' This is a Misc. Application under section 151, C.P.C. made by the applicant in probate proceedings.
The probate was granted on 27-1-1985 by the Honourable Chief Justice to be issued to the applicant in accordance with rules. The office demanded from the applicant administration bond with two sureties. The applicant thereupon has made the above application that he being Christian was exempted from furnishing any bond of security.
2. The Honourable Chief Justice while entertaining the said application observed as follows: - "The point involved is likely to be raised in many cases. In these circumstances, I issue notice to Attorney-General to appear and assist the Court in deciding the following question:- Whether a Court while issuing probate in respect of the deceased Christian and in favour of the living Christian can demand security from the person in whose favour probate is granted."
3. I have heard Mr. G.A. Raymond, learned counsel for the applicant and Mr. Liaquat Merchant, Deputy Attorney-General, on Court notice.
4. The only point for consideration is whether the applicant who is a Christian can be called upon to furnish a bond with two sureties for the probate granted to him on 27-1-1985 in respect of Will, dated 23-11-1980 of a Christian. On perusal of the office note it appears that in S.M.A. No. 66/83 the learned Chief Justice on an application under section 151, C.P.C. for exemption from furnishing bond with two sureties ordered that the applicant will only submit his personal bond whereas in S.M.A. No. 89/83 Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian ordered that the applicant will furnish one surety instead of two sureties or furnish the bungalow in question as security in terms of rule 400 with personal bond. Mr. G.A. Raymond submits that the above-said orders were passed by the learned Chief Justice and the learned Single Judge of this Court without considering any of the provisions of the Succession Act, 1925 or the case-law on the point. His submission was that the applicant being Christian stood exempted under section 291 from furnishing any bond. The section reads as under:-
(1) "Every person to whom any grant of letters of administration, other than a grant under section 241, is committed, shall give a bond to the District Judge with one or more surety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in, and administering the estate of the deceased, which bond shall be in such form as the Judge may, by general or special order, direct.
(2) When the deceased was a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person:-
(a) the exemption made by subsection (1) in respect of a grant under section 241 shall not operate;
(b) the District Judge may demand a like bond from any person to whom probate is granted."
5. Section 291(1) as quoted above envisages the grant of letters of administration on furnishing sureties in cases other than falling under section 241 of the Act, whereas clause (a) of subsection
(2) of the said section provides that in cases where the deceased was a Hindu, Sikh, Buddist, Muslim or Jaina, the Letters of Administration shall be issued on furnishing sureties. Therefore, according to the contention of Mr. Raymond Christians not having been mentioned in section 291(2)(a), the applicant stood exempt from furnishing the surety bond. He also referred to sections 228 and 241 of the Act and submitted that under section 228 the Court grants Letters of Administration without further proof of Will, whereas under section 241 the Will has to be proved.
6. Section 228 is found in Chapter I of Part IX of the Act which contains general provisions regarding the grant of probate and Letters of Administrations and it provides that :- "Administration, with copy annexed, of authenticated copy of will proved abroad. When a will has been proved and deposited in a Court of competent jurisdiction situated beyond the limits of the Province, whether within or beyond the limits of (Pakistan) and a properly authenticated copy of the will is produced, letters of administration may be granted with a copy of such copy annexed."
7. Section 241 forms part of Chapter II which makes provision for limited grants and it provides that:- "Administration with will annexed, to attorney of absent executor. When any executor is absent from the Province in which application is made, and there is no executor within the Province willing to act, letters of administration, with the will annexed, may be granted to the attorney or agent of the absent executor, for the use and benefit of his principal, limited until he shall obtain probate or letters of administration granted to himself."
8. In support of his contention Mr. Raymond relied on the following cases:-
(1) Rev. L.T. Dineen v. Emperor AIR 1938 Lah.
151.
(2) In the matter of Sir Rogerthomas PLD 1962 Kar.
744.
(3) Edward Weston Caleston v. Mrs. Theresa Chitty and others AIR 1934 All.
1053.
(4) Adwait Nath Sil.......... Petitioner In the Goods of Alexander James Milne late of Aberdean. Scotland AIR 1948 All. 351
(5) In the matter of Goods4 of Edward Carmichael McCankie. In re-Wilfrid Hazel Sell AIR 1940 Mad.
