' This civil revision calls in question an order, dated 19-1-1984 of the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, whereby he confirmed the order of the trial Court refusing temporary injunction to the petitioner-plaintiff.
2. The petitioner claimed in the suit that he was entitled to hold a private cattle market almost in perpetuity within the limits of the respondent-Town Committee, Ghakhar by virtue of an agreement dated 6-1-1971 executed by it in his favour for holding the same. He prayed for a permanent injunction against the respondent-Committee in order to restrain it from interfering with his right to hold the market. Alongwith the suit he made an application for temporary injunction which the lower Court refused to allow, inter alia, on the ground that the loss, if any, accruing excontracted could be measured up in money, and was not, therefore, irreparable.
3. The same view was adopted by the learned Additional District Judge who was pleased to confirm the order of the trial Court in this behalf.
4. The Revision was admitted placing reliance, upon Jamil Ahmad v. Provincial Government of West Pakistan and 4 others PLD 1982 Lah. 49, as according to the petitioner adequacy of relief by monetary compensation was not enough in this case to disentitle him from the injunction. A careful perusal of this authority would show that temporary injunction may not be allowed in a case where permanent injunction cannot be granted under section 56 of the Specific Relief Act. Ostensibly the respondent-Committee is trying to discharge its public functions and hence any injunction tending to interfere with the discharge of such duties has to be refused. Secondly it may be allowed notwithstanding the loss being measurable in-money, where it is made to appear a case of oppression against the plaintiff. In this case, according to Dr. Abdul Basit, Advocate for the respondent, the contract, if any, was not acted upon for more than a decade and further that by the very scheme of things it could not be granted to the petitioner in perpetuity. He propounded that there being no mention in the plaint of any consideration amount in the so-called contract, it was no better than a or licence which could be discontinued at the sweet-will of the licensor without running the risk of any action at law. He referred to sections 26, 63 and 64 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 and lately section 101 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, for the view that the contract without the signatures of the Chairman, as was the case here, was bad in law and further that its duration under the by-laws could be no more than a year. He emphasized that denying the respondent Committee its public functions and conversely claiming a right in perpetuity as against a period, limited only to one year under the by-laws, it appeared rather to be a case of oppression against the respondent-Committee than the petitioner-plaintiff.
He added that nothing was paid at all to the respondent all over this long period and that the same amounted to prevent the respondent from raising funds for public good. On these premises he tried to distinguish the authority referred to above.
5. On the other hand Ch. Mushtaq Ahmad Khan, Advocate for the petitioner, emphasized that the contract could have been awarded even for perpetuity and that the loss accruing could not be adequately compensated in money. It will be appreciated that the whole relationship between the parties arose out of the so-called contract which in so far as precludes the respondent-Committee from discharing its functions for public good cannot be specifically enforced nor any injunction could be issued on the basis thereof in terms of section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act. Since no receipt was shown in support of any payment having at all be made to the respondent-Committee for sharing the income of the cattle market, it looked like prima facie a case of sheer aggrandisement. It goes without saying that the conduct of the entire business of representative bodies like the respondents is strictly controlled by law, rules and by-laws which in this case seem to limit such a contract only for one year. On the face of it, therefore, to claim something in perpetuity was not much persuading. The absence of any mention of consideration for the so- called contract was rightly claimed to make at best -a case of licence which could be terminated at the sweet-will of the licensor, all the more when the element of reciporcity was not established. It remained to be a loss of money accruing on the petitioner's own showing from the breach of a contract for which ordinarily a claim for damages is the appropriate remedy.
6. I have no reason to disagree with the concurrent view adopted by the two Courts below and dismiss the Revision petition.