' Major (Retd.) Ala-ud-Din Akhtar, petitioner herein, has challenged through this writ petition order, dated 3-1-1984 of the District Collector, Lahore whereby he partly accepted petitioner's revision petition and reduced maintenance allowance of his wife fixed by the Arbitration Council at the rate of Rs.1,500 p.m. to Rs.750 p.m.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Mst. Gulzar Jabeen Bhatti, in her first application dated 11-12-1982, claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs.500 p.m. but she has been awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs.750 p.m. which is more than that claimed by her. It was next submitted that the learned Collector recorded petitioner's contentions but gave no reasons. to refute them in the impugned order. It was also contended that the order in the instant case was written by the Chairman, and was not signed by members, es such, it is not the decision of the Arbitration Council as envisaged under rule 5(6), of the Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961. It was lastly stated that the nominee of the respondent could not act as her witness and member of the Arbitration Council at the same time.
3. Learned counsel for the contesting-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that section 3 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 excluded the application of any other law, custom or usage in matters, covered under the aforementioned Ordinance. The application of the Arbitration Act and the Code of Civil Procedure was specifically barred. The Arbitration Council was only to issue certificate specifying the amount of maintenance payable by the husband. It was pointed out by him that on 3-8-1983 in presence of the nominees of the parties the Arbitration Council heard arguments and adjourned that case to 10-8-1983 for announcement of order, which was announced on the aforementioned date. The mere non-signing of the decision already arrived at by the Arbitration Council would not materially prejudice the case of the respondent. It was also contended that this point was not specifically agitated by the petitioner before the Collector as such, he is estopped to raise the same before this Court for the first time in writ jurisdiction. It was next stated that as contemplated under rule 5(6) of the Muslim .Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the decision in that instant case was by majority of members. Even otherwise in case of conflict between them, the decision of the Chairman was to be the decision of the Arbitration Council. It was stated that the nominee of a party of the Arbitration Council has to act as representative. He can act as witness on behalf of the principal and sit as member of the Arbitration Council. It was lastly stated that the petitioner did not pay single penny as maintenance to his wife although it was his legal obligation to maintain his wife and he is not entitled to equitable relief in writ jurisdiction.
4. I have taken into consideration the contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that Mst.
Gulzar Jabeen Bhatti had been awarded compensation more than that claimed by her, if seen with reference to another application moved by her during the pendency of the first one disclosing that the petitioner was man of means and could pay maintenance at a higher rate, loses its significance. The Arbitration Council after assessing petitioner's financial position could award maintenance allowance to his wife in accordance with his income. As regards the next contention that the learned Collector did not advert to the contentions raised by the petitioner in his revision petition, suffice it to say; that he provided opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and taking into consideration his submissions reduced the maintenance allowance to half than that fixed by the Arbitration Council. As regards the next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the order fixing maintenance allowance was signed by the Chairman and not other members of the Arbitration Council has no bearing on the decision because on a date prior to the announcement of order the arguments advanced by the parties were heard by the Council and the decision taken was that of the Council although communicated under the signatures of the Chairman. The Chairman and the nominee of the respondent had at least agreed to the decision and that being of two members out of three, was of majority and valid under the law. As a matter of fact the Arbitration Council was to issue only a certificate specifying the amount of maintenance payable by the petitioner. So far as the last contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned that respondent's nominee could not act as her witness and sit as member of the Arbitration Council, the law laid down in Rashid Ahmad Khan v. Mst. Nasim Ara and others PLD 1968 Lah. 93 is clear on the point. The relevant observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid report are reproduced as under:- "As for the second point the argument that the father of the respondent was disqualified to remain on the Arbitration Council to deliberate in the final adjudication because of his having made a statement as a witness for the respondent, is the tenor and spirit of the Ordinance in regard to the setting up of the Arbitration Councils. "Arbitration Council" is defined in section 2(a) of the Ordinance as a body consisting of the Chairman of the Union Council and a representative of each of the parties to a matter dealt with in the Ordinance. The very constitution of the Arbitration ,Council under this definition indicates that it is to have one representative or spokesman of either of the parties to a matter before the Arbitration Council and the Chairman has to act as the umpire. As a representative within the contemplation of the Ordinance he has to be the spokesman of the party represented by him and one can understand that the Ordinance fully recognized that the representative must need identify himself fully with the cause of the party he represents. The representative walks into the shoes of the party itself and it would be within his normal functions as a representative to make a statement on behalf of his principal. The fact that he makes the statement on oath or otherwise, as a witness or in any other capacity, favouring his party would not in any manner effect his capacity to sit on the Arbitration Council and to arbitrate in the matters, his position in the council being that-of a representative of his party throughout although he has to act also as an arbitrator. It is easily understandable that as a representative of one party he cannot be expected to speak for the other party at any stage of the proceedings, and in conceding to him the status of a member of the Arbitration Council, the Ordinance must be deemed to have taken into account has real capacity as a representative and as a member of the Arbitration Council. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Ghulam Mustafa Khan was not disqualified to remain on the Arbitration Council as its member by the fact that he had made a statement in favour of the respondent which does not in any way, impair the constitution of the Arbitration Council, nor the decision that has been given by it in favour of the respondent."
5. For the foregoing reasons I am not inclined to interfere in the impugned order in writ jurisdiction particularly because the petitioner did not maintain his wife and she had to approach the Arbitration Council for the purpose. This petition is dismissed with costs.