' Shera etc. Respondents Nos.1 to 18 herein, filed a suit against respondents Nos.20 to 28 for possession of land measuring 397 Kanals 13 Marlas bearing Khasra numbers 1143 to 1177 situate in village Koryana, Tehsil and District Jhang. In the said suit, the Provincial Government as also Haq Nawaz, the appellant herein, were also impleaded as defendants along with respondents Nos. 20 to 28.
2. The suit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 18 was decreed by the learned trial Court in respect of Khasra numbers 1182, 1183 and 1134 observing that the said Khasra numbers were being shown as Khasra numbers 1143 to 1177 in the revenue record.
3. The decree of the learned trial Court was challenged by way of appeal before the learned District Judge Jhang by Khuda Bakhsh, Muhammad Bakhsh, Pehlwan, Allah Ditta and Inayat respondents.
In the said appeal, respondents Nos.1 to 18 as also Haq Nawaz and others were arrayed as respondents. Haq Nawaz was shown as respondent No,22 in the memo. Of appeal. After admission of appeal to regular hearing on 12-6-1972, notices were issued to the respondents in the said appeal for 12-7-1972. In cases of Haq Nawaz appellant herein (who was respondent No,22 in the appeal before the learned District Judge) it was reported by the process server that he evaded service and notice was passed on the door of his abode. On the date of hearing, i.e, 12-7-1972, he is shown to have attended the Court personally. On a subsequent date i.e, 27-9-1972, he did not appear and ex parte proceedings were ordered against him. Again, on 21-2-1973, respondent No,22 is shown to have put in personal appearance. On 2-4-1973 also he appeared personally. On 12-7- 1973, learned counsel for the contesting parties made a statement that plaintiffs (respondents Nos.1 to 18 herein) were owners of Khasra numbers 1143 to 1177 and if these Khasra numbers were located on the spot, their suit be decreed to that extent only. They had no right or interest with regard to the other land. Pursuant to these statements, the then learned District Judge got the measurement carried out on the spot. He also visited the spot on 18-11-1973 and passed a decree to the effect on that day (18-11-1973) that the plaintiffs (respondents Nos.1 to 18) were owners of land bearing Khasra numbers 1143 to 1177 shown with words A, B, C and D in the plan 'N', and thus their suit was decreed to that extent against all the defendants including Haq Nawaz. On 23-11-1973, Haq Nawaz filed an application under Order XLI, rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that appeal be re-heard. He contended that he was not served during the pendency of the appeal and an adverse decree was passed against him at- his back. He also maintained that in fact he was in possession of the land in respect of which decree was passed in favour of respondents Nos.1 to 18.
His application for re-hearing of appeal was vehemently opposed by respondents Nos.1 to 18 and otheRS, It was alleged on behalf of the said respondents that Haq Nawaz appeared before the learned District Judge on four occasions during the course of hearing of appeal. He was present even on the day when the learned District Judge visited the spot. The learned District Judge, however, dismissed the application of Haq Nawaz appellant for re-hearing of appeal, on 17-9-1974.
4. Thereafter, Haq Nawaz preferred an appeal before this Court (F.A.O. No,131 of 1974). His appeal was accepted vide this Court's judgment dated 13-3-1975 and the case was sent back with a direction that the learned District Judge Jhang should re-decide the application of Haq Nawaz submitted under Order XLI, rule 21, C.P.C. After affording opportunities to the parties to lead their evidence.
5. In compliance with the direction of this Court, the learned District Judge recorded the parties' evidence. Haq Nawaz appellant examined A.W.-1 Allah Ditta and A.W.-2 Sikandar while he himself also testified as A.W.-3. In rebuttal respondents Nos.1 to 18 examined R.W.-1 Adil and R.W-2 Khuda Bakhsh. The learned District Judge Jhang, after considering the parties' evidence adduced before him, found that Haq Nawaz appellant pill in appearance before the learned District Judge on different dates of hearing and thus had full notice and knowledge of proceedings again him in appeal. His application for re-hearing of appeal was thus again dismissed with costs, on 20-5-1977.
The appellant, Haq Nawaz, has again come up in appeal against the order dated 20-5-1977.
6. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that it was not proved that the appellant was duly served in connection with the appeal against him and that his signatures were not obtained when the judgment in appeal was passed by the learned District Judge after visiting the spot. It transpires from the contents of the relevant records that personal service of Haq Nawaz in connection with the appeal was not effected. The process server reported that he had knowledge of the pendency of the appeal but evaded service. The Court, viz. The learned District Judge, pursuant to the report of the process server, has not passed the orders of ex parte proceedings against the appellant. In fact the appellant appeared on the date of hearing for which notice was issued to him on which it was reported that he evaded service. As already observed earlier, on two subsequent hearings also, Haq Nawaz put in personal appearance in the Court of learned District Judge. His presence on the aforesaid dates of hearing in the Court of learned District Judge has been recorded by the learned District Judge in the performance of his official functions.
Presumption of due course and correctness is attached to such official records under section 114 of the Evidence Act. This presumption no doubt is rebuttable but the evidence led by the appellant to rebut this presumption is vague and meager. He has not been successful to rebut the presumption attached to the official acts. A judicial officer of the status of a District Judge is not ordinarily expected to record the presence of a party who is actually not present before him. It has been urged that may be, that some body impersonated before the learned District Judge as Haq Nawaz on the afore-said dates of hearing. This also does not appear to be possible in the presence of Advocates and other parties to the cause.
7. Regarding the other objection that signatures of Haq Nawaz were not obtained by the learned District Judge when he visited the spot, it may be observed that the real contest was between respondents Nos.1 to 18 and Khuda Bakhsh etc., respondents Nos.20 to 28. The learned District Judge obtained signatures of the contesting parties and their counsel. It, however, so happened that the land decreed through the judgment passed in appeal was found to be actually in possession of Haq Nawaz appellant. When he learnt about it, he filed proceedings for re-hiring of appeal culminating into the order giving rise to the present F . A .0 .
8. In the light of what has been said above, it is concluded that the appellant has failed to establish that he has been condemned un-heard and that an adverse judgment has been passed against him without affording him an opportunity of hearing. He has in fact himself failed to avail the opportunity although he has been putting in his appearance before the learned District Judge on different dates of hearing.
9. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in this appeal which is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.