of the face value of Rs.520,400 and to sets of licence forms Nos. 796322 and 796323 requesting their bankers to get these forms authenticated for Rs. 5,16,015 and Rs.4,385 respectively for the import of "fully automatic continuous centrifugal machines for 'B' Fore worker and 'C' after Workers and Hoffman Roller Bearings."
3. However, the licences only specified the item "machinery and mill work and parts and accessories thereof (excluding items not importable under the General Import Policy)." These licences are dated 10th and 25th May, 1965. The appellants sought clarification from their bankers as to whether the centrifugal machines could be imported against the description specified in the licences and were informed that centrifugal machines were covered by this description.
Accordingly, the appellants placed order for the supply of these machines.
4. On arrival of the first consignment per s.s. ANNENKERR the Bill of Entry was filed for the release of the centrifugal machines but the Collector of Customs refused to release them on the ground that "machinery/ plant exceeding Rs. 10,000 was not importable as per Annexure V.U. Of Public Notice No. 1 (65) Import/R dated 11-1-1965." However, the Controller of Imports & Exports ordered for the release of goods against nominal penalty. Accordingly the Bill of Entry was again filed but respondent No. 1 still issued a Show Cause Notice dated 22-2-1966 calling upon the appellants to explain as to why the goods should not be confiscated and penal action taken under the law. In reply dated 28-2-1966 the appellants explained that they had applied for the import of the centrifugal machines but this item was not specifically mentioned in the Export Bonus List appended to the Public Notice No. 2 (39)65/EP/62 dated 29-9-1965, and, therefore, specification of the I . T . C . Classification No. IV/M. 2/2 relating to the description "machinery and mill work and parts and accessories" was given in the licence; and that the issue of import licence automatically waived the price restriction.
5. In the photostat of import licence No. 296322 it is clear against entry "A-1 item" the expression "fully automatic continuous centrifugal machines for 'B' for worker and 'C' after worker" were struck of and instead, the words "machinery and mill work and parts and accessories thereof (excluding items not importable under the General Import Policy" were typed. Respondent No. 1 rejecting this explanation, confiscated the goods under section 167(8)(b) of the Act read with section 3(i.e) of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1950 but allowed the appellants to redeem the goods on payment of fine of Rs.1,21,000 in lieu of confiscation under section 183 of the Act. The appellants paid the fine and redeemed the goods and then appealed to the Central Board of Revenue against the aforesaid order on the ground that "there was genuine mis-apprehension about the scope of the license"; that price restriction could not be effected and section 167(8)(b) was not applicable.
6. The Controller had ordered the release of goods on payment of nominal penalty but respondent No. 1 reduced the fine to a sum equivalent to 25% of the value of the "offending goods." The appellants, invoking revisional jurisdiction, appealed to the Government against the aforesaid order, and, consequently, the Government further reduced the fine to 10$ of the value of goods.
Therefore, the orders passed by respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on 5-3-1966, 25-9-1967 and 14-2-1969 were impugned in petition 546 of 1969 before the High Court C.A. No. K/28 of 1973.
7. All other facts are common in petition 547 of 1969 C . A . No. K/29 of 1973 except that the centrifugal machines arrived in to lots. Orders passed in petition No. 546 of 1969 relate to the first lot while those impugned in this petition relate to the second consignment which arrived per s.s. SIPSAH. But the fine imposed by respondent No. 1 qua the second lot was Rs. 4,01,000 reduced to 25% and finally to 10% of the value of goods by the appellate and revisional authorities.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the learned High Court has not appreciated the submissions made in respect of the interpretation of subsection 167(8)(a) and 167 (8)(b) of the Act. Perusal of these to subsections reveal to different offences and distinction has, therefore, to be found between the to because penalties provided for the to offences are different: one provides for confiscation and penalty, while the other also provides for imprisonment for six years and whipping; that the learned High Court also did not appreciate the ruling in PLD 1964 Lah. 627. The argument was that .The provisions of subsection 167 (8)(a) and 167 (8)(b) of the Act were discriminatory because under the former persons convicted, were liable to imprisonment while under the latter, they were only liable to confiscation of the goods and pecuniary penalty. But the learned Judge repelled the contentions holding that the to subsections laid down to distinct offences and to classifications of the accused persons and the difference was that while (a) referred to such goods and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use, while (b) referred to such goods and in such quantity as could be normally imported or exported for bona fide personal use; that in PLD 1968 Lah. 1183 the learned Judge observed that section 167 (8)(b) was not applicable to the facts of the case because (b) did not provide for trial of an accused and in that case the petitioners had been tried and convicted by a Magistrate and as such it would be wrong to say that they were only liable to a sentence of fine and not of imprisonment. The learned Judge also observed in this case that the only difference in the to provisions was that item (a) referred to the prohibition or restriction by or under the Act whereas (b) as confined only to prohibition or restriction under the Act. It was not appreciated, the learned counsel submitted, that restrictions and prohibitions under the Act were covered by both the subsections, therefore, some other distinction between the to subsections had to be found besides the difference pointed out by the learned Judge.
