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1985 PLC 392

GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTHERN TELECOMMUNICATION REGION and another

Citation1985 PLC 392
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No. Wck. 3 of 1984
Date1984-12-12
Judge(s)Ali Nawaz Budhani
ResultAppeal dismissed

ORDER

' This is an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, against the impugned order, dated 18-2-1984, of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation who awarded compensation of Rs.13,500 to the widow of the deceased Sathi.

2. The facts of the case as enunciated in the memo. Of appeal are that the respondent's husband, namely, Sathi son of Suleman, was engaged as collie on daily wages and was employed in the telegraph department. On 17-7-1977, while working at the lines, Sathi got an electric shock accidently and he died. Several applications were made by the widow of coolie Sathi for compensation but these applications were not heard. The dead body of the deceased was removed to his native village Mirpur Mathelo. On 27-3-1983, an application was filed under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, on behalf of the widow of the deceased through one Ahmad Bux Balich, a retired Sub-Post-master, Mirpur Mathelo, which application was entertained and registered as Case No.48/83. A notice, dated 30-3-1983, was issued fixing the date of hearing on 24-4-1983. The appellant submitted written statement raising preliminary objections on the maintainability of the said application. However, the impugned order was passed on 18-2-1984, awarding compensation of Rs.13,500 to the widow, namely, Mst.Sharman of the deceased Sathi.

3. The learned counsel, Mr. Dastgir Ghazi, who appeared on behalf of the appellant and Mr.Abdul Rasheed Kalwar, Advocate, for the respondent workman, have been heard.

4. The learned counsel, Mr.Dastgir raised two contentions, firstly, that the coolie Sathi was not a workman according to the definition of the Workmen's Compensation Act; and secondly, the application was badly time-barred.

5. As regards the first contention that the deceased was not a workman, I am referred to section 2, subsection 1(n) read with Schedule 11 together with item 9. The section 2(1)(n) defines the 'workman' as under:- "(n) 'workman' means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business) who is--

(i) xx xx xx xx xx (ii)Employed on monthly wages not exceeding (one thousand rupees, in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II)."

' Schedule II - item 9 is reproduced as under:- "(ix) employed is in setting up, repairing, maintaining, or taking down any telegraph or telephone line or post or any overhead electric line or cable or post or standard for the same."

6. The above definition contemplates that a person whose wages not exceed Rs.1,000 per month and who is employed in sett' up, repairing, maintaining, or taking down any telegraph or telephone line or post or any overhead electric line or cable or post of standard for the same, is a 'workman' within the definition. The exception is only made where that person is employed casually and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of employer's trade or business. The learned counsel, Mr.Dastgir has argued that the deceased worker, worked from June to July for about 35 days on the daily wages and as such he was not awarded wages on monthly basis. He was, therefore, employed for a casual work and as such he was not a workman. The word 'casual' does not connote, that a person, working on daily wages is a casual worker. The deceased worked, continuously for more than a month till he died. Mere fact that he received daily wages, he cannot be called to be casual worker.

7. There is no evidence to show that the deceased worked casually but it is admitted by the appellants themselves that he worked on a telegraph line and got an electric shock. There is no evidence to show that it was not the job of the deceased to work on telegraph line. He did work on the telegraph lines and accidently by a charge of electricity, he got the shock and died. The flow of the electricity through the telegraph lines or pole may be accidental by its attachment with electric poles but all the same the deceased had died while doing work for which he was employed.

Therefore, he was not employed to do a casual work. The meaning of word "casual" as given in Webster's Dictionary is-- "occurring, encounter, acting or performed without regularity or at random; occasional. A casual and migratory work. Vagrant."

8. On the whole, the meaning as spelt out is that the work done for which the worker was not chartered or he worked by chance or at random. In the instant case, he was regularly performing his duties on telegraph poles and by an accident, through an electric shock he died. This was not done by the deceased at random, and, therefore, he was not a casual worker as contemplated in the section. The nature of casual work connotes entirely a different meaning for instance if the employer orders the employee to fix a glass in the window and the glass breaks, it causes injuries to the worker, it is a casual work done by the worker not in regular performances of his duties. In this case, there is an admission by the employer, by the department that he died during the work that he did in the telegraph and telephone lines, therefore, he cannot be a 'casual worker'. If the meaning of casual worker is given due to the fact that he was getting daily wages then that meaning also is outlandish. The daily wages may be for a period of one month or so or more but all the same he is employed to do the work as a regular job. By no stretch of imagination, the deceased would be called a casual worker and deprived of the benefits of compensation.

9. In my view the deceased was regular worker and he comes within the definition of section 2(1)(n) and Schedule II of the said Act.

10. As regards the contention of the appellants' counsel that the application under section 10 was hopelessly time-barred, I am referred to Annexure at page 57 of the proceedings in which an affidavit is sworn by Mst.Sharman, the widow of Sathi at paragraph 6, she has submitted several letters to the Ministry of Communication specially letter, dated 30-1-1983 and a letter to the General Manager, dated 20-2-1983; and a letter from Islamabad, dated 20-2-1983, showing that she was in constant correspondence with the department concerned to get the compensation but ultimately, a letter, dated 23-2-1983, she received from the Director-General, Islamabad, addresssed to the General Manager, Karachi, and a copy was forwarded to Mst. Sharman. This letter calls for the comments with regard to the case from the General Manager and it shows that the correspondence was continuing to get the compensation. Nevertheless the record shows that the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation had condoned the delay in filing the case, vide his order, dated 18-2-1984 and an application thereof filed by the respondent, Mst. Sharman, earlier.

11. The fact that the delay was condoned on the ground that several applications were made from time to time to the relevant authorities for award of compensation, which did not receive the attentions of the relevant department and, therefore, the delay in filing the application under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, was rightly condoned by the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to the application being time-barred has, in the circumstances, no force.

12. I am also referred to an Indian Authority reported in AIR 1956 Bombay 424 (V. 43 C-167-June), in which the following words are worth quoting:- "It is perfectly true that whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not is a question of law. But the facts found by the Commissioner on which he comes to the conclusion that the delay should be condoned must be accepted by this Court. It is on the facts found that a question of law arises where there was sufficient cause."

13. It has also been contended in the arguments that no evidence was recorded in this case. There was an admission on the part of the appellants that the deceased died due to accident on account of electric shock and that he was present. His admission was considered by the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. On the contrary, the respondent was called absent as she was a woman and a widow and resident of far-flung Mirpur Mathelo.

14. In the result, I do not find any fault in the award of the compensation. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

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