' The second appeal is addressed against the order of the learned District Judge, Mirpur passed on 18th June, 1984, who concurred with the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the first appeal.
2. Alif, respondent purchased the land in dispute from Fazal Dad, vendor, through a sale-deed dated 13th November, 1979. Ghulam Rasool challenged the sale in exercise of his prior right of purchase and brought a suit for possession. The superior right of the pre-emptor was accepted but the suit was dismissed on account of exclusion of the land from the operation of law.
' The appeal raises the controversies--
(i) actual price of the suit land, and
(ii) interpretation of phrase "so displaced" appearing in the Notification issued under section 6(2) of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, whereby sales of land made in favour of Mangla Dam affected and displaced persons were exempted from the operation of provisions of the Right of Prior Purchase Act.
4. The first objection pertains to the price of suit land. According to t.the vendee, the price of the land was fixed as Rs.50,000 out of which a sum of Rs.29,000 was paid to the vendor at the time of the Settlement of the bargain and the balance was paid at the time of registration of the sale- deed. The contrary view was that the actual bargain was settled at and the price paid thereby was only Rs.21,000 and a sum of Rs.50,000 was entered in the deed to defeat the superior right of pre- emptor. The relevant evidence of the parties consists of the testimony of Alif, vendee and Allah Dad, D.W. Alif, vendee-respondent, in his statement recorded on 5th September, 1982, deposed that a sum of Rs.50,000 was settled as the price of the land out of which Rs.29,000 were paid earlier and the balance was paid at the time of registration before the Sub-Registrar. In answer to a question in cross-examination, it was disclosed that the earlier payment was made in presence of one Muhammad Sadiq son of Bagh Ali at the residence of Fazal Dad, but no receipt was acquired for such payment. Fazal Dad, Vendor, and Muhammad Sadiq before whom the payment was alleged. to be made, were not produced to corroborate the vendee. Failure to produce the vendor and Muhammad Sadiq, was not explained by the vendee. The onus of issue, that the alleged price was fixed in good faith or actually paid to the vendor, was on the defendant-vendee. As the defendant- vendee failed to produce evidence in support of his claim, the finding is, obviously, unsustainable.
On the other hand, Allah Dad who appeared on behalf of the pre-emptor, testified his presence at the time of Settlement of the bargain and fixation of Rs.21,000 as price of the land. The witness was not shown interested or hostile to the opposite party. The subordinate Court failed to appreciate the testimony of Allah Dad in a juxtaposition to the bald statement of Alif, vendee. Failure of the subordinate Courts to appreciate the evidence in its true perspective, leads to the conclusion that their finding on the question A of actual price of the land is misconceived.
5. Another relevant evidence to the issue of price is the registered sale-deed. The recitals of the deed do contain entries that a sum of Rs.50,000 was settled as the price of the land, out of which Rs.29,000 were received earlier. The recitals of the sale-deed and admission of receipt of part payment of the price earlier to the registration, is binding only on the vendor and not on the pre- emptor. This is so as the pre-emptor was neither a party to the bargain nor he made such an admission, in any other capacity. Thus, the finding of the subordinate Courts on the question of price of the land is reversed and it is held that the price of the land, settled and 'paid was Rs.21,000, paid in presence of the Sub-Registrar.
6. The second objection confines to interpretation of the Notification which excluded the specific sales from the operation of the provisions of the Right of Prior Purchase Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act). At the time of construction of gigantic Mangla Dam, more than 100-villages were affected. The Government prepared a scheme of rehabilitation of persons affected by the construction of Mangla Dam and decided that displaced families would be settled in Punjab as well as in New Mirpur Town and hamlets, situate on the periphery road. On the representation of the affected persons, it was further decided to exempt the sales of immovable property from the mischief of the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act and Right of Prior Purchase Act, so that the affected persons were saved from litigation to settle at convenience and adequately. On this view of the matter, both the Punjab Government and Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government issued the relevant Notifications to exempt the sales of land and built-up property from the application of pre-emption laws. In Azad Kashmir, the first Notification was issued on 15th October, 1964. It is postulated that the alienations of land situate outside the Mangla Dam affected area, made in favour of displaced persons certified to be so affected by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs, shall be exempted from the operation of the provisions of the Act. The interpretation of the Notification came under consideration before a Full Bench of this Court, in Ghulam Rabbani v.
Maqbool Khan PLD 1971 A J K 68 wherein the view of the minority was that the Notification was enforceable in favour of all persons whose interest, direct or indirect, suffered in execution of the project of the Dam, whereas the counter-view of the majority was that the provisions of the Notification were attracted only in those cases where the alienation was made in favour of persons whose property was acquired and as a result of such acquisition, the owners were displaced. The anomaly raised in the interpretation of the Notification was removed by subsequent Notifications which expressly provided that only such sales of immovable property shall be exempted from the operation of the provisions of the Act which were made in favour of Mangla Dam affected and displaced persons, certified to be so displaced by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs.
7. The proposition raised herein is that the certificate of Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs, by itself is not a conclusive proof to give the benefit of the Notification to sale made in favour of a person claiming as Mangla Dam affected and displaced person. The certificate being rebuttable, it was essential to look for other independent tangible evidence. In the instant case, as in addition to the certificate, Exh.D.A., parties also felt advised to lead oral evidence in support of their respective claims, it was, therefore, argued that the question of exemption from the operation of the provisions of the Act, might be settled on the basis of total evidence of parties.