680.
9. In the first above-named case AIR 1938 Lah. 151 facts were that on an application for the grant of probate of the estate of the deceased Christian, the original Court granted the probate for which it called upon the petitioner to pay probate duty, required an inventory and accounts to be filed, and added a clause that the petitioner should furnish security. On appeal it was held that as the deceased was a Christian, security should not be demanded under section 291 and there was no other section under which the Court had power to demand a bond.
10. In the second case, PLD 1962 Kar. 744 Sir Roger Thomas, a Christian died on 19th of September, 1960, having made a will in respect of which probate was granted on 28th June, 1961 by the High Court of Justice in the District Probate Registry at Carmarthen. Later on, an application was filed in the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan Karachi Bench by Mr. R.F. Spickerell who held a power-of- attorney on behalf of the executor of the will who was absent from the province for the grant of probate for him. The question arose whether a will having been proved in England, letters of administration would be granted to the attorney of the absent executor under section 228 of the Succession Act or under section 241 of the said Act. It was, then, held that in the circumstances of that case grant of letters of administra tion with an authenticated copy of the will annexed was to be made to the attorney of the absent executor under section 228 of the Act, on condition that he executes a bond as required by section 291 of the Act.
11. The third case AIR 1934 All. 1053 appears to be entirely on a different point and is of no application at all to the facts of the instant case.
12. In the fourth case AIR 1948 All. 351 a Full Bench Judgment, one Alexander James Milne died in Scotland on 6th April, 1947 leaving property both in India and in the United Kingdom. By his Will dated 29-3-1946 he appointed one Allan Hay his executor, who obtained confirmation of the will in the Sheriff Court Aberdeen, Kincardine and Banff at Aberdeen, on 13th June 1947. The executor then appointed Adwaita Nath Sil, as his attorney for the purpose of applying to the proper Court in India for letters of Administration with an authenticated copy of the will annexed. The said attorney applied to the Allahabad High Court for a grant. The question arose as to which of the two sections namely section 228 or 241 of the Act was applicable. It was held that it was section 228 which applied in that case.
13. In the fifth case AIR 1940 Mad. 680 one Edward Carmichael McCankie, possessed of property in India, died in England leaving a will by which he appointed a person to be his executor who, after obtaining probate of the will in England, executed a power-of-attorney in favour of person in India to enable him to apply as his agent. It was held that the said agent was entitled to the letters of administration on an application under section 241 with a copy of will annexed. It was further held that furnishing of security was not a condition precedent to the granting of probate as section 228 in such a case had no application.
14. As would appear from the case-law cited above, the question of the execution of the administration bond is shown to be linked with the consideration whether the application made for the grant of probate falls within the purview of section 228 or section 241, for, the Court if acting under section 228 grants the administration, the execution of the bond with surety will be necessary whereas if the grant of administration is made under section 241 of the Act no bond shall be necessary if the deceased was a Christian. A comparative study of section 228 and section 241, makes it clear that section 228 does not make provision for the grant of administration to an agent or attorney, while section 241 assumes production of the original will by the attorney. Furthermore, section 228 applies to a case where the will has already been proved in the Court of competent jurisdiction situated beyond the limits of the province, whether within or beyond the limits of Pakistan, whereas in a case under section 241 the will has not been proved at all. Under section 228 it is only an authenticated copy of the will which is produced and the letters of administration is granted with copy annexed without further proof of the will, whereas under section 241 original will is to be produced and has to be proved.
15. Section 291 of the Act, which falls within the Chapter IV provides that:-
(1) "Every person to whom any grant of letters of administration, other than a grant under section 241, is committed, shall give a bond to the District Judge with one or more surety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in, and administering the estate of the deceased, which bond shall be in such form as the Judge may, by general or special order, direct.
(2) When the deceased was a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person;
(a) the exemption made by subsection (1) in respect of a grant under section 241 shall not operate;
(b) the District Judge may demand a like bond from any person to whom probate is granted."
'A plain reading of the above section makes it clear that every person to whom any grant of letters of administration has been made shall give a bond to the Court with one or more surety or sureties.
