' The instant appeal is directed against the order, dated 30-6-1983, passed by the Sind Labour Court No.VI at Hyderabad. The said Labour Court accepted the grievance application of the respondent and ordered re-instatement of the respondent with all back benefits.
2. The respondent, Ghulam Qadir Siddiqi was appointed by the appellants as an Assistant with effect from 1-9-1977 under letter, copy A/9, dated 17-8-1977. The said letter was issued by the Manufacturing Division of the appellants at Daharki. It seems that Ghulam Qadir Siddiqi, the respondent developed eye trouble from May, 1979, and as such he was treated for vertigo.
Subsequently by a letter of A/5, dated 2-8-1979, he was transferred to the Marketing Division of the appellants at the Regional Office at Hyderabad. He was to report to the Regional Sales Manager, Hyderabad, on 28-8-1979, after enjoying his vacations. At Hyderabad the respondent was placed as Assistant-II in the place of Mr.Hameedi, who was transferred to Karachi, vide copy A/6. At Hyderabad, he went under treatment and as such he was treated at Karachi from the period 24-1- 1982 to 30-4-1982. However, on 17-6-1982, the Head Office of the appellants at Karachi issued a letter, A/1, terminating his services. The letter of termination refers to various medical opinions which allegedly show that the respondent was no longer capable for performing satisfactory work.
Hence, the respondent sent the grievance notice, copy A/2 and the same was rejected by the appellants, under reply, copy A/3.
3. In his grievance application. The respondent challenged the order about the termination of his services mentioning that the same was illegal, void, mala fide and ineffective. The order of termination was based on false and fabricated facts which were essentially mala fide and unsatisfactory. The respondent suffered from eye trouble since May, 1979, because he worked beyond normal working hours for 2 years. He further has alleged that his request for transfer to Karachi was not acceded to but he was posted at Hyderabad. The Specialist advised the appellants to put the respondent on some light work to avoid giving telex duties to the respondent.
This advice was ignored by the appellants and it insisted him on giving Telex duties which was not the primarily job of the respondent. Various doctors were consulted and he was under the treatment of those doctors at Karachi during the period from 24-1-1982 to 30-4-1982.
4. The stand taken by the appellants that the grievance application is not maintainable. The Regional Office at Hyderabad had employed only seven workers and it was registered under the West Pakistan Shops and Establishment Ordinance, and was not covered by the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Further, it was alleged by the appellants that the respondent was not an aggrieved person as he has collected all his dues from the appellants in full and final settlement after his termination from service. The transfer at Hyderabad was said to be at the request of the respondent himself. The transfer of Mr.Hameedi to Karachi was due to his promotion. It is pleaded by the appellants that they have extended all possible facilities of treatment to the respondent who was granted leave as per rules and whose medical expenses were born by the appellants. It indicated that the respondent was not capable of undertaking or performing his normal duties including the typing or Telex duties. The appellants submitted the medical opinion which indicated that the respondent was not capable of performing his normal duties and his services were terminated. The appellants have no light work to offer to the respondent and his behaviour was that he wanted anyhow to be transferred to Karachi.
' I have heard the learned counsel of the appellants, Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani and Mr.Wasiullah Qureshi for the respondent. The learned counsel of the appellants raised a plea that the respondent was posted at Hyderabad and that establishment was registered under the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance and that in the Regional Office at Hyderabad only seven employees were working. Therefore, the Standing Orders Ordinance did not apply to it. While, on the other hand, Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi had argued that although the respondent did work in the Regional office but he was originally transferred from Daharki by the Head Office at Karachi and that his services were terminated by the Head Office at Karachi and, therefore, thecircumstances in the present case are distinguishable from the numerous authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. The Standing Orders Ordinance does apply in the instant case and since his services were terminated on the plea that they were unsatisfactory and that the respondent was not able to carry on the work assigned to him, it necessitated We domestic enquiry as contemplated by the Standing Order 15.
