' This appeal is directed against the order, dated 12-3-1984, passed by the 1st Sind Labour Court at Karachi granting an interim order in the nature of mandatory injunction directing the appellants to put back the respondent on duty which he was performing on 14-3-1982 with full back benefits till the disposal of the main grievance application.
2. The facts leading upto the appeal briefly stated are that the respondent was an employee of the appellants Habib Bank Ltd. He was posted as Manager of the North Napier Road Branch, Karachi at the relevant time when misconduct was alleged against him. He was alleged to have caused loss to the Bank to the tune of Rs.32,37,553.22 by his fraudulent acts. He was placed under suspension vide order, dated 14-3-1982 without having been served with a charge-sheet. He was charge- sheeted subsequently vide letter, dated 17-6-1982. A domestic enquiry was held against him on the charges. He was found guilty and ultimately was dismissed from service on 24-10-1982. On coming to know that the dismissal order was issued, he filed a Civil Suit against the appellants in the Court of Senior Civil Judge at Karachi praying for a declaration that the suspension order, show-cause notice, and enquiry proceeding were illegal and inoperative and further praying for restraining the appellants from ousting him from service. In the suit he filed an application for temporary injunction. He was granted a temporary injunction, which was ultimately vacated by the learned District Judge, vide his order, dated 23-5-1983, in appeal. The respondent moved the High Court in Revision and got a status quo order. Ultimately on 30-1-1984 the suit filed by him in the Civil Court was dismissed for non-prosecution on account of his absence, vide order, dated 30-1-1984. It appears that for the reason that he failed to get a substantial relief from the Civil Court, he filed an application under section 25-A, I.R.O., 196c, before the Ist Labour Court, Karachi calling in question the order of his suspension, dated 14-3-1982 as illegal and incompetent as the period of his suspension was beyond four weeks in contravention of the provisions of Standing Order 15(5). It appears to have accrued to him for the first time that he was a workman within the meaning of section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Alongwith his application he also moved the learned Labour Court in an application for an interim order of the nature of mandatory injunction praying for putting him back on duty pending disposal of his main application. The learned Labour Court on hearing the counsel appearing on behalf of the parties directed the appellants to put him back on duty he was performing on 14-3-1982 on which date he was suspended with full back benefits till disposal of his main grievance application. Aggrieved by this order, the appellants have come in this appeal.
' I have perused the material evidence available on the record and have also heard the learned counsel for the parties Mr. Obaidur Rahman Khan for the appellants and Mr. Muhammad Humayun for the respondent. Mr. Obaidur Rahman Khan for the appellants raised contentions; firstly, that the relief granted by the learned Labour Court was much beyond the scope of the relief asked for by the respondent in the application for a temporary injunction; secondly, that the relief granted by way of interim order in the nature of mandatory injunction, would finally dispose of the main application filed under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969; thirdly, that the provisions of section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 under which the main application has been filed do not contemplate the interim orders in the nature of temporary injunction in individual grievances brought before the Labour Court; and finally that the principles for grant of temporary injunction, a prima facie, balance of convenience and irreparable loss have not been established in favour of the respondent and the injunction granted is not legally warranted even on that score.
4. As regards the first contention, there is no doubt that the relief granted by the learned Labour Court by way of temporary injunction pending the main application under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 is clearly to the effect that the respondent be re-instated with effect from 14-3-1982, when he was placed under suspension with full back benefits till the disposal of the main application, when the relief asked for in the application for temporary injunction was only to the effect that he may be put back on duty. It is, therefore, clear that the relief granted is beyond the scope of the relief asked for in the application for temporary injunction and I find force in the contention of Mr. Obaidur Rahman Khan that no such relief can legally be granted.
5. Coming to his second contention, I find sufficient force in the plea to the effect that the interim relief that the respondent be put back on duty with effect from 14-3-1982 when he was suspended, with full back benefits till the disposal of the main application cannot be legally granted as in fact it disposed of finally the main application itself. It is an established principle of law of Injunction that no relief by way of temporary injunction can legally be granted when such a relief decides the main application itself, as there would be nothing left for adjudication and decision finally. This principle is so well-established that neither it needs any elaborate discussion nor any authority in support of it. Mr. Muhammad llumayun for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Messrs Crescent Films, Mangal Mansion Royal Park, Lahore v. Mumtaz Muhammad Khan and 3 others reported in 1979 SCMR 107 in support of his contention to the contrary, but I find that this authority is absolutely besides the issue involved, and is not at all applicable. Accordingly, there is no doubt that no relief by way of temporary injunction can legally be granted when such relief would finally dispose of the main application, as there would remain nothing left for adjudication and decision finally.
