' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, C. J. - The appellant, Dr. Muhammad Akram herein, unsuccessfully invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for quashment of the order of the Allotment Committee, Mirpur Development Authority whereby the allotment of the plot in question bearing No, 40/C in sub-sector B-2, Mirpur Town, measuring one Kanal to the appellant was refused. The writ petition was disallowed on 3-10-1983.
2. The facts leading up to the dispute in brief are : that allotment of plot in question was originally made by the Allotment Committee on the 8th of January, 1978, in the name of the appellant. This allotment, however, while deciding the writ petition moved by one Muhammad Azam in the High Court under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, was cancelled on the premises of the reasoning that allotments made by the Allotment Committee headed by Ch. Sohbat Ali, a Minister of the Government, would be considered as to have created no interest in the plots allotted. Thereafter a Revising Authority under a Government Notification was constituted to consider the cases of allotments afresh. Before the case of the appellant could be finalized by this Revising Authority, the Authority was also dissolved and another Allotment Committee was formed to consider the cases of the previous allottees afresh. After examination of the case of the appellant the Allotment Committee rejected his 'claim with regard to the allotment of the plot in question in its meeting held on the 2nd of May, 1983. Appellant was refused the allotment mainly on the ground that as a residential plot stands already allotted in his name in the new Mirpur Town, the appellant, under law, is not entitled to have another allotment.
3. The appellant challenged the validity of this order by way of writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed by the High Court on 3-10-1983. Hence this appeal, by leave, to assail the said judgment of the High Court.
4. Mr. Basharat Ahmed Sheikh, the learned Advocate for the appellant, raised the following points of objection for the quashment of the impugned report :-
(i) that the appellant is a doctor by profession and the plot in question was originally allotted to him for clinic purposes and therefore, the earlier allotment of a plot for residential purposes in the name of the appellant is no bar for a fresh allotment of the plot in question for clinic purposes. The Allotment Committee's refusal to make allotment for the clinic purposes, in his estimation, amounts to refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it ;
(ii) that the interpretation assigned to rules 5 (iii) and 6 of the Mirpur Development Authority Special Regulations for the allotment of the plots to the effect that the appellant is precluded to have a second allotment in the presence of first allotment is erroneous as the second allotment of the plot, was only for opening of the clinic and the first allotment for residential purposes is no bar for the second allotment.
5. To counter Mr. Basharat Ahmed Sheikh, Ch. Muhammad Taj, the learned counsel for the respondent, maintained :- #TBS (i) #TBE that the words used in rule 5 (iii) are of clear import and meaning. They best convey the intention of the law-makers and the Courts are not permitted to add any word to destroy the clear impression they create. He maintained that the presence of the earlier allotment of a plot for residential purposes disentitles the appellant to have the second allotment whatever the purpose of the second allotment may be ;
(ii) that even if the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that in presence of a plot for residential purposes another plot for clinic purposes can validly be allotted is construed to be correct,, there is nothing on record to show that the plot in question was meant for commercial purposes. His case is that the plot in question is a residential plot situated in a Muhallah and the mere fact that it may be. Used for opening a clinic would hardly make arty difference ;
(iii) that after the judgment of the High Court the plot has been allotted to one Shaukat Majeed who has not been impleaded as a party. This appeal, therefore, in the absence of the necessary party is liable to be defeated.
6. We have considered the objections advanced at the bar and are of the view that this appeal merits no consideration. It is significant that under rule 4 (ii) of the Special Regulations, the application of a person for the allotment of a plot can only be considered if he fulfils all the conditions prescribed for the eligibility of the allotment of a plot and as the appellant! Had no entitlement under the provisions of Special Regulations to have the A second allotment, the allotment was rightly refused. The qualifications! And conditions of eligibility of an applicant to have the allotment are enumerated under rule 5 of the M. D. A. (Special Regulations, 1981). The relevant rule 5 (iii) reads as under :- "The applicant himself or any of the members of his family must not have previously obtained any allotment of any residential plot either in the Mirpur Town or in any Hamlet or have been allotted/transferred C or D type Bungalow or lower type quarter belonging to the Government or VVAPDA".
' The reading of the rule shows that only that person can apply for the allotment of the plot who himself or any of the members of his family has not previously obtained any allotment of any residential plot either in the Mirpur Town or in any Hamlet. It makes no exception to have a second plot for a clinic in the presence of the first allotment. Under rule 5 (vi) where there are two applicants for a plot, the Allotment. Committee would take a suitable decision in favour of one or none of them on the merits of each case and this procedure has been strictly followed in this case.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant does not contest that Dr. Muhammad Akram earlier held allotment of residential plot in Mirpur Town. All that he says is that the earlier allotment was for residential purposes and, therefore, his second allotment meant for clinic purposes could not validly be refused to him under the provisions of the Regulations or Ordinance. We are afraid, we cannot subscribe to his view. Under rule 5 (iii) of the Special Regulations for obtaining the allotment in Mirpuri Town only those persons are eligible to have the allotment of a plot if there! Does not exist in his name any allotment for residential purposes.