The only exception applies to a case when the deceased was not a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an 'exempted person' as provided under section 3(3) of the Act. The outcome of this excepting provision is that if the deceased was a Christian or a Parsi, the exception made by subsection (1) of section 291 will apply, if the grant of letters of administration has been made under section 241 of the Act. Section 241, as observed above, provides administration of estate with will annexed, to an attorney of absent executor. It thus provides for a situation that if any executor is absent from a province in which applica tion is made, and there is no executor within the Province, letters of administration with the will annexed may be granted to the attorney or agent of the absent executor for the use and benefit of its principals for a limited duration until he shall obtain probate or letters of administration granted to himself. In the instant case it is apparent that the application was filed under section 276 by the executor himself with the will annexed, which having been proved, a grant of probate was made in favour of the applicant. The circumstances of the present case, as would appear from the facts stated in the application, do not attract the provisions of section 228 or 241 inasmuch as no will has been proved in another Court as envisaged by section 228 or that no attorney for the executor absent from the Province has filed the present application for a limited duration. The instant case would thus neither fall under section 228 nor under section 241, so as to attract the provisions of section 291(1)(2)(a) of the Act and therefore, the decision as reported in PLD 1962 Kar. 744, AIR 1948 All. 351 and AIR 1940 Mad. 680 are not applicable to the facts of the present case.
16. However, it is not correct to say, as submitted by Mr. Raymond, that a probate granted under section 276 upon a will having been proved, in favour of the executor himself is analogous to the provisions of section 241, which aims at granting of letters of administration with the will annexed in favour of an attorney or agent of the absent executor for the use and benefit of his principals for limited duration until he has obtained probate or letters of administration granted to himself. The requirement of proving the will on an application filed under section 276 alone is not enough to attract the provisions of section 241 of the Act, as in section 276 it is also the permanent nature of the probate with unlimited duration by the executor himself, which is another factor dissimilar to the provisions of section 241 of the Act.
17. Mr. Raymond further submitted that there is no other provision in the Succession Act whereby the petitioner, as executor of the will of the deceased, can be called upon to execute a bond for the due administration of the estate of the said deceased whether with or without sureties, and in this respect he referred to the decision reported as Rev. L.T. Dineen v. Emperor AIR 1938 Lah. 151 noted above. With respect, I could not persuade myself to agree with the said judgment, for the simple reason that it neither discusses any case-law on the subject nor give any cogent reasons for the view expressed therein. It is also not clear whether the learned Judge was considering an application under section 241 or 276. It appears, reliance has been placed on section 291 with "some change under the new Act" which was "pointed out in the commentary by Mr. Sen Gupta" the relevant paragraph of which has not even been quoted.
18. However, the said commentary by Mr. Gupta being available in this Court Judges' Library I had an opportunity of looking into it. The comment under section 291 made by the learned author appearing, at page 928 of 1928 Edition, reads as under:- "This section (section 291) combines the provisions of the corresponding sections of the old Succession Act and the Probate and Administration Act between which there were two points of difference. Under the Succession Act of 1865 no bond could be demanded of an executor, nor of the attorney of the executor where he took out administration as such under section 241. But under the probate and Administration Act the exception in favour of the attorney did not exist and even in the case of the executor the Court could in its discretion ask for an administration bond.
' This difference is retained in this section, so that in the case of Hindus, Muhammadans, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jainas, attorney's have to execute the bonds and executors may be called upon to execute a bond at the discretion of the Court; in other cases bonds may not be demanded of the executor or his attorney.
19. It further reads:- "Except in case of a grant under section 241, the bond is comuplsory and cannot be dispensed with."
20. As would also appear from the said comment, in case an application is made under section 241, the Hidus, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jainas have to execute the bonds whereas, in other cases, say, in case of Christian or a Parsi, a bond may not be demanded, but except in case of a grant under section 241, as aforesaid, the bond is compulsor E and cannot be dispensed with in the matter of Letters of Administration as provided in section 291(1) of the Act.
