S.A.NUSRAT, J.-- This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeals Nos. K-24 and K-25 of 1978 which involve common question of law and also arise out of a common judgment of the Sind High Court dated 8-3-1977 whereby the constitution petitions of the appellants were dismissed. The facts giving rise to these appeals, shortly stated, are as under.
2. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. K-24 of 1978 is the Holy Family Hospital, which is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is stated to be carrying on charitable work on non-profit basis dedicated to the service of God and humanity and is run on charities and donations from Pakistan as well as from abroad. Donations given to the hospital are exempt from payment of income-tax by virtue of a Notification issued under section 15-D of the Income-Tax Act. 1922. The appellant applied to the Director, Excise and Taxation for exemption from the levy of education Cess under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) but such request was rejected and the appellant was informed by letter that it fell within the definition of "establishment" as given in the Ordinance and was asked to submit a return and to pay education Cess amounting to Rs.31,00 at the rate of Rs.100 per employee per year. This order was challenged in a Constitution Petition in the High Court which was dismissed as per impugned judgment.
3. Tile appellant in Civil Appeal No. K-25 of 1978 is the Liaqat National Hospital, which like Holy Family Hospital is run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
4. This hospital is also being run, on non-profit basis and one of its objects is to train nurses, midwives and other medical technicians. The contributions made to the hospital have been exempted from the payment of income-tax, and it also enjoys exemption from payment of property tax and charges of the local bodies. The appellant was served with a notice by the Excise and Taxation Officer, requiring it to submit returns under the Ordinance for payment of Education Cess. The appellant represented against such notice which was turned down. Aggrieved by such decision the appellant filed a Constitution Petition in the High Court, which was dismissed as per impugned judgment.
5. It was contended before the High Court, on the basis of the definition of "establishment" given in the Ordinance that though the to appellants did have "premises" in which workers are employed for the purpose of carrying on service, the word "service" as used in the definition of "establishment" in the Ordinance, cannot be construed as any type of service, but must be given a meaning akin to the other purposes specified in the definition on the principle of noscitur a socio. It was further contended that only such organizations, institutions and premises are liable to tax as are being run for profit or gain. The learned Judges overruled those contentions by observing that the word "service" was not defined in the Ordinance and there was no reason for construing it as analogous to business, trade or manufacture. It was held that the word "service" as used in the definition of "establishment" in the said Ordinance is to be construed as material service and the services being rendered by the employees of the to appellants were material service. It was further held that the to appellants are neither being taxed on any profit nor on the basis that they are industries, but they are being taxed because they are undertakings or premises in which workers are employed for the purpose of carrying on service. The contention that the word "service" in the definition of "establishment" in the said Ordinance was to be read ejusdem generis with the words "business", "trade" or "manufacture" was also repelled on the ground that the words "business", "trade", "manufacture'", "calling", "employment", "occupation'' or "service" cannot be construed to be of the same category, genus or class and as such the doctrine of ejusdom generis did not have any application. It was also held that the word "service" as contained in the definition of "establishment" is not restricted to "service" which results in profit or gain, but would embrace service of various kinds. In view of the above findings, both the petitions were dismissed and it was held that the appellants had been rightly served with notices for payment of the education cess under the said Ordinance.
6. Leave to appeal was granted to the appellants by common. Order dated 6-3-1978 to examine the contention whether the institutions of the appellants did not fall within the purview of the term "establishment" as defined in the Ordinance as they were not belng run for the purpose of profit or gain.
7. The Ordinance was promulgated with the object of providing education to workers' children and matters ancilliary thereto. Section 4 of the Ordinance lays down that the Provincial Government shall provide education free of cost upto matric to one child of every worker employed in an establishment referred to in section 3. Subsection (1) of section 3 of the Ordinance, which provides for the levy of education cess is as under:- "3. Levy of Education case.--(1) Every employer of an establishment in which the number of workers employed at any the during a year is twenty or more shall pay to the Provincial Government an education cess at the rate of one hundred rupees per worker per annum." . .
The word "establishment" has been defined in section 2(b) of the Ordinance as under:- "Establishment" means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workers are employed for the purpose of carrying on any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation."
There is no dispute that the number of workers employed in the institutions, of the to appellants at any the during a year is more than twenty and the appellants do have premises in which workers are employed for the purpose of carrying on service as provided in section 2(b) of the Ordinance.
The question, which falls for determination, therefore, is whether the institutions of the appellants fall within the purview of the term "establishment" for the purpose of the Ordinance. The contentions raised by the learned counsel are the same as were raised, considered and rejected by the learned High Court. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellants that they were not liable to pay education cess because the hospitals in question were not being run for the purpose of profit or gain has no force. The education cess in terms of section 3 of the Ordinance is not levied on profits of an establishment but is required to be paid by an employer of an establishment at the rate of Rs. 100 per worker per annum provided the number of such employees during a year is twenty or more. The education cess is charged fort the benefit of the education of workers' children. Such object indeed) is beneficial and has nothing to do whether the service rendered by the workers results in yielding any profit for the establishment or not. In accordance with the accepted principle of interpretation while dealing with a welfare and beneficial legislation, which indeed the Ordinance in question is,, the term "establishment" is to be given wide and liberal interpretation in keeping with the object of the legislation so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief or else it would defeat the very legislative intent.
8. The learned counsel were unable to refer to any decision dealing directly with the question involved in these appeals and some decisions which were cited at the Bar were irrelevant and hence need not be referred.
9. The judgment of the learned High Court is well considered and no exception can be taken to the findings recorded therein. In the circumstances, we find no merits in these appeals, which are dismissed, but there will, however, be no order as to costs.