' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.--This petition for leave to appeal, under Article 42(12) of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Consti tution Act, 1974, has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 24-12-1983.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that respondents-assessees made an application to the Appellate Tribunal to refer the case to the High Court after formulating the questions of law, arising out of the order of Appellate Tribunal, but their prayer was rejected mainly on the ground that no question of law arose out of the Order passed by the Tribunal. Consequently, an application was filed before the High Court under subsection (2) of S. 136 of Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, praying that the questions of law arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal might be framed and decided as envisaged under subsection (5) of section 136 of the said Ordinance. The High Court, after hearing the parties, passed the impugned judgment; whereby the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal was set aside and that of Income-tax Officer was restored.
3. We have heard arguments and gone through the relevant record. It has been argued by Mr. Muhammad Amin Butt, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the High Court has not applied its mind as to whether any question of law arose out of the order passed by the tribunal; rather it has been assumed that such questions arose out of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal.
The learned counsel has referred us to the impugned judgment and has argued that the learned Judges in the High Court have expressed themselves in terms that "the following questions of law are said to have arisen in the case". He has urged that it is evident from the aforesaid expression that instead of applying their mind as to whether the questions agitated before them were the questions of law, which arose out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the learned Judges vaguely opined that the "following questions of law are said to have been arisen". The said expression, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, clearly shows that the High Court has committed error in exercising the juris diction vested in it; it has travelled beyond the jurisdiction, vested in it under the relevant provision of Income-tax Law. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken pains to refer to the questions enumerated by the learned Judges in the impugned judgment and has argued that these questions cannot be regarded as the questions of law; arising out of the Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. It has been further urged on behalf of the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the High Court to apply its mind to each of the points raised before it and to determine as to whether the questions agitated were that of law and arose out of the Order of the Appellate Tribunal. After framing the questions of law, if any, those were to be decided; and the judgment was to be delivered; and a copy of the same was to be sent to the Appellate Tribunal to pass order in conformity with the said judgment. The High Court, it has been argued, was not competent to dispose of the matter itself by setting aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and restoring the order of the Income-tax Officer.
4. In reply the learned counsel for the non-petitioner, Ch. Muhammad Afzal, has raised two preliminary objections and has argued that in view of the provisions contained in section 66-A(2) of the Income-tax Act read with relevant provisions contained in section 137 of Income-tax Ordinance of 1979, it was incumbent for the petitioner to obtain the centificate of fitness from the High Court, instead of coming with a petition for leave to appeal under subsection (12) of section 42 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974. The learned counsel has relied on Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi and another AIR 1927 P C 242, Provincial Library v. Commissioner of Income-tax East Pakistan PLD 1958 SC 81 and 1960 2-TAX (Suppl. 300), in support of his contention. He has also raised an objection to the effect that the appointment of the Commissioner, Income-tax who has filed the present petition for leave to appeal is not legal in view of the relevant provisions contained in the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979.
Thus, according to him, the present petition for leave to appeal is incompetent. He has maintained that the appointment of the petitioner has been made by the Azad and Kashmir Council, whereas it should have been made by the Board of Revenue. The learned counsel for the respondents has also contended that the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity and that the points decided by the High Court pertained to the questions of law and the High Court has rightly framed and decided the same.
5. Coming to the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, it may be observed that the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his contention, namely AIR 1927 P C 242 and Provincial Library v. Commissioner of Income-tax, East Pakistan are not applicable to the case in hand on the simple ground that those cases were decided in reference to the provisions contained in sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code and not in context of the provisions contained in section 42 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, or in view of the corres ponding provisions contained in Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973). It may be observed that the validity of the point as to whether the petitioner should have moved the High Court for obtaining fitness certificate as visualised under section 66-A(2) of the Income-tax Act, read with section 137 of the Income-tax Ordinance of 1979 or his remedy was to seek special leave from this Court under subsections (12) of section 42 of the Interim Constitution Act 1974 is to be adjudged while taking into consideration the provisions of the said Act. In this context under subsection (10) of section 42 of Interim Constitution Act, Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeals from the judgment, decree final order or sentences of the High Court subject to the 'succeeding provisions', i.e., the provisions contained in subsection (11) and subsection (12) of the said section. Subsection
(11) gives right of appeal in cases enumerated therein whereas subsection (12) envisages that in all other cases which do not fall under subsection (11), an appeal to the Supreme Court shall be only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal. It is crystal-clear from the phraseology employed in subsection (12) of section 42 that if a case does not fall within the ambit of subsection (11), the appeal to the Supreme Court shall lie only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal. Obviously, subsection (12) excludes any right of appeal against the judgment, decree and order etc. of the High Court, if the case is not covered by any of the eventualities envisaged under subsection (11) of section 42 of the Interim Constitution Act. The argument that the jurisdiction has been conferred on the Supreme Court not only by the Interim Constitution Act but it can also be conferred under or by any other law as envisaged under subsection (2) of section 42 and thus the provisions relating to the issuance of fitness certificate by the High Court under section 66-A(2) of the Income-tax Act, and section 137 of the Income-tax Ordinance 1979 are valid laws on the statute book of the State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, is not tenable because the expression "subject to the provisions of this Act" employed in subsection (2) of section 42 controls the subsequent expression, "by or under any law", used in the aforesaid subsection. For the sake of convenience, subsection (2) of section 42 of Interim Constitution Act, is reproduced as under:- "(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall have such jurisdiction as is or may be conferred on it by this Act, or by or under any law."
