1. ' Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are the sons of late Khairat All who was the owner of the house in dispute situated at Ilyas Street, Kharadar, Karachi. By an agreement dated 20th January 1972, he let out the disputed premises to the present appellant on monthly rent of Rs.25 per month. By reading para. 1 of the agreement it appears that the premises consisted of 1st Floor, 2nd Floor, 3rd Floor and top floor and treated by the parties as a residential premises. Subsequently, the ground floor was used for commercial purposes. But there was no dispute that basically, this is a residential unit.
2. ' The father of the respondent (Khairat Ali) died on 1-1-1973, and his two sons Shaukat An and Muhammad. Ali the respondents in this appeal became the landlord. The appellant started paying rent to them. On 22nd May 1982, the two brothers Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Ali who were the owners of the premises filed a Rent Case No. 2308 of 1980 in the Court of IIIrd Rent Controller Karachi praying ejectment of the appellant on the ground of personal need. It was stated that one of the brothers namely Shaukat Ali had gone to Saudi Arabia and has now returned and the premises in question are required for his occupation. The written statement was filed by the present appellant in which the allegations in the application were denied. The defence set up was that the opponent had spent some money on renewal and repairs of doors, windows and on laying pipeline, electricity and gas fitting of the premises with the understanding that the opponent was to live in the premises permanently It was further alleged that the landlord had agreed to sell the property in question for Rs. 16,000 out of which 10,000 was deposited by the opponent. On these pleadings the learned Rent Controller proceeded to dispose of the case and only one material issue was framed which is as follows:-
(1) Whether the premises in dispute is required by the applicant bona fidely for their own use?
(2) What should the order be?
3. ' The parties led evidence in support of their respective pleas. Applicant Shaukat All examined himself as Exh. 5, while opponent Ghulam Hussain examined himself as Exh.
6. Both were cross-examined by each other. The learned Rent Controller by his order dated 17th December, 1981, allowed the application and directed the opponent/ appellant to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the applicant. The applicant has filed this appeal against this order. According to this order the applicant Shaukat Ali is a licensed plumber and was working in Saudi Arabia and has now returned to stay in Pakistan. He is living with his brother since his return to Pakistan. The two families of two brothers consisting of 15 members are facing hardship on account of shortage of accommodation, at present. The Rent Controller was further impressed by the fact that "Not a single question is put to the applicant that their family does not consist of 15 members or that he has any other shop for his business or that the premises in possession of the applicant is quite sufficient to meet his requirement". The opponent in his affidavit in evidence has also not challenged the need of the applicant.
4. ' The Rent Controller in his order has also examined the pleas raised by the appellant but it appears that he remained unconvinced.
5. ' Learned counsel for the appellant now before me in this appeal has relied on para. 6 of the lease agreement, which is as follows:- "So long tenant pays the rent regularly, the landlord will not ask tenant to vacate on any ground. If when tenant vacates he will be returned his deposit and will be entitled to remove his water pump and machine and other things whatever is his. The landlord can pay compensation for the same if he wants the tenant not to remove."
6. 'I may state that even at this stage the learned counsel has not seriously challenged the contention of the respondent that the premises are not required for personal use and occupation of one of the brothers or that the request for possession is not inspired by good faith. The main burden of argument is that by provision of clause 6 of the agreement quoted above, the landlords are precluded from resorting to the remedy of ejectment of the appellant. For this purpose reliance was placed on C a case reported in PLD 1984 Supreme Court 38. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the law has given a right to landlord to eject the tenant only on certain specified grounds. These are for benefit of the landlord and it is always open to the landlord to contract out of these and barter away this right in lieu of certain privileges or advantages at the time of creating tenancy. The learned counsel for the responent however, contends that no agreement against a statutory provision is binding on his client. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that in the first place no advantage or benefit was ever obtained by the respondent/landlord from the appellant, to barter away his right to acquire possession. The amount of Rs. 10,000 was paid by the appellant as security deposit, as is evident from the contents of para. 3 of agreement itself which says that "this amount of Rs. 10,000 will be returned to the tenant by the landlord when the tenant vacate all the upper protion above the ground shop. As such this case is clearly distinguishable from the case decided by the Supreme Court. In that case, a vacated plot was let out by the landlord for the purposes of a petrol pump for a term of ten years renewable for another 20 years at the option of the lessee. On the strength of this long term lease, the lessee had invested huge amount in the development of the plot before using it as a petrol pump and they had constructed a huge underground tank and also raised construction on the plot. In this situation it was held that the landlord could not abruptly terminate the lease and eject the tenant on the ground of personal occupation. The situation here is different. No additional advantage or benefit seems to have been obtained by the landlord. The proper interpretation to be placed on clause 6 would be that it merely emphasise the need for a regular payment of rent which in any case is the duty and obligation of the tenant to discharge. If assurance for payment of rent coupled with an undertaking not to eject the tenant is treated to be an estoppel for the landlord for not ejecting the tenant on any ground for ever it would not only be contrary to the concept of ownership of immovable property but would also be against the scheme and spirit of law which permits such a remedy to a landlord.
7. ' There is one more point which may also influence the decision of this case. It appears that it was not considered by the Rent Controller. The jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller is limited and the Rent Controller has to exercise power within the framework of rent laws. Question would be whether the Rent Controller could entertain and adjudicate the pleas relating to ownership rights claimed in property. In my humble opinion such pleas should better be decided by the civil Court of competent jurisdiction because controversies like specific performance of contract, transactions of mortgage and pleas of moneys advanced or other questions regarding title in the property fall beyond the purview of the Rent laws. Such defences could not be agitated by the tenants and disposed or by Rent Controller in rent proceedings. The jurisdiction of Rent Controller is of a special nature. It need not be reiterated that the Rent Controller is not a civil Court ejoying general jurisdiction. The Rent Controller has to decide the question of relationship of landlord and tenant on material existing on the face of the record and on conditions prevailing. He can neither launch a probe for search of title of the landlord nor for prospective acquisition of title in property in future.
8. All such questions should be left to be raised and settled between the parties before regular Courts.
9. ' No serious contest or opposition is put up by the appellant so far as the need and 'personal occupation of the landlord is concerned.
10. ' In this view of the matter the order of Rent Controller could not be said to be improper calling for interference in appeal. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Ejectment to follow in terms of the order of the learned Rent Controller. The Respondent L/R to be put in possession by the 31-3- 1985.
11. ' This judgment was dictated to the steno on the date of hearing. But change of stenos and time taken by them in typing and re-typing has delayed its announcement till today.