9. The learned counsel further submitted that the point regarding the interpretation of subsection 167 (8)(a) and 167 (8)(b) of the Act was directly considered in PLD 1970 Dacca 260 and there is elaborate discussion in that ruling. It was clearly held that 167 (8)(b) was applicable if the goods were such and in such quantity as could normally be imported or exported for bona fide personal use and 167 (8)(a) was applicable if the goods were such and in such quantity as could normally not be imported for bona fide personal use. The case was referred to a third Division Bench because of the difference of opinion regarding the forum of appeal, from the judgment of a Magistrate under section 167 (8)(a) of the Act. The opinion of the Division Bench is reported in PLD 1970 Dacca 279 and the learned Judges agreed with the view of the earlier Division Bench regarding the applicability of the aforesaid to subsections but they expressed the doubt if an offence under section 167(8)(b) could be tried by a Magistrate. On this, a special Bench of five Judges was constituted and Salahuddin Ahmad, J of the Dacca High Court (as he then was) expressed doubt about his opinion in the earlier Division Bench about the interpretation of the said to subsections but it was held by him even after expressing the doubt that the petitioners in that case were guilty under section 167 (8)(b). No other Judge, it may be pointed out, expressed any opinion contrary to this interpretation regarding the applicability of the said to subsections and the order of the Court, therefore, was in keeping with the interpretation of these subsections as contained in judgment; of the original Division Bench.
10. The learned counsel contended that the learned Judges of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court have erred in disagreeing with the interpretation of these to subsections as contained in the Dacca judgment; that the to subsections create to different offences, one set of three ingredients is given in clause (1) while in the following clauses, alternate set of ingredients has been given. The subsections have been so worded that clause (1) has to be read with the other clauses. In the end, another set of ingredients has been given and the to sets of ingredients have to be read together; subsection 167 (8)(a) covers restriction by or under the Act while subsection (b) covers restriction under the Act. Restrictions under the Act are covered by both the subsections. Clauses (2) and (3) of subsection (a) are the same as those of subsection (b) clause (4) of subsection (a) is also the same as that of subsection (b) with the difference that in the latter "aircraft, railway train etc. In use for entry into and exit from Pakistan" is mentioned. There is no parallel clause in (b) for clause (5) of (a). This clause refers exclusively to exports. Clause (6) of (a) and clause (6) of (b) are quite different from each other and it is in these clauses that the distinction between the to subsections has been made out. Clause (6) of subsection (a) and clause (6) of subsection (b) has to be read alongwith every clause of those subsections; and the learned Judges of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court did not consider as to when subsection (a) would be applicable and when subsection.
(b) would be applicable.
11. The learned counsel submitted that subsection 167(8)(a) and 167 (8)(b) were added by Ordinance LVIII of 1962. The same Ordinance also amended subsection 167(81) of the Act.