8. In view of the clear state of law, we are of the considered view that the appellant was not entitled to have the second allotment and the learned Judge in the High Court has exercised the discretion in a legal fashion to disallow the writ petition. The discretion exercised, therefore, needs no interference. Even otherwise, there is nothing on the record to show that the plot in question was a plot for commercial purposes.
9. It is settled principle of law that the interpretation of the statute made by the High Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction is not liable to be disturbed in the Supreme Court unless it is shown that the interpretation is perverse or manifestly wrong. In the instant case the interpretation made by the High Court suffers from no such defect as to call for any interference.
10. One of the conditions precedent to issue a writ of certiorari, when the inferior Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, is an error apparent on the face of the record. It is necessary that the person complaining of error should make his allegations in a specific manner as for as possible. In dealing with such petitions the Court will not ordinarily enter into the examination of complicated questions of fact or law such as are more suitable for resolution in a suit or other proceedings of more normal kind in which an opportunity for full investigation in presentation of all the relevant G matters is available to both sides. The errors should generally appear on the very face of the proceedings and the relief claimed should be addressed specifically to the correction of such an error, if no error of the relevant kind is made to appear in the petition itself it is clearly the duty of the Court to reject the petition. This view of ours is fully recognized in 'The Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha and others (1) .
11. The learned counsel wants us to hold that if the second allotment made to the appellant was not for the residential purposes, we should hold that it was permissible under law to have the second allotment. His case
(1) PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 437 precisely is that second allotment is only forbidden when it is meant for residential purposes. As said earlier, we cannot see eye to eye with the learned counsel and modify the clear intention of the law-makers. We have to interpret the law as it is and not as it ought to be. We are not expectedH to make law or interpret it.In a way which may reasonably be considered as to make law.
12. What yardstick is available with the Courts to know the intention of the law-makers may also be answered in this case, Maxwell in his book, "Interpretation of Statutes", seventh edition, relying on Income-Tax Commissioners v. Pinsel and River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, says at page 2 :- "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such' case best declaring the intention of the Legislature."
' Again relying on R. V. City of London Court and Mrsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Turner; Maxwell says at page 4 :- "The rule of construction is to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. 'It matters not, in such a case, what the consequences may be. Where, by the use clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced, even though it be absurd or mischievous. The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the Courts as to what is just or expedient".
' Elaborating the point at page 5 it is stated again that :- "However unjust, arbitrary or inconvenient the meaning conveyed may be, it must receive its full effect. When once the meaning is plain, it is not the province of a Court to scan its wisdom or its policy".
' Craies on Statute Law Seventh Edition Chapter 5th at page 65 says :- "Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature".
' It is further stated at page 66 :- "Some fifty years before in Salomon v. A Salomon & Co. Ltd. Lord Watson had said : 'Intention of the Legislature, is a common but very slippery phrase, which popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of law or equity what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be ascertained from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.' After expounding the enactment it only remains to enforce it, notwithstanding that it may be very generally received opinion that it 'does not produce the effect which the legislature intended', or 'might with advantage be modified'."
' The point is further clarified at page 67 whereat it is stated :-- "Even though a Court is satisfied that the Legislature did not contemplate the consequences of an enactment, a Court is bound to give effect to its clear language. Thus Lord Herschell in Co. v. Hakes, said : `It is not easy to exaggerate the magnitude of this change (i. e. That discharge from custody by a Court of competent jurisdiction does not protect from further proceedings) ; nevertheless, it must be admitted that, if the language of the Legislature interpreted according to the recognised cannons of construction, involves this result, your Lordships must frankly yield to it, even you should be satisfied that it was not in the contemplation of the Legislature';'
' The question of creeping of an error in a statute is dealt with at page 68. It is stated thereat :- " 'In Lee v. Bode etc. Ry. Where it was argued that certain Acts of Parliament had been obtained by inserting in them false recitals, I would observe', said Willes, J., 'that these acts of parliament are the law of the land, and we do not sit here as a Court of appeal from Parliament If an Act of the Parliament has been obtained improperly, it is for the Legislature to correct it by repealing it ; but so long as it exists as law the Courts are bound to obey it'."
13. In view of this cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes the Courts are bound to assign the ordinary and plain meaning of a word used in a statute and to do otherwise and import meanings of which the word is not susceptible, is to usurp the field of la .v-makers which is not permissible for a Court. The function of a Court is to interpret a law as it is, and not to intrude in the filed of legislation which is the function of the Legislative body only. So, in the present case, in presence of first allotment for residential purposes, second allotment for any purpose is totally barred ; we are debarred to have any other interpretation destroying the effect of clear legislation.
14. In view of the approach we have made to the issue we do not think] that the interest of Shaukat Maj2ed can be said to have been affected. ' Even otherwise, Shaukat Majeed was not a party before the High Court and when we have decided to maintain the judgment of the High Court, it would serve! No purpose to implead him as a party.
' In view of the above this appeal fails. In the circumstances of the case no order as to costs. ORDER OF THE COURT ' The judgment shall be announced by the Deputy Registrar, Supreme Court, Branch Registry, Mirpur, after giving notices to the learned counsel for the parties or the parties.