' The seven appeals captioned above involve the same question of facts and law, so are being disposed of together through this single judgment.
2. On the ground of misconduct the appellants were charge-sheeted and enquiry was held which culminated in their dismissal from service. None of the appellants had joined the enquiry, so it is alleged to have been made ex parte. One of the stands taken by the appellants was that the Enquiry Officer did not hold the enquiry. After the appellants had concluded their evidence in their cases and before evidence in rebuttal, could be produced it was proposed by each one of the appellants on 17th April, 1984 that if Saleemullab, Enquiry Officer, stated on the Holy Qur'an that he had held the enquiry and that the appellants did not wilfully join the same, his petition be dismissed or otherwise it be accepted. The case was adjourned to 14th May, 1984 for the respondent's evidence. On the following day the representative of the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent appeared and informed the Court that the parties had agreed to settle their dispute on special oath as proposed by the appellants on the last day. The file was brought and the statement of Saleemullah was recorded who stated that he was available on the date and time mentioned in the enquiry notice but the appellants did not appear from 11.00 a.m. To 4.00 p.m., therefore, he completed the enquiry. The learned lower Court, thereupon dismissed the grievance petitions of all the appellants.
3. ' Certain points have been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in his arguments but they have no force. It has been argued that the appellants had proposed that Saleemullah should say that he was available to hold enquiry but the appellants did not wilfully appear but Saleemullah did not use the word 'wilfully' in his statement. Saleemullah could not have come to know of the wilfulness or otherwise of the appellants and could depose about their attendance non-attendance. In the oath it was not suggested by the appellants that Saleemullah knew that it was not physically impossible for the appellants to attend the enquiry on the date fixed for the purpose. So, it was not necessary for Saleemullah to say that the appellants wilfully did not appear.
4. The other point raised is that on 18th April, 1984 when Saleemullah made statement on the proposed oath, the appellants, except Maqbool Ahmad and Qadir, were not present. Their presence was not material because they had already proposed the special oath and had not withdrawn it before it was taken. The representative of the appellants was present. The other argument is that acceptance of the oath by the representative was unauthorised as he had been authorised only to present the grievance petitions. Acceptance was not necessary when the very proposal was made by the appellants in person on 17th April, 1984. The proposal was to be accepted by the respondent which was done on 18th April, 1984. So far as Maqbool Ahmad and Qadir are concerned, they were present in person on 18th April, 1984 and accepting the statement of Saleemullah said that their petitions be dismissed.
5. The other argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the appellants had produced complete evidence and had closed their cases, the learned lower Court should have considered the evidence produced by them. This argument is not acceptable. Since the respondent had not produced any evidence in rebuttal as before the date fixed for the purpose compromise was effected only the statement of Saleemullah was to be considered and not the evidence produced by the appellants. If the learned lower Court had for good reasons refused to act upon the statement of Saleemullah made on special oath, only then the case could have been decided on the evidence led by the appellants and that too after affording proper opportunity to the respondents to rebut the evidence and after considering the evidence, if any produced by the respondent.
6. The last point raised is that the Labour Courts being special tribunals have no authority to administer special oath to a party. The reason given by the learned counsel is that there is no provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 about it. The argument is not tenable. Even in C.P.C. No provision can be found about authorising the civil Courts to administer special oath. Any authority who is authorised to administer conventional oath can administer special oath to a party or a pet son as agreed between the parties and there is no restriction in law.
7. The appellants are bound by the statement made by Saleemullah on special oath as proposed by them. The learned lower Court was thus justified in dismissing the grievance petitions of the appellants on the statement of Saleemullah made on the Holy Qur'an.
8. As a result, the appeals having no force are hereby dismissed.