Subsection 167(81) as well as 167 (8)(a) provide for imprisonment for six years and in both these subsections the offences are of contingent liability; that section 3(2) of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1950 lays down that restricted or prohibited goods could not be imported except in accordance with the conditions of a licence. This clearly meant that issue of a licence automatically removed the restriction, therefore when a licence for over Rs.5 lacs was issued, the restriction of Rs.10,000 remained no longer relevant; that in view of the fact that the appellants applied for import of centrifugal machine and obtained bonus vouchers for the same, and the same item was mentioned on the licence form, the question of their importing 50 or more items of value of less than Rs.10,000 each under the licence issued to them for Rs.5,21,961 just did not arise because the Government in its decision in Revision Application No. 439/R of 1972 dated 30th October, 1972 C. No. 10(74) Rev. II/68 has held that issue of a licence of more than Rs.10,000 obviously presumes that goods of the value of more than Rs.10,000 would be imported and finally the learned counsel submitted that while referring to the recommendations of the Controller of Imports & Exports, Lahore, for releasing the goods on nominal penalty, the learned Judges have not appreciated the fact that the Assistant Controller, who had issued the licence from Peshawar, was no longer available. Moreover the practice of the Trade Control Authorities is that they do not dispute the findings of the Customs Authorities but they only recommend for the release of the goods on nominal penalty.
12. Under the import policy, goods to be imported covered by the licence were "machinery and mill work and parts and accessories thereof excluding items not importable under the General Import Policy IV/M/2-3" promulgated vide Public Notice No. 1 (65) Import-R dated 12-1-1965. The title of Annexure-V appended to this Notice gives out a list of goods not importable and reads as under: "List of goods, import of which will not be permissible against the following items."
One such item which is listed at. S. No.11 under the same heading "H. Machinery and Mill work IV/M.
2/3" as is indicated in the licence as under: "Any other machinery/plant exceeding Rs.10,000 except;
(a) construction and mining equipment
(b) agricultural machinery and equipment
(c) generators and boilers
(d) cold storage and air-conditioning plants
(e) passengers' lifts"
The language of the title places an embargo on the import of goods of generic description valuing over Rs.10,000 such as listed at S. No. 11. Hence, what was excepted from import under the licence was "any other machinery/ plants exceeding Rs.10,000" pursuant to the use of the expression "excluding items not importable under the General Import Policy IV/M-2/3."
13. The licence was issued under the Export Bonus Scheme (Public Notice dated 15-1-1959 amended by Public Notice dated 2-2-1965 to which para 8 of the Export Bonus Scheme was applicable and according to it the licence was subject to all the restrictions then prevalent. The Public Notice No. 1 (65)/Import-R dated 11-1-1965 which conveyed for public information import policy for January- June 1965 was given legal sanction by Notification No. SRO. 123(K)/65 dated 16th February, 1965 issued under section 3(i) of the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Paragraph 4 of the said Notification allowed the import of such goods for which a licence was issued except such goods and commodities as were specifically excluded and listed in Annexure XII. One such item listed at S. No. 11 under the head "M. Machinery and Mill Work IV/M-2/3" corresponds to the same item which was excepted from import under the licence as per general import policy. Hence, the goods of the afore-mentioned generic description exceeding the price ceiling, were not legally importable against the licence in terms of section 3(ii) of the Act and by operation of the deeming provision e.g. Section 2(i.e) of the Act, it also constituted a restriction under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. The Collector of Customs, relying on Public Notice dated 11-1-1965, held in his order dated 5-3-1966 that the licence did not cover the value of the goods imported and observed:- "Messrs Premier Sugar Mills & Distillery Co. Ltd. Mardan imported a consignment of fully automatic continuous centrifugal machine valued at Rs:4,00,790 from Germany covered by B/E para 15 No. 37183 dated 29-11-1965 ex s.s. SEPSAH and sought clearance against licence No. 796322 issued for machinery and mill work and parts and accessories as thereof (excluding items not importable under the General Import Policy) under Part IV/M. 2/3 of Import Trade Control Schedule. Value of the centrifugal machines being over Rs. 10,000 its import is banned under General Import Policy vide Public Notice No. 1/65-Import-R dated 11-1-1965. Licence produced is, therefore, not valid to cover the goods imported.
Since no valid licence has been produced, the importers have contravened the provisions of section 19 of the Sea Customs Act read with section 3(i) of Imports a Exports (Control) Act, 1950 punishable under section 67 (8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act read with section' 3 (ii) of Imports t Exports (Control) Act, 1950 " and, therefore, the Collector ordered confiscation of goods under section 168 (8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act read with section 3(i.e) of the Act and simultaneously allowed the goods to be redeemed on payment of penalty.
