1. ' On 19-9-1974 the respondent filed an ejectment application against the appellant on the ground that he has defaulted in payment of rent for the months of July, August and September, 1974. It was also stated that the appellant has filed Miscellaneous Application No.2816/74 for the deposit of rent in Court to cover up the default. The appellant denied the allegation and pleaded that he had offered the rent to the respondent which was not accepted. Thereafter, money order were remitted to the respondent which were also refused and finally he filed application for permission to deposit the rent in Court. The learned Controller dismissed the ejectment application holding that no default has been committed, but the learned 1st Appellate Court reversed the order of the learned Controller.
2. ' Mr. Abdul Hafeez Siddiqui the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned 1st Appellate Court has misconstrued the evidence and the provision of law. In this regard the learned counsel contended that as on refusal to accept the money order the appellant had filed an application for deposit of rent on 17-8-1974 there was no default in payment of rent on 19-9-1974 when the ejectment application was filed. The admitted position is that there is no written agreement between the parties fixing a date for payment of rent. Therefore, the appellant was entitled to pay the rent within 60 days from the period for which the rent was payable. The entire controversy, therefore, hinges on the interpretation of section 13 subsection (2) Or of Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 which provides that the Controller may eject the tenant if in the absence of any agreement he has not paid or tendered rent due by him within 60 days for the period from which the rent is payable.
3. ' Mr.Siddiqui has contended that as the appellant had tendered rent by money order and also filed application for permission to deposit on 17-8-1974, there could be no default in payment of rent as he was entitled to tender rent upto 29th September, 1974. On the other hand Mr.S.Abbas Zia the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that in terms of the aforesaid provision of law the rent for July should have been tendered or paid upto 29th August, 1974. the learned counsel for the respondent has relied on Ghulam Abbas v. Syed Ehsan Ali SBR 1972 Kar. 230 in which the learned Judge following the view expressed in an unreported case Khalil v. Mst. Hanifan II Appeal No.364 held that the period of 60 days should be computed from the commencement of the period for which the tenant becomes liable to pay the rent and as the rent was payable from 1st August, 1962,60 days were to be computed from that day. A copy of the judgment in II Appeal No.3/64 has been produced by Mr.Abbas Zia in which it was observed; that "it was urged that a period of 60 days was to commence after one month had expired commencing from 21-12-1962. This explanation on the face of it is ridiculous and cannot be accepted." The learned Judge had adopted the reasonings of the learned District Judge which does not find place in this judgment.
4. The contention of the learned counsel falls for interpretation of the aforesaid provision of law. I have gone through both the judgments relied by Mr.Abbas Zia and do not find any reasoning in it.
5. Section 13(2)(i) contemplates that if the rent due has not been paid or tendered within the specified period the Controller may eject the tenant. As there is no agreement fixing the date for payment of rent the appellant was entitled to pay within 60 days. But the question arises from which date 60 days should be computed. A reading of section 13(2) (i) makes it clear that a tenant is liable to be ejected if he has not paid or tendered rent due within 60 days from the period for which the rent is payable. Therefore, the tenant is liable to pay or tender the rent which has become due. It is the statutory obligation of the tenant to pay rent at the end of every month, therefore, the liability to pay the rent for the month will arise after it has accrued and become due.
6. As tenant cannot be subjected to eviction for non payment of rent which is not due. In that context sixty days should be computed on the expiry of month for which rent is due. In Rehmat All v. Khadija Hakeem PLD 1967 Lah. 29 while interpreting section 13, (2) (i) following observation was made:- "Rent falls due on the end of every month and there is liability in the tenant to pay rent at the end of every month. Under clause (i) of subsection (2) of the Rent Controller may direct a tenant to put the landlord in possession if the tenant has not paid or tendered rent due by him in respect of building within 60 days from the period for which the rent is payable. The liability to ejectment accrues for non- payment of rent within 60 days of the date from which the rent is due. If, a tenant does not pay rent for 60 days from the date of its falling due then the power vests with the Controller to order his ejectment. Therefore, under subsection (2) of section 13 the tenant incures the liability to be ejected from the premises if he commits default of two months in paying rent."
7. ' In Shan Gul v. Abdul Majid PLD 1968 Quetta 45 Abdul Kadir Sheikh, J. (as he then was) while interpreting the aforesaid provision observed: 'Sixty days have to lapse from the period for which the rent is payable by the tenant before the landlord can seek eviction under section 13 (2) (i) of the Ordinance. in the case of a monthly tenancy the period for which the rent is payable is the whole month, not each day of the month. A tenancy may be monthly, fortnightly, weekly, or even a daily one, the basis in each case is the period for which the rent is payable'. The words 'the period for which the rent is payable' are extremely significant because the Legislature did not use the words' the day the rent is payable.'
8. ' In Muhammad Uris v. Ziauddin PLD 1981 Kar.
345. Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J. ( as he then was) while agreeing with the aforesaid observation set aside the order of the Additional District Judge who had held that the rent for the month of March and to be paid before 1st May, 1974. In A.B.C.O. International Corporation of Pakistan's case II Appeal No.37/81 Zahoorul Haq, J. observed that 'in the present case the rent for the month of October was to be paid by or before 30th December, 1976 and the rent of November, was to be paid by 29th January, 1977, but the same has not been done. Of course the respondent had filed the application for ejectment on 3-1-1977 when only the rent of October had become due to be paid on 30th December, 1976, and therefore, on the date of application for ejectment there was only one month's rent namely of October, 1976 which was due.'
9. ' This observation supports the view taken in Muhammad Uris's case. It therefore, seems clear that the consensus is that 60 days period should be computed from the expiry of the month for which the rent is due and payable.
10. ' On 12-8-1974 the appellant had remitted the rent for the month of July, 1974 by money order which was refused. He, therefore, on 17th August, 1974 applied for deposit of rent. Even if for argument sake the money order receipts are excluded from consideration the appellant by applying for permission to deposit the rent on 17-8-1974 shall be demeed to have tendered the rent for July, 1974 within sixty days from the date when it became payable. Therefore, on 19-9-1974 when the ejectment application was filed there was no default.
11. ' The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment of the learned appellate Court is set aside and the order of the learned Controller is maintained.