1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against judgment, dated 27-10-1984 of the Lahore High Court, whereby a Constitutional petition arising out of a labour dispute, filed by the present petitioner (the employer), was dismissed.
2. The respondent workman in the petitioner concern fell ill end underwent a surgical operation. After recovery the doctor issued him fitness certificate with a recommendation that for to months he should be given light duty and be saved from smoke and dust. It appears that the petitioner did not honour the recommendation of the doctor. The respondent again approached the petitioner after the expiry of the said to months with the prayer that he still needed care as recommended by the doctor. In addition to the seeking of a favour from the petitioner employer, the respondent committed "the folly" of informing his employer that in case there was no favourable response to his request ire might seek legal remedy. This evoked prompt response from the petitioner. The respondent was offered to resign within 7 days otherwise his services were to be terminated with one month's notice/pay. The excuse put forward by the petitioner for such a drastic action was that there was no light job to offer to him. The respondent did not exercise the option for resignation within 7 days. The petitioner then passed an order of termination of his service on the ground that he possessed ill-health and that the doctor had also recommended light job for him and because there was no light duty to offer him, therefore, his service were to be terminated on ground of ill- health. This order was passed on 14th February, 1983, which was to take immediate effect. However, the respondent was allowed to days the to collect his dues including one month's pay in lieu of notice.
3. Thu respondent approached the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance XXIII of 1969. The order of termination of respondent's service was set aside but he was not allowed back benefits on the ground that he "did not conduct properly by issuing the grievance notice after the expiry of period of to months light duty in January 1983 and his termination of services was effected on his own plea of ill-health". However, a finding of fact was rendered against the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner should riot have removed the respondent on ground of his ill-health on 14-2-1983 as oft that date the period of to months of light duty had already expired. And further that the respondent should have been ordered to get himself medically examined and only if he was found to be unfit then of course his services could be terminated. The action of the petitioner was held to have been taken in an improper manner for the additional reason that if it was not possible for the petitioner to give him light duty he could have been sent on leave.
4. Both parties filed appeals before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. In a carefully considered judgment the action of the petitioner was held to be not bona fide. Their appeal accordingly was dismissed. The appeal of the respondent was accepted and he was allowed the back benefit. The petitioner's challenge to the orders of the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal through Constitutional petition in the High Court did not succeed. The findings of fact including that of mala fides rendered against the petitioner were not disturbed and the Constitutional petitions was dismissed in limine. Therefore, the petitioner had sought leave to appeal.
5. Learned counsel has raised to-fold contentions: One, that the provisions of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance were not attracted to this case; and secondly, that the findings of fact rendered against the petitioner are not sustainable.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have also perused the record. There are concurrent findings by the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal, which have been affirmed by the High Court that the petitioner acted mala fide in terminating the services of the respondent.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to satisfy us that. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the action of the petitioner was not mala fide. No law or principle has been cited to justify interference by this Court in so far as the findings of fact regarding mala fides are concerned. Nor it is the petitioner's case that notwithstanding the action being mala fide the Labour Court and or the Labour Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere by virtue of the provision contained in section 25-A. Obviously if the action was mala fide the respondent could invoke the provisions contained in section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. We accordingly do not consider it a fit case for interference. This petition, therefore, is dismissed.