6. So far the third contention raised by Mr. Obaidur Rahman Khan is concerned, a plain reading of the provisions of section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, would clearly show that no relief by way of interim order is contemplated by the provisions of subsection (5) of section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, which reads as follows.
"Subsection (5).-- In adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4), the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case."
This subsection if read with the foregoing subsections of section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 would make it clear that no interim order by way of temporary injunction is contemplated by it, either restraining the employer from removing his employee or directing him to put back his removed employee on duty or to re-instate him with back benefits pending disposal of the main grievance application under section 25-A,I.R.O., 1969. However, Mr. Muhammad Humayun for the respondent has relied on the decision of Karachi High Court in the case of L.I.C.I./I.C.A. Employees' Union v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation, Karachi and another reported in PLD 1975 Kar. 858, in support of his contention to the effect that the Labour Court has powers to pass an interim order by way of temporary injunction. I am certain the learned counsel has failed to appreciate that this decision arose out of absolutely different facts and circumstances, when an application was filed before the Labour Court under section 34, I.R.O., 1969 for enforcement of pre-existing rights arising out of settlement. The facts and circumstances of that case are, therefore, absolutely distinguishable and would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case wherein the respondent has brought in an individual grievance under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, before the learned Labour Court. In that respect reference is invited to Division Bench decision of the Karachi High Court in the case of Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi, and another reported in PLD 1973 Kar. 189 which decision was referred in the above-mentioned Single Bench decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent. In this Division Bench decision an individual grievance, was brought in before the Labour Court under section 34, I.R.O., 1969, when the individual grievances were also being brought before the Labour Court under that section, before the amendment was brought in by the Act XXIX of 1973, whereby the words "or workman" were omitted from section 34, I.R.O., 1969. The learned Judges of the High Court in this decision held that the Labour Court pending the main application has no authority to pass an order in the nature of interim injunction under Order XXXIX, rule 1, C.P.C., restraining the employer from terminating the services of the employee.
This authority is applicable on all fours to the facts and the circumstances of the instant case and I am clear in my mind that section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969, where under also individual grievances can be brought before the Labour Court for adjudication does not contemplate passing an order in nature of temporary injunction either restraining employer from terminating the services of his employee or directing him to put back his removed employee pending 2, disposal of the main application. I would, therefore, find substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants in that respect and I am clearly of the view that no such order by way of temporary injunction pending disposal of the main application is contemplated by section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, and the Labour Court legally has no power to pass such an order.
7. I would next come to the last contention raised on behalf of Mr. Obaidur Rahman Khan for the appellant back. It would suffice to say that it occurred to the respondent after having failed to get substantial relief from the Civil Court that he was a workman within the meaning of Standing Orders and he filed an application under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969. This fact would be material to determine as to whether the respondent has a prima facie case or not. However, the learned counsel for the parties before the learned Labour Court in that respect (sic). Accordingly, in view of my findings on the issues abovementioned, it would be unnecessary to give a finding on this.
8. Confronted with the situation, the learned counsel for the respondent, Muhammad Humayun has contended that this appeal is not maintainable as the order complained of, is not a "decision" within the meaning of section 37(3) of the I.R.O., 1969. As interpreted by Sardar Muhammad lqbal Khan Mokal in his "Law Terms and phrases", the expression "decision" has a wide connotation.
Whenever a question is determind or a definite opinion is formed or a judgment is rendered or a conclusion is arrived at after weighing the reasons for and against the proposition, it is "decision".
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a judgment or decree pronounced by Court in settlement of a controversy submitted to it and by way of an authoritative answer to the questions raised before it, is a "decision". It was observed in the case of Pakistan Shipping Corporation and another v. Rustom F. Cowasjee and 5 others in PLD 1982 Lah. 671, that it is true rule of interpretation of laws that a statute which creates rights in favour of citizens is construed liberally in their favour and a statute which imposes liabilities or takes away their rights is construed narrowly and strictly. I would in that respect also invite reference to the authority in the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wall Khan reported in PLD 1976 SC 57, wherein it was observed that word "decision" is a comprehensive term having no fixed legal meaning and may equally well be employed as referring even to ministerial acts. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the word "decision" is so comprehensive that it would include even an interim order. Considering the connotation of the word "decision" in section 37(3). I.R.O., 1969, in the light of the above-mentioned authoritative views, I am clear in my mind that "decision" in subsection (3) of section 37 of the I.R.O., 1969, would include both final as well as interim orders. In that view of the matter, I find no force in the contention raised on behalf of the respondent by his learned counsel. In my view, therefore, the appeal is legally maintainable.
9. The result is that the impugned order passed by the Labour Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The main application filed under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, is withdrawn from the Labour Court No. I, Karachi and is transferred to Labour Court No. II, Karachi for disposal according to Law.