' The appeal captioned above arises from the decision, dated 17th April, 1983 passed by the learned Presiding Officer. Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his re-instatement in service was dismissed.
2. The allegation against the appellant was that he had been making advances without any authority. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the appellant was proceeded against under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, the charge-sheet is time-barred. In this respect reliance has been placed upon Exh. P. 9, whereby the appellant was informed that the documents sought for could not be supplied as the enquiry was being held under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. So far as the question of supplying of documents is concerned, there is no difference in Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and the Wage Commission Award. It has not been shown what documents were demanded by the appellant, so it cannot be said that due to the non-supply of the same, he was in any manner prejudiced in the enquiry. Proviso to section 1 (4)
(c) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 says that Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 would not apply to an establishment which is run by or under the authority of the Government and is having its own statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline. I have held in so many cases that since according to section 4 of the Banks (Nationalization) Act, no private person can run any Bank without the permission of the Government and as the award of the Commission has been made under an enactment i,e, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and was duly notified in the official Gazette, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable. Learned counsel has cited a ruling of the Karachi High Court namely 1984 PLC 276. It has been held therein that Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 applies as Banks have no statutory rules. There are two conditions for the rules to be statutory.
One is that they should have been made under some provision of some enactment and the other is that they should have been notified. Both the conditions are fulfilled in the case of Wage Commission Award. Section 38-A provides that the Wage Commission will be constituted for determining all or any terms and conditions of service. Section 38-C provides that the decisions of the Wage Commission shall be published. Admittedly, the respondent Bank is a nationalized establishment. So both the conditions contained in proviso to section 1 (4) (c), Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, stand fulfilled. So the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable to the nationalized banks and no question of the charge-sheet being time-barred arises in the present case.
3. It has been argued that no rule was cited nor evidence was pros diced by the respondent that they hit the advances made by the appellant. No such plea was taken that the appellant was himself competent to make the advances. If he had taken such a position, the respondent might have cited rule and given evidence. The plea of the appellant rather was that with the consent of the account-holders concerned, he had withdrawn the money from their accounts. In reply to the charge-sheet the appellant admitted that he had done the irregularities with which he was charged. He also said that since it was his first negligence, it be condoned. He himself mentioned in reply the competent authority who had to give the Sanction for advances. He also said that so far as the allegation contained in para. 4 of the charge-sheet was concerned, the advance was made on the verbal approval of the competent authority. This shows that the appellant himself was not competent. The mere fact that the advances had been adjusted would make no difference and convert the irregularities into legalities. According to sub-para. (2) of para. 258 of first Wage Commission Award, violation of rules and acts of negligence amount to misconduct for which one of the punishments is dismissal. It has not been argued that there was any flaw in the enquiry or any provision of para. 258 (4) and (5) had violated. If the competent authorities did not accede to the request of pardoning the appellant, the Courts would not interfere. Since the charges were admitted and proved, the appellant was rightly punished and his grievance petition rightly disallowed.
4. As a result, the appeal being without any force is hereby dismissed.