1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine Second Appeal No. 206 of 1971.
2. The said appeal arose out of a suit for pre-emption filed by the respondent herein to pre-empt a sale made by one Ghulam Abbas Shah to the seen petitioners herein. The Courts below, including the High Court, have concurrently held the, out of the seven petitioners who purchased the land in dispute, six had a right superior to that of the respondent herein ; but the petitioner Muhammad was a stranger and therefore, since the other petitioners had associated themselves with a stranger, they too had lost their superior right, and could not, as such, resist the pre-emptor's claim.
3. On behalf of the petitioners, it was sought to be contended before the High Court that the petitioner Muhammad was not a stranger, since he was shown in the jamabandi as a tenant in possession without payment of rent. The High Court refused to go into this question, as it was concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below.
4. Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition has, however, contended that this is a question of law, for, a person in occupation without payment of rent to the landlord but paying land revenue is to be treated as an "owner" under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 (Land Reform Regulations).
5. We are not concerned with the definition of "owner" given in the Martial Law Regulation No. 64 or in the Bombay Land Revenue Code or in the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 but we are here concerned with the question as to who is to be treated as an "owner" within the meaning of section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. This Act does not define an "owner" and, therefore, the ordinary meaning of an "owner", namely, a person possessing full proprietary rights over the land, has to be accepted.
6. The jamabandi shows that the Provincial Government is recorded as owner in the column of "ownership". The finding of the Courts below is, therefore, a finding of fact based upon a consideration of the evidence, and the High Court was right in not interfering with this concurrent finding of fact in second appeal.
7. Learned counsel next contended that the decision of this Court in the case of Abdullah v. Abdul Karim (PLD 1968 SC 140) which has been relied upon by the High Court, is distinguishable. Learned counsel has not, however, been able to show us how the case is distinguishable. The principle enunciated therein is fully applic--able in the facts of the present case. Here too the consideration, according to the Deed of Conveyance, was paid in a lump sum for the whole area sold, and there was no proof that the payment of the price was made by the various vendees in specified amounts.
8. Learned counsel next urged that this decision needs recon--sideration. The decision was given after considering a number of decisions on the point and we see no reason to re-open this question.
9. These are all the points urged in support of this petition. Since we have found no substance in any one of them, this petition is dismissed.