21. Mr. Liaquat Merchant learned Deputy Attorney-General, on the other hand, referred to rule 400 of the Chief Court of Sind as applicable to the original side of this Court and submitted that it was discretionary with this Court to order for the execution of a bond with two or more sureties for the amount of the value of the property for which the grant has been made by the Court. The said rule reads as under:- "Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or in non-contentious matters by the District Delegate, an administration bond or succession certificate bond shall be given with two or more sureties, approved by the Nazir, for the amount of the value of the property for which the grant is made or succession certificate issued: ' Provided that, if the value is under Rs. 500, one surety only may be taken."
22. Mr. Liaquat Merchant further submitted that clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 291, which is to be read independently, gives discretion to the Court to demand a bond from any person to whom probate is granted. He, however, submitted that the discretion should be exercised in a reasonable and judicial manner. In this respect, he placed his reliance on a D.B. decision of Rangoon High Court reported as Zubeda Khatoon v. Muhammad Zakaria and another (1938) 74 I C 421.
23. Mr. Liaquat Merchant also submitted that the purpose of the bond is to safeguard the interest in the property, for example, in case some other person may claim an interest in the property, or the probate is found void at a future date or the estate is not managed in accordance with the probate.
24. Mr. Liaquat Merchant lastly submitted that there should be no distinction between a Christian and a non-Christian in the matter of furnishing administration bond on grant of probate.
25. Mr. Raymond, in reply, submitted that clause (2)(b) of section 291 is not to be read independently. It is to be read with clause (2)(a) which ends with a semi-colon. The idea underlying subsection (2)(a) seems to be that in respect of a grant under section 241 when the deceased was a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, the grantee shall give a bond with one or more sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in and administering the asset of the deceased, whereas in the case of gaurantee, under section 241, other than a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina, say Christian or a Parsi, no bond is required to be furnished. Mr. Raymond pointed out that there are a number of other provisions such as sections 4, 34, 29, 31, 57, 58, 211, 212, 213, 218, 219 and 264 which recognise and make a distinction between a Christian on the one hand and some other religious communities living in India, on the other. As the Succession Act, 1925 is a pre-independence enactment made by British Rulers of this Sub-continent, the distinction is understandable.
26. Clause (b) of subsection (2) may, however, be interpreted in two ways: if it is to be interpreted in conjunction with clause (a), as submitted by Mr. Raymond, in the cases other than a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, the Court may demand a like bond from such other person to whom the probate is granted. It would also include Christians and Parsis in its fold. If clause (b) is interpreted independently, as contended by Mr. Merchant, the interpretation of clause
(a) would be that when the deceased was a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person the bond for the grant of Letters of Administration shall be given by a person to whom a grant is made, and that no bond shall be required from a person other than those mentioned in clause (a). Consequently, a Christian or a Parsi or for that matter any person other than those mentioned in clause (a) shall not be required to give any bond for a grant under section 241.
Clause (b), reading independently, gives its discretionary power to the Court to demand a bond with one or more sureties from any person, irrespective of any caste and creed to whom the probate is granted, other than under section 241. The last interpretation, seems to be more suitable to the Scheme of the Act, and acceptable to me as it is beneficial to the public at large and is of general application. I, therefore, agree with Mr. Liaquat Merchant that clause (b) is to be read independently.
27. Mr. G. Raymond lastly submitted that there is a difference between an administrator appointed by the Court to administer the assets of the deceased and an executor appointed under the will by the testator. It is true that in case of letters of administration the administrator is appointed by the Court, and the Court insists as a condition precedent to the grant of letters of administration that the administrator funishes a bond with one or more sureties, for the due collection, getting in and administering the asset or such part or portion of the asset as may be necessary in the case of grant of letters of administration. But it is nowhere provided that the probate in the case of a Christian is to be issued necessarily without a bond. The grant of probate with or without a bond is discretionary not only in case of a Christian but in favour of all, as provided in clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 291, referred to above. For this view I am supported by a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Surrender Nath Pramanik v. Amrita Lal Pal Chaudhuri and others AIR 1920 Cal.
584. Though this case was decided under the provisions of old Act, but the said case is of some relevance. Let me first quote the provisions of section 78 of Probate and Administration Act, 1881 on which this decision is based. It reads as follows:- "Every person to whom any grant of letters of administration is committed, and if the Judge so direct, any person to whom probate is granted shall give a bond to tile Judge of the District Court, to ensure for the benefit of the Judge for the time being, with one or more surety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in and administering the estate of the deceased, which bond shall be in such form as the Judge from time to time by any general or special order directs."
