' This Civil Revision arises from the order of learned Senior Civil Judge, Bahawalpur, whereby he on 10-7-1982 while reserving his decision refused to give decision on the application, dated 6-6-1982 submitted by Fateh Muhammad and 4 others, petitioners herein, for the cancellation of the report of the commission appointed under section 9 of the. Court Fees Act to prepare Fard valuation and report for the Court Fee valuation.
2. The facts leading up to this revision in brief are that Fateh Muhammad and 4 others, petitioners herein, purchased land measuring 200 Kanals situated in Chak No.12, Teh. Hasilpur for ostensible consideration of Rs.1,50,000 from Abdullah Shah through registered sale-deed, dated 4-3-1978.
Muhammad Ibrahim, respondent herein, filed a suit for pre-emption on the basis of his superior right as co-sharer. The petitioners/defendants contested the suit. They raised preliminary objections and denied averments of plaint. The trial Court framed several issues including the issue about the correct valuation for the purpose of court-fee. The parties led their evidence to prove the issues. On 18-5-1982, the trial Court appointed Sadar Qanungo, Bahawalpur as a Commission under section 9 of the Court Fees Act, who accordingly submitted his report on 31-5-1982. On 6-6- 1982, the petitioners herein filed objections requesting for the cancellation of that report and appointment of a new Commission. On 10-7-1982, the trial Court after hearing the parties postponed the decision on that application till the final judgment on the ground that since the issue about the valuation for the purpose of court-fee has already been framed, it would be premature to give any opinion on the point of court-fee Valuation, and proposed to decide the application, dated 6-6-1982 for the cancellation of the Commission at the time of final judgment.
Hence this revision.
3. Learned counsel for petitioners has contended that the trial Court should have decided the application dated 6-6-1982 which relates to valuation for the purpose of court-fee first and should not have reserved its decision till final judgment. Reliance has been placed on Muhammad Ramzan and 3 others v. Mst. Irshad Khanam PLD 1982 B.J. 38, wherein it has been laid down that every question relating to valuation for the purpose of Court-Fee has to be decided first as a preliminary issue.
' As against this the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon Sujjatha Shibathullahi Sahib v.
Muhammad Labbi and others, AIR 1950 Mad. 596, to contend that in appealable cases the Court should as far as possible decide all issues together to avoid piecemeal trial.
' It is remarkable (as stated by the learned counsel for the parties) that the trial Court has already settled the issues, the evidence adduced by the parties have been recorded and the trial was at the stage of final arguments when application dated 6-6-1982 for the cancellation of the Commission was moved by the petitioners/defendants.
4. I have considered the arguments presented by the learned counsel for the parties with care. No doubt, as a rule, the question relating to court-fee valuation should be determined and decided first and the issue about court-fee should be treated as preliminary issue, but in spite of this observation, in view of the peculiar circumstance of the case in hand, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order whereby the trial Court has postponed its decision on the application till final judgment on all the issues, for the reasons that the trial is now ripe for final judgment, issues including the issue about the correct valuation for the purpose of court-fee have already been framed; when the issues were settled, the petitioners did not ask the Court to treat the issue of court-fee value as a preliminary issue; evidence led by the parties have been recorded; the Commission has already submitted the report; objections have been filed and the case is ready for final judgment after hearing the arguments. Furthermore, the case is appealable. In these circumstances, the departure made by the trial Court from the Rule, that "the question of court-fee should be decided first" by postponing its decision cannot be declared illegal or unjustified. I am convinced that to avoid piecemeal trial and long litigation in the shape of appeal, revision and remand in case the decision of the trial Court on application dated 6-6-1982 or on issue of court- fee is not upheld by the superior Courts, the trial Court was fully justified in passing the impugned order.
5. For what has been stated above, this revision is dismissed. The trial Court is directed to decide the case within one month.