14. Having regard to the terms of the licence which excluded the import of machinery exceeding Rs.
10,000 it is inconceivable that there was no violation of price restriction in terms of section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. This Court, while refusing leave to appeal in C.P.L.A. No. K/45 of 1967, held so, in identical situation, observing: "The relevant Government Notification which applied to the present case was issued on 2-2-1965 and this was obviously not affected by the Tariff Commission's subsequent recommendation. It, inter alia, provided as is mentioned at page 23 at seq of the show cause notice issued to the petitioners that the petitioners were not entitled, under their licences, to import glass goods below the prices mentioned in the relevant Notification and even under a clause in their licences. The prices of the goods actually imported, however, were far below these prices. It was held, therefore, that the goods had been imported in contravention of section 19 of the Sea Customs Act read with section 3(i) of the Import t Export (Control) Act, 1950 and the offence was punishable under section 167(8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act.
The learned counsel was unable to point to any material on record which could contradict this position. As has been observed above, even the terms of the licences issued to the appellants forbade them from importing glass sheets having prices below those mentioned in the licences.
Hence, there can be no doubt that there was violation of the'' condition imposed by the licences.
15. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that since the item i.e. "fully automatic continuous centrifugal machines for 'B' fore-worker and 'C' after-worker and Hoffman Roller Bearings" was not specified in the list of items which could be imported, it was, therefore, covered by the generic description "machinery and mill work" which is an expression of wide import, and, consequently, the price restriction will not come in the way. It is true that the expression "machinery and mill work" is used in the generic sense but from this description that kind of machinery and mill work is excluded which is valued over Rs.10,000 according to the terms of the licence pursuant to the price restriction imposed by the afore-mentioned Public Notices. Hence, this plea is mis-conceived.
16. Again the learned counsel invited our attention to section 3(i) of the Act and attempted to draw a distinction between it and section 19 of the Sea Customs Act in the manner that whereas subsection (i) of section 3 of the Act has a wide scope inasmuch as the Central Government is empowered to regulate trade generally in terms of the language of this subsection, and, consequently even if the Central Government was empowered to impose price restriction, nevertheless the same price restriction cannot be read within the meaning of the expression "goods of any specified description" in section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. This contention is also mis-conceived as the learned counsel for the appellants did not take into consideration subsection (i.e) of section 3 of the Act while raising this plea which, in clear terms, provide: "all goods to which any order under subsection (i) applies, shall be deemed to be goods of which the import or export has been prohibited or restricted under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly "
In terms thereof, the goods will not only be classed as restricted in view of the price restriction imposed by operation of section 19 of the Sea Customs Act but also because of this deeming provision of section 3 (i.e) Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, Therefore. It is inconceivable that the expression "goods of any specified description" in section 19 of the Sea Customs Act will not include the concept of price restriction in view of the different language of section 3(i) of the Act and section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. Another argument was raised as regards the meaning of the expression "specified description" in section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the term exceeding Rs. 10,000 which provides a ceiling cannot be read within the above expression according to the ordinary meaning. However, he failed to satisfy us as to why it would not be so and our own examination reveals that having regard to the dictionary meaning of the words "specified description" price restriction is included in that concept.
17. Learned counsel contended next that the price ceiling was waived as the licence was intended to be utilized for the import of centrifugal machines valued at Rs.5,21,951 as it was purportedly issued for that purpose i.e. For the import of "machinery and mill work" and no waiver can be inferred from it, for any number could be imported within the value of the licence, the price ceiling of which did not exceed Rs. 10,000. The price ceiling, consequently, on the face of the licence negatives this plea. Thus, licensing authority has also treated it as a violation of the licence and had accordingly recommended imposing of nominal penalty and even this action belies the plea of waiver. Hence, we find no substance in this contention.
18. Lastly, it was contended that the contravention fell within the ambit of section 167 (8)(a) and not (8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act and hence the penalty was wrongly imposed. Learned counsel drew our attention to section 167 (8)(a) and (8)(b) and contended that whereas section 167 (8)(a) applied to goods imported in large quantity for purpose of trade, section 167 (8)(b) applied to personal baggage brought by a passenger and this distinction, according to the learned counsel, was apparent from the expressions "and if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use" and "if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally be imported or exported for bona fide personal use" in the last paragraph of section 167 (8)(a) and (8)(b) respectively, which govern the preceding paragraphs.
