1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-- Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 6-2-1981 of the Lahore High Court; whereby Auqaf Appeal No.25 of 1969, was dismissed.
2. The petitioner (Evacuee Trust Board) had raised a question before a Settlement Commissioner through reference regarding the status of the property in dispute as an evacuee Trust Property because as asserted, it was a Janj Ghar. The Settlement Commissioner after affording due opportunity to the petitioner held that the building in question which appeared to be a house, was not an evacuee Trust Property. On appeal a learned Judge in the High Court affirmed the finding of fact reached by the Settlement Commissioner. Therefore, now the Evacuee Trust Board has sought leave to appeal.
3. Learned counsel has raised to-fold contention: One, relating to the merits of the concurrent findings of fact challenged in this petition; and secondly that the petitioner wanted to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage which opportunity was denied to it.
4. Learned counsel has brought to our notice the material on the basis of which according to his submission the property could have been treated as belonging to an Evacuee Trust. It includes certain photographs of the front part of the house showing that it was used as a Janj Ghar. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel that one of the rooms in the building, was being used as the office of an Evacuee Trust, but it could be as a tenant of the owner.
5. Be that as it may the concurrent findings of fact impugned before us do not suffer from any legal defect. The observation of the High Court that the mere use of the property as Janj Ghar would not transform it into a Trust property, in our view is unexceptionable. Learned counsel tried to rely on some judgments where the use of the word Dharam Sala led to the presumption that it was a Trust property, but he could not press the arguments any further, when it was pointed out that the expression Dharam Sala in its connotation depending upon the circumstances of each case is totally different from the connotation of the expression Janj Ghar. Regarding the additional evidence suffice it to observe that even if it would have been admitted, it would not have made any difference with regard to the findings of fact. Secondly it cannot be said that the petitioner had not sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence which was sought to be led at the appellate stage. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.