6. The contention of the learned counsel of the appellants is briefly that the Regional Office at Hyderabad was registered under the Shops and Establishment Ordinance and as such was a separate establishment. Since the workers were only seven in the Regional Office, the Standing Order 15 does not apply and his services were terminated in accordance with law and was paid in lieu of one month's notice. He has cited a number of authorities. The outstanding authority is reported in P.U.D.C. v. Khadim Husssain 1980 PLC 1012. In this citation, the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Court was challenged. One Khadim Hussain has filed grievance application being the Head Office at Karachi, but he was transferred to a place in N.-W.F.P. At Tarbela. It was held that Tarbela Court had the territorial jurisdiction as it was situated altogether in a different Province, although the Head Office at Karachi gave the approval on that behalf. In the instant case the establishment are situated in the same Province. The order of appointments was given by the Manufacturing Division at Daharki and then the termination of his services at Hyderabad were ordered by the appellants at Karachi. None of these letters were issued by the Hyderabad Office (i.e. Marketing Division). The authority quoted as above is distinguishable from the present case. The termination order is issued by the Karachi Head Office which implies that the Karachi Head Office had a control over the respondent. The services were terminated by the Regional Office at Hyderabad although it may be that the Head Office is a separate establishment but in the same Province. The fact that the respondent was transferred from Daharki to Hyderabad and the fact that the Karachi Head Office controls both the transfers and postings of the respondent and thereafter the termination of the respondent was also ordered from Head Office at Karachi. Therefore, the case of the respondent is on a different footing. The evidence led in the present case was that of respondent who in cross-examination stated that there were twelve employees in the Regional Office at Hyderabad. The appellants' witness, Anwar Hussain stated in his affidavit that seven employees were working in the establishment at Hyderabad. The conflict between Anwar Hussain 'and the respondent suggests that the management is not speaking the truth. The Monthly Wages Register and the Muster Roll should have been produced by the management to see if twenty workmen or more or less were working in the establishment. The respondent was out of Hyderabad for 4 months getting himself treated at different Clinics and hence the pleas raised by the management that there were less than twenty workers in the establishment is not borne out by the satisfactory evidence.
5. The order of termination of services is pretty elaborated and cites many ailments with the respondent. The contention of the respondent is that he was suffering only with eye trouble and consequently since he worked on Telex for two years he developed vertigo. But the vertigo is not an ailment to incapacitate the respondent from doing the work of a clerk or of milder duty. The enumeration of the ailments by the appellants in respect of Ghulam Qadir Siddiqi shows that the management was ill-disposed to him. A slight malice may be attributed to the management.
8. It is also argued on behalf of the appellants that the respondent was not an aggrieved person because he had taken all the legal dues in full and final settlement and hence his grievance application under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 was not maintainable. In the affidavit, the respondent Ghulam Qadir Siddiqi stated that it was falsely and mala fidely alleged against him that he has collected all his dues from the company in full and final settlement. In short he has not received the legal dues as such. But the respondent admitted having received from the appellants letter R/11, but he denied having received the letter, dated 25-1-1982. He also admitted having received the letters, R/12, R/13, R/14, R/15 and R/16. One Amir Ahmad of Postal Department was examined that a registered letter booked on 26-2-1982 for the respondent was sent to Nazimabad Post Office, Karachi, for delivery to the respondent. There is no evidence that what was contained in the registered cover. There is no evidence that the respondent received all the legal dues. If the respondent did not receive the legal dues or received the legal dues under protest, that would not bar the rights of the respondent to move the grievance application, as held by this Tribunal in 1983 PLC 644.
9. The respondent in this case was not issued any charge-sheet before termination of his services.
The witness Anwar Hussain admitted in his cross-examination that the respondent was not issued any charge-sheet while he remained under medical treatment. The question to be considered is whether the order of termination was 'termination simplicitor' under Standing Order 12(1). The order of termination contains the words that the respondent is no longer capable to perform the work satisfactorily. Such an order cannot be termed as 'termination simplicitor' under Standing Order 12(1) but it carries in itself the stigma of unsatisfactory working. Therefore, the Standing Order 15 is applicable in the present case. Anyhow, the appellants could not have issued the impugned order without following the provisions of Standing Order 15 despite the Medical Certificates, copies R/2 to R/7.
10. Under these circumstances, the appellants have no case and the appeal is hereby dismissed.