Another subsidiary contention advanced in this regard was that if the first respondent has acted under section 167 (8) (a) then the appellant would have had the opportunity of establishing that the goods were imported under a bona fide mistake as to the scope of the licence having regard to the expression "unless the contravention is due to a bona fide doubt or difference of opinion about the classification of the goods under the Customs Tariff or under any law for the the being in force" in the last paragraph of section 167 (8) (a) of Sea Customs Act occurring after the first cited expression and, consequently, the penalty of confiscation could have been dispensed with.
Reliance was placed on the observations of Salahuddin Ahmed, J as he then was, in Alik Kumar Mitra and others v. The State PLD 1970 Dacca 260 (274): "On a careful reading of the to items of section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act, as a whole and together I agree with Mr. Ismail that the chief difference in the application of the to items lies in the fact that while in item (8) (a) the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use in item (8) (b) the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally be imported or exported for bona fide personal use. The difference is apparent on a proper construction of each one of the to items, and seems to be reasonable having regard to the fact that while' in one case, the goods are such as would be exported or imported in large quantity obviously for the purpose of trade and commerce, while in the case of item (8) (b) the person tries to take out only his personal goods and the idea of trade and commerce is very remote and not contemplated. A plain construction of each item show that the word 'and if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use in item (8) (a) and if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally be imported or exported for bona fide personal use' in item (8) (b) not only govern the paragraphs in which they occur but also all the other paragraphs which precede the paragraphs in which these words occur. The enormous difference in the punishments provided in the to items, also support this view. In my opinion, therefore, in the facts of the present case the petitioners should have been proceeded against either under section 167 (8) (b) of the Sea Customs Act or under section 7 of the Land Customs Act"
19. This distinction made out appears to be from the expression and if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use in clause
(8) (a) and 'if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally be exported or imported for bona fide personal use in clause (8) (b) upon the premise that they govern the previous clauses, supporting reason being the difference in the punishment provided in clause (8) (a) and
(8) (b) of section 167. The same learned Judge again expressed doubt as to the consequences of the above view, in the following words at page 305: "In my order dated 26-7-1968 I had held that the difference between the to parts of item 8 is that while in (a) 'the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use' in (b) 'the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally be imported or exported for bona fide personal use. In all fairness I think I should say that I have since entertained a doubt about the correctness of this view having regard to the language of item 8 namely a semi-colon appearing at the end of each preceding clause of parts (a) and (b) of section 167 (8) of the Act. As, however both the members of the original Division Bench had entertained the aforesaid view and inasmuch as it was neither the subject matter of reference to the third Bench or to the present Bench I have thought it advisable to leave it at that"
20. Learned counsel for the appellant then cited Muhammad Akbar and others v The State PLD 1964 Lah. 627 wherein a learned single Judge held that "The offence described in clause 8 (a) is qualified by the following words and if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use' unless the contravention is due to bona fide doubt of difference of opinion about the classification of the goods under, the Customs Tariff or under any law for the the being in force and onus of proving the existence of such doubt or difference of opinion being on the person concerned in the offence and as' for clause (b) only this much was stated that paragraph (b) of section 167(8) deals with such goods which are in such quantity as could be normally imported and exported."
21. The above observations appear in the context of the contention whether there was discrimination between persons who commit such an offence and the learned Judge was of the view that the to clauses of section 167 (8) can almost be said to be to classifications of the accused persons and such a classification is not hit by article 15 of the Fundamental Rights'
Rounding of the discussion the learned Judge observed: "The learned counsel contended that the last wording in paragraph 8(a) beginning from 'and if the goods are such and ending on 'the person concerned in the offence' were used in relation to the goods which were brought to any wharf, but I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel because these last words cover the whole of the section 167 (a) preceding these words. "
22. How would all the paragraphs of section 167 (8) (a) be governed by the above cited expressions is not reasoned out nor any distinction appears from the judgment in the application of clauses (8)
(a) and (8) (b) to a given case. Our own examination of the to clauses leads to the conclusion that each paragraph is separate in its application to a situation mentioned therein, for not only there is a semi-colon at the end of each paragraph which denotes separation with distinctive but this is also followed by the disjunctive 'or' the expression "and if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally not be imported or exported for bona fide personal use" in section 167 (8)(a) and "and if the goods are such and in such quantity as would normally be imported or exported for bona fide personal use" in section 167 (8) (b) are integral parts of those paragraphs in which they occur and there is nothing to conclude that --these expressions should be read in a manner to govern the preceding paragraphs. What is contended can be achieved only if the expressions are read separately from the paragraphs in which they occur which is not possible. If the legislature wanted this result, it could have enacted in clear words, which is not the case here. Even Salahuddin Ahmad, J has expressed a doubt and we are not able to discern from the judgment of the learned single Judge in the Lahore case as to how he had reached that conclusion. In the result we do not see any force in this contention.