28. It was thus observed in the said case that: "Under this provisions (section 78) the Probate Court is bound to take a bond in the case of administrators, but has a discretion in the case of executor."
29. 1 may also refer to a decision reported in ('47) 1947 Rangoon Law Report 307 (310) (D. B.) referred to in AIR Manual,Vol. 15, II Edition, page 197 (Foot-note) (5) which reads as under:- "The grant of probate is a judgment in rem, while the order to furnish security is a matter of discretion. The Court may under S. 291 (2)(b), dispense with security altogether. A District Court which passes an order for a grant of probate on furnishing security can vary the order for security, provided it does so in a reasonable and judicial manner."
30. In my view the rationale behind this distinction, between the grant of Letters of Administration and the probate seems to be that in matters of the grant of Letters of Administration there is no Will annexed and the Administrator is appointed by the Court, whereas in matters of Probate the Will of the deceased is annexed, appointing the Executor by the testator himself. That is why the furnishing of bond with sureties in matters of the grant of Letters of Administration is compulsory and in matters of Probate it is discretionary with the Court.
31. The probate is in the nature of administration for the purpose of administering the estate in terms of the will and for the purposes of due execution and performance of the will. I would, therefore, agree with Mr. Liaquat Merchant that to order the execution of the administra tion bond with sureties is discretionary and particularly more so in a non-contentious matter like the present one wherein all the next of kin, who are mentioned in paragraph 9 of the application, have filed affidavits waiving the notices and stating that they have no objection to the grant of the administration.
32. The real object which the Probate Court must always keep in mind is the due and proper administration of the asset of the deceased and the interest of the parties beneficially entitled thereto. The bond is taken to ensure the due administration of the estate of the deceased.
33. For the reasons stated above, it will be proper and judicious to order the applicant who holds an exalted position of Archbishop of the Romon Catholic Church at Karachi, to execute only a personal bond, without any surety, for the due performance of the Will in respect of which probate has already been granted. I, therefore, order accordingly. The application is allowed to that extent only.
Order accordingly, 1985 CLC 2211 [Peshawar] Be fore Allah Bakhsh, J MUHAMMAD SADIQ and 2 others--Appellants versus FAKHARI PASHA and 3 others--Respondents First Appeal from Original Order No. 13 of 1984, decided on 22nd May, 1985.
(a) Insurance Act (IV of 1938)-- - --S. 39--Central Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act (II of 1969), S. 2(5)-- Employee of statutory body--Such employee having been insured under Group Insurance Scheme, held, would be governed by Act II of 1969 and not by provisions of Insurance Act, 1938.
[p. 2212] A
(b) Central Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act (II of 1969)-- - --S. 2(5)--Nominee under Group Insurance Scheme--Such nominee, held, was not entitled to entire disputed amount. [p. 2212] B
(c) Central Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act (II of 1969)-- ---Ss. 2(5), 15 & 19--Term 'family', scope of--Major brother would not come within definition of family--Member or members of family could be nominated under Act II of 1969--Person nominated as beneficiary under Act not being member of family, such nomination, held, was not valid--Member of family could apply for succession certificate.
[pp. 2212, 2213] C & D
(d) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)-- ---S. 373--Object of Succession Certificate--Object was to facilitate collection of debts by person who had prima facie clear title to succession and had beneficial interest in debts--Right to Succession Certificate is to be decided in summary manner. [p. 22131 E Abdur Rehman Khan for Appellants. Z. Mahfooz Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 22nd May, 1985.
' Fakhri Pasha applied for a succession certificate with regard to a sum of Rs. 25,000 pertaining to the Group Insurance of his father Ghulam Mustafa who while in the service of WAPDA had died on 14-2-1983. His mother and two sisters who were respondents 2 to 4 supported his claim but his three uncles Muhammad Sadiq, Muhammad Rafiq and Ghulam Raza contested it. It was inter alia averred by them that Muhammad Sadiq being the nominee of the late Ghulam Mustafa was entitled to receive the entire amount exclusively and that they had spent a considerable amount on the treatment obsequies and other ancillary expenses of the deceased. The application of Fakhri Pasha was allowed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Peshawar per his order, dated 3-11- 1984 and aggrieved from it Muhammad Sadiq and others have come on appeal to this Court.
2. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that under the Insurance Law it was the nominee who was entitled to the sum secured by the policy. He referred me to section 39 Insurance Act, 1938 which contemplates that the holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may, when affecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment, nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. This provision is restricted to a policy for life insurance affected under the Insurance Act. The late Ghulam Mustafa had not taken out a policy for life under the said Act and, as such, shall not be governed by the aforesaid provision. He was an employee of the WAPDA and had been insured under the Group Insurance Scheme. The Federal Employees Benevolent Funds and Group Insurance Act, 1969 (hereinafter called the Act) would, therefore, govern the case.
3. It is an undisputed fact that the late Ghulam Mustafa had nominated his brother Muhammad Sadiq and the name of the latter was entered as nominee in the Nomination Form Exh. R.W. 1/1 as well as his service record. The question that arises is whether as a nominee B Muhammad Sadiq was entitled to the entire disputed amount and the answer, I am afraid, lies in the negative.
4. The term "family has been defined in section 2(5) of the Act to mean:-
(a) in the case of a male employee, the wife or wives, and in the case of a female employee the husband of the employee; and
(b) the legitimate children, parents, minor brothers, unmarried, divorced or widowed sisters of the employee wholly dependent upon her.
' Muhammad Sadiq being a major brother of the late Ghulam Mustafa was not a member of his family as defined above. It is envisaged by section 15 of the Act that subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules, in the event of the death of an employee, occurring by whatsoever cause, during the continuance of his employment, the Board shall pay to the family of the deceased employee a sum specified in the Second Schedule. It would be profitable in this context to refer to section 19 which reads as under:-
19. Payment of the sum assured.- (1) On the death of an employee, the sum assured shall be paid to such member or members of his family as he might have nominated in accordance with the rules in full or in the shares specified by him at the time of making the nomination.
(2) Where no valid nomination made by the employee subsists at the time of his death, the sum assured shall be paid to such member or members of his family subject to such conditions imposed with a view to ensuring that the sum is justly and equitably, utilized for the maintenance and benefit of all the members of the family as may be prescribed or may consistently with the rules, be determined by the Board or any officer authorised by the Board in that behalf.
' The term "family" underlined by me in both the sections is significant and denotes that it is a member or members of the family who is or are to be nominated and it is such nominee or nominees to whom the specified sum shall be payable. It follows that Muhammad Sadiq being not a member of the family as defined in the Act could not validly be nominated by the late Ghulam Mustafa and, as such, he was not entitled to the disputed amount or any part thereof. Secondly, since no valid nomination made by the late Ghulam Mustafa subsisted at the time of his death the sum assured was to be paid to such member or members of his family as laid down in section 19(2) of the Act reproduced above. It is manifest that Fakhri Pasha, respondent 1, being a member of the family was entitled to apply for a succession certificate and the objections of the appellants to his entitlement were without any substance.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants suggested that the question with regard to the expenses incurred by the appellants on the treatment, obsequies and other ancillary matters may be left open for decision by a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The object of a succession certificate is to facilitate the collection of debts by a person who has prima facie a clear title to the succession and has beneficial interest in the debts. The persons who have a counter-claim can establish the same by a civil suit inasmuch as the Court is required by section 373 of Succession Act to decide in a summary manner the right to the certificate. The liabilities of the late Ghulam Mustafa cannot, therefore, be adjudicated upon in these proceedings. Moreover, no decision upon any question of right between the parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties as laid down by section 387, Succession Act.
Furthermore, Fakhri Pasha, respondent 1, in compliance with the direction of the learned lower Court made under section 375, Succession Act has furnished a bond for indemnity of the persons who may be entitled to the whole or any part of the disputed amount. The object of such a bond is to render an account of the debts and security received on the foot of the succession certificate and to indemnify the aforesaid persons.
' In the result, I find that the impugned order is unexceptionable and merits no interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.