1. ' ABDUL HAYEE KURESHI, C. J.-The present petition has been filed by Ghulam Rasool and Ghulam Mustafa, who claim to be voters in National Assembly Constituency No, 196, to a seat, which is described as "Karachi-7". The grievance of these petitioners is that respondent Muhammad Ramzan, who is described in the title of the petition as "son of not known, Muslim, adult, residing at 125, Haji Rahim Khan Goth, Model Colony, Karachi", and who has offered himself for election to the National Assembly and whose nomination paper has been filed, scrutinised and accepted, is not entitled to contest for reason of disqualification contemplated by subsection (8) of section 10 of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Election) Order, 1977 (P. O. No, 5/1977). This provision contemplates disqualification on the following terms :- "(8) if he, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account or as a member of a Hindu undivided family, has any share or interest in a contract, not being a contract between a co-operative society and Government, for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any contract or the performance of any services undertaken by Government."
2. ' Admittedly, none of the two petitioners objected to the filing of the nomination paper, nor appeared at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers, nor did they file an appeal against the acceptance of nomination papers. However, Mr. S. Abrar Hassan states that, since the two petitioners were not contesting candidates, or, election agents of the contesting candidates, or, person authorised by election candidate to attend the scrutiny of nomination papers, these petitioners had no right, or opportunity to appear and object to the acceptance of the nomination papers.
3. ' In order to assimilate the remedies, which are provided by the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (Act LXXXV of 1976), it is necessary to reproduce such provisions in the above Act as are relevant. The first three subsections of section 12 of the said Act, which are relevant in the context, read as follows :- "12. Nomination for Election.-(1) Any fifty electors of a constituency may nominate a duly qualified person to be a member for that constituency.
(2) Every nomination shall be made by a separate nomination paper in the prescribed form which shall be signed by all the fifty proposers and shall contain a declaration signed by the candidate that he has consented to the nomination and that he is not subject to any disqualification for being elected as a member.
(3) Every nomination paper shall be delivered by any of the proposers to the Returning Officer, or his nominee, who shall acknowledge receipt of the nomination paper specifying the date and time of receipt."
4. ' Section 14 of the said Act deals with scrutiny, and the same to the extent of relevancy reads as follows :- "14. Scrutiny.- (1) The candidates, their election agents, and proposers, and one other person authorised in this behalf of each candidate, may attend the scrutiny of nomination papers, and the Returning Officer shall give them reasonable opportunity for examining all nomination papers delivered to him under section 12.
(2) The Returning Officer shall, in the presence of the persons attending the scrutiny under subsection (1), examine the nomination papers and decide any objection .Raised by any such person to any nomination.
(3) The Returning Officer may, either of his own motion or upon any objection, conduct such summary enquiry as he may think fit and may reject a nomination paper if he is satisfied that-
(a) the candidate is not qualified to be elected as a member."
5. Subsection (5) of section 14 provides for an appeal against the decision of the Returning Officer in cases of acceptance, or, rejection of a nomination paper. This provision reads as follows :- "(5) An appeal against the decision of the Returning Officer under subsection (4) shall lie to the Commissioner or, in the case of a constituency within the territorial jurisdiction of a Bench of a High Court, to a Judge of the High Court, nominated by the President in consultation with the Commissioner and the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall be summarily decided within such time as may be notified by the Commission and any order passed thereon shall be final."
6. On a reading of the several provisions from the Representation of People Act, which have been reproduced above, it would appear that, except in the matter of filing a nomination paper, the remedies by way of appeals at the time of scrutiny, and even appeal against that could be filed by any person. Section 14, which deals with scrutiny, does not state, or, describe as to who are the persons authorised to object to the acceptance of a nomination paper. On the contrary, it is stated that the Returning Officer may, either on his own or upon any objection, conduct a summary enquiry and reject a nomination paper. To that extent, Mr. S. Abrar Hassan states that objection could be raised only if the petitioners were authorised persons to appear at the time of scrutiny. He states that subsection (1) of section 14 only contemplates the appearance of candidates, election agents and authorised persons at the time of scrutiny, but this subsection does not state that, besides these persons, none else could appear. On the other hand, since the power of scrutiny of nominations could even be exercised by the Returning Officers suo motu, the petitioners could have sent objections in writing to the Returning Officer for examination. Even this they did not do.
