' This judgment will dispose of S.A.O. No.484 of 1979 and S.A.O. 495 of 1979. These two appeals arise out of two different judgments passed by Ch.Ihsanul Haq Bhalli, Additional District Judge, Faisalabad by which dismissing the appeals of the appellants in the two cases he maintained the order of their ejectment from two portions of the same shop owned by the respondents in the two appeals.
2. The relevant facts are that the shop is owned in equal shares by Sardar Muhammad, etc., and Muhammad Shafi respondents in the two appeals. Sardar Muhammad, etc. gave their portion of the shop to the appellant on rent by an indenture dated 12th January, 1965. By another indenture of even date Muhammad .Shafi gave his portion of the shop also to the appellant on the same terms and conditions. The relevant condition in the two documents was that the tenancy would continue for a period of 12 years, after which by service of three months' notice prior to the culmination of the period of tenancy it would be open to the appellant to extend the tenancy for a further period of 8 years. Both the sets of landlords filed petitions for ejectment from their respective portions against the appellant on the 4th January, 1977, on the ground that they require the premises for their personal business.
3. The appellant contested the petition on the ground that firstly, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease agreement he had extended the period of lease for a further period of 5 years and as such both the petitions were premature. It was further stated that the landlords did not require the shop for their personal business since they were already carrying on their business.
However, it appears to have been impliedly admitted in the written statement that none of the landlords respondents had any shop in their possession and within the same locality or within the same municipality.
4. In the case arising in S.A.0 No.495 of 1979, the following issues were framed:-
(1) Whether the petitioner requires the shop in dispute in good faith for his personal use ? O.P.A.
(2) Whether the petition is premature in view of the preliminary objection No.17 ? O.P.R.
(3) Relief.
In the other case the issues are the same but their construction is different. These issues are as follows:-
(1) Whether the petition is not maintainable in view of the preliminary objections raised by the respondent ? O.P.R.
(2) Whether the petitioners in good faith require the rented property for personal need and occupation of petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 7 ? O.P.A.
(3) Relief.
4a. The learned Rent Controller overruled the preliminary objections in both the cases and after holding that the portions of the shop in dispute were required by the landlords for their personal business ordered the ejectment of the appellant from both the premises. This finding was maintained by the learned Additional District Judge.
5. In the case of Muhammad Shafi there is no evidence at all that the appellant ever extended the period of lease by service of any notice as required by the lease-deed. The only argument of the learned counsel in that case is that there is no evidence about the specific business which the respondent Muhammad Shafi wanted to carry on in the shop. In support of this reliance was placed on Khushi Muhammad v. Muhammad Rashid 1968 SCMR 1158 (2) in which it is held that mere expression of desire to have the shop for personal business is not sufficient unless bona fide requirement is also proved. Reliance is also placed on Barkat Ali v. Sughra and others PLD 1979 Notes 28 at p. 40 in which it is observed in Head Note 58, 'by the Karachi High Court that if the business is not specified the onus of the issue of requirement of the shop is not discharged. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on Haji Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Qadir PLD 1975 Lah. 200 in which there is an observation that each case has to be decided on its own merits, and even if the business is not specified that is not a defect vitiating the proceedings.
6. This argument was also raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in the other case of Sardar Muhammad etc.
7. So far as Muhammad Shafi is concerned A.W.1 in his case, clearly stated that Muhammad Shafi wanted to carry on hosiery busines which he had been carrying on even before this shop was given on rent to the appellant. The argument of the learned counsel is of n avail in view of this evidence about the specific character of business of Muhammad Shafi. But even otherwise this argument is without meri in the circumstances of this peculiar case. It is not a question of mere desire since it is the appellant's own case that the respondents in both the appeals are carrying on business even now. From the evidence it, appears that they have no shop at all in their possession and they are, carrying on their business by roaming in Market. In the circumstances, from the concession of the appellant the personal requirement of the, landlords is established.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the documentary evidence R.W.1/1, a notice addressed to Sardar Muhammad--Mukhtar Ahmad, respondents 1 and 2 in S.A.O. 484 of 1979, in which it was stated that as per lease agreement, the Bank hereby exercises its option to renew the lease-deed for a further period of six years with the same terms and conditions. Please acknowledge its receipt and oblige and Exh.R.1.Certificate of Posting of the same date, i.e 10-8-1976 addressed to Messrs Sardar Muhammad--Mukhtar Ahmad Exh.R.W.1/1 and R/1 both were produced before the Court on the 20th July, 1977, after the evidence of the landlords was closed, R.W.1 made a statement only about the notice and that it was sent but he did not state about the manner in which it was sent. Exh. R.1 was admitted to evidence on a tender made by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is thus clear that there is no evidence to connect R.W.1 with Exh.R.1. But there is a more strong Objection to this. This evidence can at most be relied upon for the purpose of raising presumption that the notice sent in the ordinary course of business on the 10th August, 1976, must have reached the addressees i.e. Sardar Muhammad--Mukhtar Ahmad the landlords, but Sardar Muhammad and Mukhtar Ahmed are not the only landlords. The number of landlords is thirteen.
Clearly, therefore, the notice has not been served upon all the landlords and the appellant cannot take advantage of the notice Exh.R.W.1/1 which is addressed only to two persons. Even otherwise this presumption stands rebutted by the unrebutted evidence of Sardar Muhammad who clearly stated that no notice was received by them. In the circumstances of this rebuttal, it was incumbent upon the appellant to prove actual service of the notice which has not been done in this case.
9. The appeals are without force and are dismissed with costs.