' The bare reading of subsection (2) makes it amply clear that jurisdiction can be conferred on the Supreme Court by or under any law provided it does not offend against the relevant provisions contained in the Interim Constitution Act. If it is conceded that the jurisdiction can be conferred on the Supreme Court by or under any law other than the Constitution Act, without having regard to the restrictions imposed by the expression "subject to the provisions of this Act", used in subsection
(2) of section 42, it would render the said expression as redundant. It is a settled principle of rule of the interpretation of Statutes that the interpretation rendering any provision of law as redundant or superfluous should be avoided. The interpretation of a statute must be such as would reconcile and harmonise the various provisions of law and not render the same as superfluous or redundant.
Thus, in our view, the jurisdiction on this Court can be conferred by or under any law as visualised under subsection (2) of section 42 only if the law conferring such jurisdiction is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Interim Constitution Act. As under subsection (12) of section 42, in cases not covered by subsection (11) of section 42, the appeal to this Court would only be competent if the Supreme Court grants special leave to appeal, the provisions contained in section 66-A(2) of the Income-tax Act and in section 137 of the Income-tax Ordinance 1979, so far as those pertain to the requirement of obtaining certificate of fitness from the High Court, stand impliedly repealed in view of the provisions contained in section 42 of the Interim Constitution Act of 1974. It follows from this that if a case is not covered by subsection (11) of section 42 of the Interim Constitution Act or any other provision of the said Act, an appeal to this Court shall be valid only if special leave to appeal is granted under subsection (12) of section 42 and not otherwise. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the present petition for leave to appeal is competent and the provisions contained in aforesaid statutes requiring the certificate of fitness from the High Court are no longer a valid law on the statute book of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir State. We are fortified in our view by a case reported as Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore v. Umar Saigol PLD 1975 Lah. 1558, wherein, in view of the provisions contained in Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), the requirement of obtaining certificate of fitness under section 66-A(2) of Income-tax Act was held to have been impliedly repealed. The argument that the aforesaid authority is distinguishable because there was no provision in Article 185 of the Pakistan Constitution (1973) empowering the Legislature to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Pakistan, as is the case under section 66- A(2) of the Interim Constitution Act, is fallacious not only because an identical provision did exist under Article 175(2) of the said Constitution but also because, as already pointed out, in view of the expression "subject to the provision of this Act", used in sub section (2) of section 42 of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 the law offending against the constitution has no validity. However, with profound respect which we have for the Judges we differ from the view taken in the aforesaid case that Article 175(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) was not an enabling provision but it was merely an exhibiting provision and as such Parliament was competent to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Pakistan only in matters specifically provided by the Constitution itself. We are of the view that Article 175(2) of the Pakistan Constitution (1973) does not put any such embargo on the powers of Parliament to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court even in cases not specifically envisaged in the said Constitution, provided that law conferring jurisdiction does not offend against the provisions contained in Article 185 or against any other provision of the said Constitution.
6. So far as the objection with regard to the competency or incompetency of the present petitioner to file this petition is concerned, we are of the opinion that as the point needs exhaustive arguments, it shall be considered at the time of hearing of the regular appeal. Coming to the merits of the petition, it may be observed that in view of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, already referred to, we are of the view that this is a fit case in which leave should be granted to consider the points raised in the petition, expecially as to whether the High Court acted within the four corners of the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Laws and whether the questions decided by the High Court. are question of law, which arose out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
'The upshot of the above discussion is that we allow this petition for the consideration of the points referred to above. The petitioner shall deposit security amounting to Rs.1,000, failing which the leave to appeal shall stLnd rescinded. The file, after completion in the Registry, shall be placed before the Court for orders.