' AJMAL MEAN, J.-- This is a High Court Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by a learned Single Judge on 4th April, 1975 in Suit No, 354/69. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that the respondent was an employee in the service of the then Government of India in the Customs Department in the year 1945. On 18-6-1951, he was holding the post of Appraiser when he was placed under suspension and was charge-sheeted on 15-3-1952, and thereafter was dismissed from service, with effect from 11-8-1952. On 13-9-1954, the plaintiff filed a declaratory suit challenging his dismissal which was decreed on 23-8-1958. It was held that the orders of suspension and dismissal were illegal, void and inoperative and that the respondent continued to be and was entitled to be treated in service and on duty from 11-8-1951. The Government filed first appeal against the above judgment and decree, which was dismissed on 22nd December, 1962. The second appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed on 3-2-1966.
On 7th July, 1966 the respondent was 'informed by the appellant-department that he was re- instated in service with immediate effect and was to be considered as having been on duty from 11-8-1951. After the resumption of duty the respondent pressed for the payment of the arrears of salary, but in spite of his best efforts the appellant-department did not pay the arrears.
Consequently, the respondent served a notice under section 80, C.P.C. On 23-4-1969 and thereafter filed the present suit on 4-8-1969. The above suit was resisted by the appellant-department on a number of grounds. The learned Single Judge on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed as many as 9 issues.
' The respondent examined himself (Exh.15) whereas the appellant examined D.W. Ghulam Nabi Exh.16. The respondent also got the service record produced. At the stage of arguments issues Nos, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were not pressed. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge decreed the suit to the extent of Rs,52,751.95 i.e. Rs,91,230 being the salary from the date of respondent's suspension until re-instatement as an Appraiser, less Rs,18,478.05 received by the respondent during the suspension period and less further sum of Rs,20,000 being the respondent's income from the alternate source during the period of suspension and after the termination of the service. The appellants being aggrieved by the above judgment and decree have filed the present High Court Appeal, whereas the respondent has filed cross-objections.
2.(a) In support of the above appeal Mr. Syed Inayat Ali, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in view of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (Act LXX of 1973), the suit stood abated. No argument on merits was advanced by him.
(b) On the other hand Mr. J.H. Rahimtoola, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant the arrears of salary in the instant case inter alia for the reason that the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 was amended by Service Tribunal (Amendment)
Act, 1974 (Act XXXI of 1974), whereby clause (c) in section 4(1) was added to provide that no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority made at any time before the 1st July, 1969.
3. In furtherance of his above submission Mr. Syed Inayat All has referred to the case of Khalilur Rehman and others v. Government of Pakistan and others, reported in PLD 1981 Kar. 750, in which a Full Bench of this Court comprising of 5 Judges, held that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted in regard to all such matters which fall within the ambit of the authority of Tribunal to adjudicate even though the Tribunal is conferred with jurisdiction limited to some of matters relating to terms and conditions of service.
' On the other hand Mr. J.H. Rehimtoola has referred to the case of Khan Faizullah Khan v.
Government of Pakistan through the Establishment Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat and another, reported in PLD 1974 SC 291, in which the Honourable Supreme Court has taken notice of the above amendment brought about by the above amending Act XXXI of 1974 and it was held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction against an order or decision of the departmental authority made at any time before 1st July, 1969.
We are inclined to hold that in the instant case factually the respondent was not impugning any disciplinary action taken by the appellant-department, but he was claiming the arrears of the salary, which he was entitled to under the law on account of setting aside of the suspension and dismissal orders. This claim relates back to the departmental original action of suspension taken on 11-8-1951, dismissal order passed on 15th March, 1954, and the re-instatement order, dated 7-7- 1966, and, therefore, the above actions/orders relate to the period prior to 1st July, 1969, and, therefore, in view of the above clause (c) of section 4, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. We are also inclined to hold that since it was a question of payment of arrears of salary, it is very much doubtful whether the Tribunal could grant simpliciter a money decree in a case in which the departmental action in the form of any disciplinary action was not impugned.
4. Adverting to the cross-objections, it may be observed that Mr. J.H. Rahimtoola has urged that the respondent was entitled to have been promoted as a principal Appraiser for the reason that he had excellent service record except during the period under which he remained under suspension and after the dismissal order. He has further urged that the Selection Committee had misread the service record of the respondent. It may be stated that before the learned Single Judge the arrears of salary were claimed on the assumption that the respondent was factually promoted as a principal Appraiser, but the learned Single Judge has decreed the suit on the basis that the respondent was serving as an Appriaser. We have perused the judgment on this aspect and found that the learned Single Judge has concluded that the Selection Committee had declined to promote the respondent for the reason that the respondent did not have requisite experience necessary for the promotion to the post of a principal Appraiser. It is true that the respondent could not have the requisite experience on account of the above suspension order, and, thereafter the dismissal order, which were held to be illegal by a competent Court of law; but the fact remained that the respondent did not have the requisite experience. Even otherwise this question has now become academic for the reason that the respondent has already retired from the service.
5. For the aforesaid reasons the High Court Appeal as well as cross-objections are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.