1. ' By this Constitutional petition, the petitioner has called in question the judgment of the XXVIth Civil/Family Judge, Karachi, dated 13th August, 1983, whereby the suit filed by respondent, Met.
2. Yasmeen for dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner was decreed.
3. ' I heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also perused the impugned judgment carefully.
4. It appears that the petitioner after Ming written statement I the suit in question did not turn up to contest the same with the result that ex parte judgment was passed against him. It is not dispute that no appeal lies from the judgment and decree, by which marriage is dissolved. The superior Courts have repeatedly held that such judgment and decree cannot be questioned indirectly in writ jurisdiction of this Court, unless of course it is shown that the lower Court committed gross illegality.
5. ' The Darned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out if the impugned judgment suffered from any legal infirmity. All that he stressed in course of his arguments was that the trial Court has wrongly held that the dower of Rs,10,000 was not paid by the petitioner to his wife, Mat. Yasmeen. In this connection he invited my attention to the judgment of the Civil Judge Mansehra delivered in the petitioner's suit against his wife for restitution of conjugal rights. No doubt it is stated in the said judgment that para. 15 of the Nikah form shows that some agricultural land was given by the petitioner to his wife in lieu of the dower. But that judgment too like the impugned judgment was ex parte as the respondent Mat. Yasmeen who was served by substituted service by publication failed to appear in the Court and contest the suit. Moreover the petitioner having failed to turn in the Court to contest his wife's suit did not lead any evidence in support of his plea and as such the judgment of Civil Judge Mansehra referred to above was not formally proved in evidence. Even if it is taken into consideration despite its being ex parte, at best it proves that the dower of Rs,10,000 fixed at the time of parties marriage had been paid by the petitioner. As against this finding, it has been held in the impugned judgment that the said dower had remained unpaid until the pronouncement of the said judgment.
6. As stated above both the judgments which are conflicting on the question of payment of the dower are ex parte. Surely the invoking of writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate remedy to resolve the aforesaid question of fact. Assuming for the sake of argument that the findings of the learned Civil Judge Mansehra as to payment of the dower are correct, yet by that reason the annulment of marriage of the parties will not be affected. Obviously the marriage has been dissolved on the ground of Khula. It, therefore, follows that the wife had shown her readiness to return all the benefits received by her from the husband including of course the dower of Rs,10,000. Even if the petitioner succeeds in proving that the said dower had been paid by him, he would at the most be entitled to its recovery. But in no case the proof of receipt of the dower by the wife would in any way affect the dissolution of her marriage.
7. ' For above reasons the petition being without merit was dismissed in limine by short order, dated 9-12-1984.