8. A well-acknowledged norm of interpretation is that the words of a statute are construed by assigning ordinary primary meanings. When the words are themselves precise, explicit and unambiguous, then it isB no more necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. 'Craies on Statute Law', at page 65. described as:- "If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words temselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law-giver Where the language of an act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature."
9. For settlement of the proposition, the provisions of the Notification are reproduced below:- "In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of section 6 of the Jammu and Kashmir Right of Prior Purchase Act, 1993 (Bikarmi), as in force in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and in continuation of this office Notification No.2591-94/Sl/72, dated the November 18, 1972, No.1727-30/SL/76, dated the April 25, 1976 and No.55-66/SL/77, dated the January 8, 1977, the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is pleased to declare that in the whole of Azad Jammu and Kashmir tarritory no right of prior purchase shall exist with repect to the sale of land, including built up property, made----in favour of a person who is affected by the construction of Mangla Dam and certified to be so displaced by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs.
' Nothing in this Notification shall be deemed to affect any decree passed in favour of the pre- emptors prior to the date of this Notification."
' It is evident from the language of the Notification that the provisions of the Act are not attracted with respect to the sale of land, including built-up property, made in favour of a person who is affected by the construction of Mangla Dam and certified to be so displaced by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs. The conditions precedent as contemplated by the Notification, are:-
(i) one must be affected;
(ii) in consequence of 'affected', he must be displaced, and
(iii) the satisfaction of the two requisite conditions, must rest on the certificate of Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affiars.
' Thus, on one hand, it is made imperative that a person affected must necessarily be displaced as well. A person affected but not displaced or a person displaced otherwise than affected by the construction of the Mangla Dam, was not covered by the exemption contained in the Notification.
The Notification preconceived two stages simultaneously. The other aspect of the intention of the Legislature is that a person affected by the construction of Mangla Dam and so displaced must bear a certificate from the authority of the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs. In the present case, undoubtedly, the vendee-respondent fulfilled the requisite condition by production of certificate by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs, to avail the benefit of the Notification. Thus, primary evidence in such like cases, is the certificate issued by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs.
Nevertheless, the certificate by itself was not deemd sacrosanct in presence of the likelihood of misrepresenta tion, forgery and alike possibilities. This was so as the particulars of the certificate.
Ordinarily, rested on the record of rights and the record of the Collector Land Acquisition on whose report, the Commissioner Mangla Dam Affiars issued such a certificate. Thus, in presence of the possibilities and chances of deception and collusion, it was considered expedient to treat the evidence of certificate like any other evidence. The evidence of certificate, therefore, was treated as a rebuttable peace of evidence. The credibility of such an evidence was tested in the light of counter-evidence led in rebuttal. In this view of the matter, in Raj Wali's case PLD 1981 Azad J K 71, it was observed that in a case where a certificate and its character is challenged by a party, the Court is vested with power to test the bona fides and credibility of such a certificate. It is, therefore, agreed that a certificate issued by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs, although a primary evidence, yet its correctness is subject to the test of the Court.
10. It is accepted that the land and houses of the vendee were acquired for the construction of Mangla Dam, as such he is an affected person, as contemplated by the Notification. The objection is that despite acquisition of the property, the vendee was not a displaced person, as tie still lived in the acquired house, by its repurchase at reduced rate one-fourth of the assessed value. Therefore, emphasis was made t satisfy that the vendee was not entitled to the benefit of the Notification. The phrase, "so displaced" received attention of this Court in 'Sattar Muhammad v. Muhammad Latif' PLD 1982 Azad J K 31 and it was assigned the following meaning:- "To move from the place."
' The dictionary meanings of word "displace" as described in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, are as:- "Shift from its place (persons), remove from office, oust, take the place of, put something else at the place of, replace."
' Keeping in view the language of the Notification and its primary object, no other than the meanings detailed above can be assigned to the word "displaced" used in the Notification. On acquisition of the property, the last owner is, obviously, replaced by successor-in-interest who ousts him for all practical purposes. In present case, it is accepted that the vendee was divested of his possession by acquisition but the allegation is that he repurchased the houses and continued his living, without shifting to a new place. It is undisputed that Mangla Dam reservoir level is 1210 ft. from Sea level. All lands and built-up property, within the reservoir, have been acquired. Maximum water level is maintained upto 1202 and provision to meet an emergency of flood rise, is kept. Thus, in some places people do reside beyond the level of 1202 and within 1210 ft. level. But such persons live within the limits of emergency zone, at their own risk. Moreover, as they have no right to live within the zone, they can be forced to vacate it at any time. Their temporary residence is purely at the mercy of high flood in river Jhelum, and pleasure of the Mangla Dam authorities. Thus, by fiction of law, a person whose house has been acquired and in conse quence thereof, he is divested of his possession in due course of Law, despite his temporary residence in the said house, is a displaced person; within the purview of the Notification.
11. Apart from the fact that the oral testimony led by the appellant is self-contradictory, as such incredible, its reappraisal is not permissible in presence of its concurrent appreciation by the subordinate Courts. The learned counsel for the appellant was unable to satisfy that the concurrent finding of facts rested on misconceived, misreading, non-reading or mis-interpretation of evidence.
12. The aforesaid analysis leads to the inference that the subordinate Courts rightly rejected the claim of the appellant by recording dismissal of the suit. There is no force in the appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed with costs.