ZABFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.-Leave was granted to determine two questions of law that arise in this case. The first question is whether the remedy of filing a revision petition available to a party under the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, was dependent on his exercising right of appeal etc. Or could be exercised independently of it. The second question is whether in the circumstances of the case the bar of limitation created such a jurisdictional defect in the proceedings before the member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, as to merit interference in constitutional jurisdiction.
2. Briefly the facts are that the appellant owned and possessed agricultural land measuring 47 Kanals 3 Marlas in village Phullarwan, Tehsil and District Sheikhupura. In the consolidation scheme the appellant was allotted most of the land originally owned by him. Some of his land was allotted to respondent No, 2 and in lieu thereof he Was given about 6 Kanals land in another Khasra number, the net result was, that his holding was reduced from 43 Kanals 3 Marlas to 39 Kanals 14 Marlas. The appellant, however, did not file any, appeal against the order of the Consolidation Officer.
3. Four years after the confirmation of the scheme on 27-10-1965, the appellant filed a miscellaneous application before the Additional Commissioner/Consolidation, seeking to challenge the scheme, but his application was dismissed vide order dated 10-8-1966. He then preferred a revision before the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, which was decided by the Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan vide his order dated 16-12-1968. His revision was accepted and the order of the Consolidation Officer was modified by taking out the area to the extent of shortfall given to respondent No, 2 from his Khata and allotted to the appellant.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed in revision by the learned Member, Board of Revenue, respondent No, 2 filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, Lahore, which was accepted by the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 15-11-1973, and the order of the Board of Revenue was set aside. The reasons that prevailed with the learned Judge in the High Court were, firstly that the power of revision conferred on the Board of Revenue under section 13 of the Punjab Consolidation Holdings Ordinance, 1960, was exercisable either suo Motu at any time or on the motion of a person aggrieved by an order passed by any Consolidation Officer, but this power, having regard to the scheme of the Ordinance, can only be invoked after exhausting the remedies of appeal provided therein. Secondly it was held, that as the revisional jurisdiction was exercised on the motion of the party the same had to be invoked within the prescribed period of 90 days but in this case the revision was entertained beyond the said period of limitation. Lastly the Court held that in ally case the application of the appellant before the Additional Commissioner Consolidation did not purport to be a revision application but a miscellaneous application, on which the revisional jurisdiction was not exercisable by the Additional Commissioner and therefore, the Board of Revenue, could not have recourse to its own revisional jurisdiction on proceedings arising out of such an application.
5. We have heard the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant. The respondent, has however, not appeared to oppose this appeal and has remained absent. The provisions requiring interpretation are contained in section 13 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, which are in the following terms :- "Section 13.-(1) The Board of Revenue may -
(a) at any time of its own motion call for the record of any proceedings under this Ordinance pending before, or disposed of, by any Revenue or Consolidation Officer, or
(b) on application made to it in that behalf by a person aggrieved within ninety days of the passing of an order in any proceedings under this Ordinance by any Revenue or Consolidation Officer, and after giving such person an opportunity of being heard, call for the record of such proceedings.
(2)A Commissioner or Collector may call for the record of any case under this Ordinance pending before, or disposed of by, any. Revenue Officer or Consolidation Officer, under his control.
(3)If in any case in which a Collector has. Called for the record under subsection (2), he is of opinion that the proceedings taken or order made should be modified or reversed, he shall report the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Commissioner.
(4)The Board of Revenue may in any case called for under subsection (1) and a Commissioner may in any case called for by him under subsection (2) or reported to him under subsection (3), pass such order as it or he thinks fit: ' Provided that no order shall be passed under this section reversing or modifying any proceedings or order of a subordinate Revenue Officer and affecting any question of right between private persons without giving those persons an opportunity of being beard."
6. Now, taking up the grounds of the decision impugned before u in the reverse order, it may at once be observed that the last ground is o no substance. The fact that the application submitted by the appellant t the Additional Commissioner challenging the order of the Consolidation Officer not having mentioned any provision of law or particularly no being described it as a revision application, will not make any material effect on the exercise of jurisdiction. There is no law or any principle of law which mandatorily requires the repository of any statutory power to act only when a particular section of the statute is mentioned in the application for exercise of such power. In such proceedings it would, to our Mind, be sufficient to look at the substance of the prayer contained B in such application. The non-mention of any provision of law is a mere matter of technicality and does not in any way affect the jurisdiction of a statutory authority or result in vitiation of such proceeding. Admittedly an application was submitted by the appellant in modification or reversal of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, which was within the power of the Commissioner to do by virtue of section 13(2) reproduced above. It will be further observed that even the statute in the heading of the section or in the side note does not describe the power conferred thereunder as revisional power. We are, therefore, unable to see the force of the reasoning that merely because the application was made as a miscellaneous application, the Commissioner was rendered incompetent to act upon it.
7. The second ground pertaining to the limitation also seems to us to be untenable as no question of limitation would arise in the facts of this case. The power under section 13(1) (b) of the Ordinance in express terms provides that an application for invoking the same can be made by an aggrieved person within ninety days of the passing of an order in any proceedings under the Ordinance by any Revenue or Consolidation Officer, which is challenged. The order under challenge before the Board of Revenue was that of the Additional Commissioner by which he had dismissed the application of the appellant for modification of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. It was not disputed that the revision application of the appellant was filed before the Board of Revenue within ninety days of the said order passed by the Additional Commissioner dated 10-8- 1966. The revision application before the Board of Revenue was, C therefore, not beyond time. It will further be noticed that the power vesting in the Commissioner under section 13(2) is not split up in two categories, as has been done in the case of the-Board of Revenue under subsection (1) of section 13, whereby the power is exercisable either suo motu or on the motion of parties. The limitation of the period of ninety days on the exercise of motion of parties, does not find place so far as th Commissioner's power is concerned. The result is that there is no limitation on the exercise of power on motion of parties so far as the Commissioner is concerned and such a limitation cannot be imported or spelled out in the provisions. Apparently, therefore, the application of the appellant before the Commissioner is-not hit by the bar of limitation and as already stated, his revision application was well within time before the Board of Revenue. Thus, no question of limitation as a clog on the exercise of power arises in the present case. We cannot agree with the learned Judge in the High Court that the period of ninety days prescribed for making application under section 13(1) (b) is computable with reference to the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, when the revision application before the Board of Revenue was directed against the order passed by the Commissioner.