23. As we have reached the conclusion that section 167 (8) (a) is not alone applicable to the present case, and its last paragraph otherwise being wholly outside the context of the present case, the expression "unless the contravention is .Due to a bona fide doubt or difference of opinion about the classification of the goods under the Customs Tariff or under any law for the the being in force" in the last paragraph of section 167 (8) (a) cannot be pressed into service with a view to lay a foundation for the next argument that the appellant was denied an opportunity of establishing that there was a bona fide mistake as to the scope of licence.
24. The first paragraph of section 167 (8) (b) is applicable and the learned counsel for the appellant was unable to controvert its application, otherwise than by drawing a distinction as discussed above. We have not accepted his contention in that respect and in the circumstances there can be no legal bar in the way of taking action- by confiscation and imposing penalty under it. No exception can, therefore, be taken if the first respondent imposed penalty while confiscating the goods. The appellants themselves stated in their. Letter No. Nil dated 28-2-1966 addressed to the Collector of Customs, Karachi, in response to show cause notice Nos. KTC/20/2/66/III and ITC/20/3/66-II dated 22 and 26-2-1966, as under: "The import licences covering the centrifugal machines together with Bonus Vouchers were submitted to the Assistant Controller of Imports & Exports, vide our letter No. 7286/75 BS dated 5th May, 1965 (copy enclosed) for authentication for the import of centrifugal machines which comes under the general terms of machiney mill works parts and accessories thereof I T C Classification No. IV/M. 2/3 but Mr. Qamar Ali the then Assistant Controller of Imports & Exports Peshawar eliminated the words centrifugal under the description as according to him, this item was not specifically mentioned in the Export Bonus List (Public Notice No. 2(39) 65, EP. 62 dated 29-9-1965) but he assured a senior officer of our Bankers Messrs National & Grindlay Bank Ltd, Peshawar that this item is covered under the general terms of 'machinery & mill works' and that there will be no difficulty at the the of clearance ....
As regards the objection that the import of machinery worth more than Rs..10,000 being not allowed under the general import policy, we have to reiterate that the issue of a proper import licence automatically waives of the restriction otherwise knowing well that this licence will be utilized for the import of centrifugal machines worth Rs. 5,21,951 the Assistant Controller of Imports Exports Peshawar would not have issued this licence for this amount, and would also have not given categorical assurance to our bankers. In this connection original copy of letter No. I/Mills dated 4-1-1966 addressed to their Lahore Office is enclosed for ready reference. The original licence No. 796322 will itself stand testimony to our contention that the licence was to be utilized for the import of centrifugal machines as .By closely scrutinising the same you will kindly observe that the words centrifugal machines' were specifically typed out by us in the description column which were cut of typographically and replaced by the words mschinery mills works etc., in the office of A C I & E Peshawar. It is needless to mention that centrifugal machines are not banned in the list referred to above. You will further appreciate that a sugar factory cannot work without centrifugal machines which are its component indispensable and integral part. The packing list and invoice of centrifugal machines are also enclosed.
If, however, despite all this explanation, there is any technical mistake, it will be due to the wrong handling of the case by the licensing authorities at Peshawar and we hope we shall not be penalized for the mistake of Mr. Qamar Ali the then Assistant Controller of Imports & Exports, Peshawar".
Impliedly admitted that there was some technical mistake due to the wrong handling of the case by the licensing authority at Peshawar and hoped that they will not be penalized for the mistake of Mr. Qamar Ali the Assistant Collector of Imports and Exports, Peshawar. Therefore, we agree with the observations of the learned High Court Judges and dismiss both these appeals with costs.