' The decision dated 24th April, 1984 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 5, Faisalabad has been challenged in this appeal, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent for his reinstatement in service was accepted with back benefits.
2. The allegations for which the respondent was dismissed from service were that he opened fictitious accounts in the names of fictitious persons and had been making advances to the fictitious account holders and thus pocketing the money : that he on 21st December, 1981 issued a pay order for Rs, 15,000 and put fictitious signatures of Haji Muhammad Hussain & Co. And received the proceeds partly in cash and the rest by crediting in his personal account ; that he was in the habit of forging the signatures of his 2nd officer on the instruments, for example he forged the signatures of the said 2nd officer on C. D. Balance book and that he was in the habit of retaining cash instead of crediting it in the accounts of the customers and credited tile amounts when withdrawal cheques were presented.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the grievance petition is time- barred. The date of dismissal is 5th March, 1983. Grievance notice was served on 2nd May, 1983.
Simultaneously departmental appeal was lodged on 2nd May, 1983. Grievance notice given on 2nd May, 1983 was later on withdrawn vide Exh. P.
13. Reminder to the appeal was sent on 27th August, 1983. Information of rejection of appeal is Exh.
P.
16. Second grievance notice after the withdrawal of the first was given on 21st September, 1983 and grievance petition was lodged on 12th October, 1983.' It is -argued that notice of withdrawal of first grievance notice was not served, so the second grievance notice was meaningless and from the date of. The first grievance notice, the petition was time-barred. The facts of the service of first notice and its withdrawal both were admitted in para. 3 of the written statement. Since the first grievance notice was withdrawn and departmental appeal lodged, the cause of grievance arose on 7th September, 1983 when vide Exh. P. 15 information of the dismissal of appeal was conveyed to the respondent. Second grievance notice Exh. P. 16 is dated 21st September, 1983, so the grievance petition, dated 12th October, 1983 was not time-barred.
4. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the respondent was a Manager at the time he committed misconduct so was not a workman. The relevant time is when an employee is punished, because cause of grievance arises to him when any action is taken against him. He has to consider what is the forum for him to challenge the order. If at the time of punishment he is not a workman, he has to go to the civil Courts for seeking remedy, otherwise he has to knock the door of the Labour Courts. Since this was not the objection of the appellant that at the time of dismissal the respondent was a Manager, so he is a workman.
5. It has been argued that after dismissal the respondent ceased to remain a workman. The argument is not tenable. The words 'is employed' occurring in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 do not mean that at the time of bringing an action in the Labour Court, the person concerned should be in service. Not only in section 2(xxviii), but even in other enactments wherein worker, employee or servant has been defined, present tense has been used, such as section 2(1) of Standing -Orders Ordinance, 1968, section 2(n) of Workmen's Compensation Act, Factories Act, and Civil Servants Acts (Central and Provincial). If the intention of the Legislature had been that dismissed or terminated employees could not challenge the orders in the Labour Courts, there would have been no need of promulgating Labour Laws and constituting Labour Courts, because remedy by way of damages for wrongful dismissal or termination was already available in ordinary civil Courts. I, therefore, overrule the objection.
6. The other point argued is that the Wage Commission Award is not enforceable under section 25- A as it is different from the Award defined in section 2(ii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
No doubt, the Wage Commission Award is not the award as defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 but on the basis of said award, a petition C under section 25-A lies. Section 38-D is a complete answer to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. According to section 38-D, all the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 would apply to such an Award. It is thus clear that a petition under section 25-A is maintainable for granting relief for the infringement of any right guaranteed by the Wage Commission Award.
7. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.