7. Similarly, subsection (5) of section 14 of the same Act, which deals with appeals relating to acceptance or rejection of nomination papers does not prescribe, or, lay down as to who could prefer such an appeal, and, in such circumstances, it would not be reasonable to state that only a contesting candidate could file an appeal against the acceptance of the nomination paper of another candidate. It must be stated that the statute, when it wishes to provide for a limited remedy, or, remedies only to a limited class of persons, it generally says so succinctly. In the instant case, there is no such limitation.
8. The petitioners, not having availed of any one of the remedies, cannot be allowed to agitate that point before us in Constitutional jurisdiction.
9. ' The next point, that has been urged by Mr. S. Abrar Hassan in regard to maintainability of the petition, is that, since the dispute concerns an election to a public office, any person could bring a petition, for such petition seeks remedy in the nature of quo warranto. He has invited our attention to a decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Fateh Khan v. Sharaaf Khan (1) decided by a Division Bench. He has particularly invited our attention to paragraph 7 in the same judgment. It reads as follows : - "7. With regard to the second submission of the respondent that the petitioner is not an aggrieved party and, therefore, has no locus standi to seek any relief, we need only draw attention to Article 9(1) (b) (ii) of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, which permits any person, not necessarily an aggrieved person, to file a petition for quo warranto. There is, therefore, no force in this submission, which is rejected.'
10. ' A bare reading of the above-quoted passage from the judgment of the Lahore High Court would show that the learned Judges of that Court were dealing with the case of an election after the elections had taken place and the respondent had been elected. An objection was raised that such election could only be challenged by a contesting candidate. On the other hand, the petitioners relied on the provisions of Article 9 (1) (b) (ii) of the' Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, which provides that a remedy in the nature of a writ of quo warranto could be sought by any person. The term' quo warranto has been explained in numerous judicial decisions, and,
(1) PLD 1984 Lab. 106 shortly put, the term means the calling into question of a person holding a public office. Since every person has a right to say that persons, holding public office, are duly elected and hold office properly and in accordance with law, the right to move a High Court for grant of remedy in the nature of quo warranto dwells in every individual. The situation, at present, is different, for the respondent No, 4, Muhammad Ramzan, is not holding any public office today. The concept of a right in the nature of quo warranto, therefore, is not attracted at present. This case from Lahore jurisdiction is, therefore, completely distinguishable.
11. ' There is another feature of the case, which also deserves mention, and that is in regard to identity of respondent No,
4. The description of this respondent in the title has been reproduced in an earlier part of this order. Mr. S. Abrar Hassan has produced some letters, which have been written on a printed letterhead, which reads follows :- "Muhammad Ramzan Katiar, Royalty Contractors (Karachi Division), Directorate of Industries and Mineral Development Department, Government of Sind."
12. ' The name of respondent No 4 has, according to Mr. S. Abrar Hassan, been wrongly typed as "Muhammad Hassan", but even if we assume that this name is of Muhammad Ramzan, still Muhammad Ramzan, respondent, in the various letters, that are placed on the record, has described himself as "Muhammad Ramzan Katiar", and what is more that his address in Form V, which is the list of contesting candidates prepared by the Returning Officer, is shown to be "125 Haji Rahis Khan Goth Model Colony Karachi". Again, an annexure to the present petition shows the address of Muhammad Ramzan Katiar to be "3/273, Hahim Raza Road, Model Colony, Karachi-27".
13. This address again is vastly different, from the address of Muhammad Ramzan, the contesting candidate, as shown in Form V, prepared by the Returning Officer. In these circumstances, even identity of Muhammad Ramzan, Contractor, is in serious doubt.
14. ' For all the above reasons, we are of the view that this petition does not merit to be admitted, and we dismiss the same in limine.