8. This brings us to the third and the main ground of the decision which falls for determination, i,e, whether it is necessary for an aggrieved person to exhaust the remedies of appeal to lower authorities before invoking the revisional jurisdiction under section 13 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960. By section 11 of the said Ordinance a right of appeal has been provided to an aggrieved person from the order of Consolidation Officer and a second appeal has been provided from the order of Collector passed in appeal, except when such order is an order of concurrence. This is a substantive right for a review of the decision by a higher authority in the hierarchy, on the merits of the controversy, so that the whole case is reopened in the entirety of its gamut. The power preserved under section 13, on the other hand, as the scheme of the Ordinance plainly shows, is the power of superintendence and control over the subordinate functionaries in the structure of the authorities envisaged under the Ordinance. This power appears to be vast and unbridled in its scope and amplitude, as there are no statutory limitations placed upon its reach and the manner and its exercise except the time limits on its recourse on motion of a party, and that also, in the case. Of Board of Revenue. In general the essence of revisional jurisdiction, as contrasted with the appellate jurisdiction, is that the . Revisional jurisdiction is discretionary whereas the appellate jurisdiction has to exercised on an appeal preferred as of right. A right is conferred upon the parties to appeal and the appeal becomes a continuation of the original proceedings. On the other hand the power exercised by the revisional Court or authority is not that of continuing the original proceedings but of examining what has already taken place with a view to determine whether what had already taken place suffers from any illegality or impropriety. But the extent of revisional power cannot be determined by applying any general notions or concepts, for the simple reason that this jurisdiction is a creature of the statute and is regulated by the express terms in which it is couched. Thus, in the C. P. C., under section 115, the revisional jurisdiction is limited to correcting the errors of jurisdiction committed by the subordinate Courts. Further the statute expressly provides limits as to class of cases in which this jurisdiction can operate, namely, in cases decided by a subordinate Court in which no appeal lies to the Court whose revisional jurisdiction is invoked. This, how ever, is a statutory limitation which cannot be imported in construing the scope of revisional powers under other jurisdictions. The extent and scope of such jurisdiction is regulated by the statute creating the same and would, therefore, be determinable according to the terms of relevant statute. We have found no limitation of the nature in the language of section 13 and we are, therefore, of the view that such limitations cannot be read into the provisions when non exist therein. The provisions of section 13 are in pari materia with section 164 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, which was construed in Muhammad Iqbal v. S. A. M.
Khan, Member (1). A Division Bench
(1) PLD 1970 Lab. 614 of the Lahore High Court, on a similar contention raised before it observed :- "The existence of the right of an appeal is not a bar for the exercise' of the revisional jurisdiction. A revising authority may not ordinarily exercise that power when another remedy is available in law.
However, if he decides to exercise his revisional jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that an aggrieved person has the right of an E appeal available to him, his action being within the ambit of law, cannot be questioned as one without lawful authority. In certain cases of grave miscarriage of justice or where an order is without jurisdiction, it is in fact just and proper that the authority should exercise its revisional powers to save a person of the agony of multiplicity of proceedings."
' We agree with the view taken in this decision, which is also applicable to the construction of section 13 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance. In Pir Muhammad Farid Jan v.
Colonisation Officer, Sukkur Barrege (2), although no such question was directly raised, yet the ratio of the decision seems to be in accord with the view taken by us. In that case the matter related to the revisional power of the Board of Revenue, under section 211 of the Sind Land Revenue Code, 1879, in that case the matter in dispute originated before the Assistant Revenue Officer, Sukkur Barrage, and appeals were filed against the original decision before higher appellate authorities.
The matter finally came before the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, which disposed of the same after hearing the parties. The order of the Board of Revenue was challenged before the High Court in writ jurisdiction unsuccessfully and eventually the case came to this Court. It was found that the lower appellate authorities lacked jurisdiction and as such the orders passed in appeals were held to be of no legal consequence. Yet this Court upheld the order passed in revision by Board of Revenue on the following line of reasoning :- "By section 211 of the Act, the Board of Revenue possesses power to revise an order passed by any subordinate officer and questions of legality as well as propriety of such a decision would be open in revision before the Board. The order of the Board was passed after full hearing of both parties on the merits of the case. Even if, therefore, the intermediate appellate links were weak, the final order in revision, referable as it was to section 211 of the Act, could not be successfully assailed as illegal."
In view of the above, we hold that the order of the Board of Revenue impugned in these proceedings did not suffer from lack of jurisdiction on the ground that intermediary steps of filing appeals before the lower authorities were not taken by the applicant in the revision.
9. In the view that we have taken that the revision application filed by the appellant before the Board of Revenue was not barred by limitation, it becomes unnecessary to go into the 'other point notice in the leave granting order.
10. In the result this appeal is allowed, but as the respondent has not contested the same we pass no order as to costs.
(2) PLD 1965 SC 399