1. ' This appeal under section 100 is filed against the judgment of Vth Additional District Judge, Karachi, dated 17-11-1978.
2. ' By the impugned order Appeal No, 286 of 1975 filed by the appellant was dismissed as time- barred. The following is the operative part of the judgment of the First Appellate Court holding the appeal as barred by limitation by three days:- "The judgment was passed on 29-9-1975 while the decree was signed on 2-10-1975. The certified copy was ready on 14-10-1975 and so the appeal should have been filed on 13th or 14th November, 1975 because the deficit court-fee was supplied, on 26-11-1975 although at best the appellants could have supplied these stamps on 23-11-1975. Record does not show that the appellants asked for any further time."
3. ' The facts stated in the above quoted passage are not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant but it is contended that in the circumstances of the case the Court should have extended the time further upto 26-11-1975 for payment of the court-fees. The admitted position in the case is that the appeal was presented on 8-11-1975 with a stamp of Re.1 only. Along with the appeal the appellant filed application under section 149, C.P.C. Praying for extension of time by two weeks on the ground that the money was already deposited but the challans were not received by the Stamp Officer. This application was granted by the learned District Judge on the same day, namely 8-11-1975 with the following order:- "Granted without prejudice to the respondent's interest."
4. Sd.
5. District Judge Karachi."
6. ' It will thus be seen that on 8-11-1975 when the appeal was presented it was within time as according to the order of the learned Vth Additional District Judge the appeal could be presented up to 14-11-1975. The learned District Judge was, therefore, right in allowing the time to the appellant to pay the deficit court-fees by two weeks. It is not disputed that the time for payment of court- fees allowed by the District Judge on 8-11-1975 expired on 23-11-1975. It will thus be seen that any further extension of time after 23-11-1975 was after the expiry of period of limitation and, therefore, it had to be extended in a judicious manner by the First Appellate Court as in their meantime a vested right accrued to the respondent because of expiry of period of limitation. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that on 26-11-1975 when the stamps were supplied no application was made to the First Appellate Court for further extension of time up to 26-11-1975. It cannot be disputed that for extension of time after the expiry of period of limitation of appeal the Court below had to give reasons for such extension in the circumstances of the case for which there was no material before the Court, and, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that the First Appellate Court while rejecting the appeal as time-barred should have considered and extended the time under section 149, C.P.C. Is wholly without any basis. In the case of Willayat Khatoon v. Khalil Khan PLD 1979 SC 821 the position with regard to extension of time by the Court before expiry of the period and after expiry of the period under sections 149 and 148, C.P.C. Has been considered as follows:- "The next point to be seen is whether in all cases a Court is first bound to grant time to a plaintiff to make up the deficiency in the court-fee under Order VII, rule 11(c), C.P.C. Before proceeding to take any further action on an insufficiently stamped plaint. My answer is in the negative. And for this purpose, I will divide suits or plaints into two categories. One category is where the plaint is filed well in time, and there is still some period of limitation left in favour of the plaintiff. In such a suit the Court is obliged and bound to grant time under Order VII, rule 11(c), C.P.C. And the time granted itself should also be within the remaining period of limitation. This is a stage when the matter is solely between a subject and the State. However, if despite grant of such an opportunity the needful is not done the Court shall reject the plaint. The second category is that where on the date of grant of time the suit has already become time-barred, or where though the time was granted on a date by which the suit will become time-barred. However, the matter is not confined solely between a subject and the State because in such a situation a third person namely defendant has also in the meantime due to running out of the period of limitation in his favour acquired a vested right. These cases are distinguishable from the first category and are a class by themselves. These are to be regulated by sections 148 and 149 of the C.P.C. Which is obvious authorise the Court to destroy the defence of limitation which may have become available to a defendant in the meantime. It is this category of cases in which a Court is not bound or obliged to grant time and nor is it to be granted just in routine or mechanically but by keeping in view the considerations above mentioned."
7. In view of the above stated legal position the first appellate Court could not extend any further time for payment of court-fees by the appellant in the absence of an explanation for the delay by the appellant and, therefore, the appeal was rightly dismissed as time-barred. There is no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.