' ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.-- The petitioner sent a memo. To its employee respondent No. 1 on 11-2- 1982 saying that his services were terminated. Respondent No. 1 did not accept the communication.
The petitioner issued a charge-sheet to the respondent No. 1 saying that he had committed misconduct by refusing to accept the order of termination of his service and on the same ground, the petitioner subsequently dismissed the respondent No. 1 on 28-2-1982. The Accountant of the petitioner prepared a Relieving Report saying that respondent No. 1 has been relieved from service from 1-3-1982 and he has been paid his dues. On this date, viz. 1-3-1982, respondent No. 1 signed a printed receipt showing that he had settled his account and there was nothing due to him from the Company.
2. On 21-3-1982, the respondent No. 1 filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, challenging his dismissal from service. The petition was accepted by the learned Punjab Labour Court No. 7, Gujranwala, on 16-11-1983, directing his re-instatement with back benefits. The petitioner challenged the order by means of an appeal which has been dismissed by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, vide order dated 17-11-1984.
Hence, this Constitutional petition.
3. Learned counsel reiterated on 9-12-1984 the contention raised before the relevant authorities that when a worker receives his dues he is thereafter not entitled to challenge the termination of his service because by the receipt of the dues he ceases to be an "aggrieved person" within the contemplation of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He contended that it makes no difference if the dues have been received for the past services rendered and the grievance may be against the order of termination of the service. To argue this point, he took an adjournment. Today, the learned counsel has referred to Mirza Majeed Baig and 3 others v. Messrs Futehally Chemicals Ltd., Karachi 1973 PLC 297 as followed in 1981 PLC 670; 1982 PLC 652; 1983 PLC 644 and 1984 PLC 786.
4. In the main decision in 1973 PLC 297, rest being derivate, the contention was that the then writ petitioners had precluded themselves from filing a petition under Article 98 of 1962 Constitution, as they had by subsequent conduct accepted the decision of the Industrial Court, dated 27th June, 1968 by receiving all their dues including notice pay, employer's contribution to Provident Fund, Gratuity etc., and the attention of the Court was drawn to the receipts given by the employees-writ petitioners "in full and final settlement of their accounts". The learned Judges dealing with the matter held that "now though it may not be strictly correct to say that by accepting the aforesaid payments the petitioners have precluded themselves from filing this petition, it certainly stands to reason that having done so, they cannot be said to be a party aggrieved by the impugned orders within the meaning of the expression used in Article 98 of the late Constitution of 1962". Finding that the then writ petitioners had accepted the payments in full and final settlement of their accounts, the writ petition was dismissed. Besides that the observation was in relation to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under the Constitution and the present contention is in relation to a petition before a special tribunal, it is to be noticed that the principle is to be applied to facts of each case. It may be correct that when an employee's services are terminated and he accepts all his dues in final settlement of the dispute between him and his employer and virtually says goodbye to his employer, he accepts the termination of his service and having done so he would not be entitled to challenge the same subsequently because having parted company with consent and grace, he cannot turn round and repudiate what he had earlier done. However, it will be entirely different if an employee's services are terminated and he is handed out the dues which he had earned while serving. He has the right to accept the payment as he had served. By acceptance of payment for the past service he does not forfeit his right to challenge the termination of his service. In the case in hand, the dispute is between the employer and the employee. The employer cannot say that if he terminates the services of his employee, the latter cannot even accept the payment for the period during which he had served the employer and if he does that, he gives up his right to challenge the termination of the service. The acceptance of the money for the period during which the employee had served, he was entitled to and by the acceptance thereof, he cannot be presumed to have accepted the termination of his services as well so as to debar him from challenging the same before a competent Court or tribunal. The relevant law deals with the grievances and rights of the employees-workers. They cannot be expected that when their services are terminated, they should either not accept the money for the period for which they had rendered services, or, they will be debarred to challenge the order of termination of their services because a worker ex facie would be needing the money for his daily livelihood. It would be too much to presume that a worker can forego his wages for service rendered and carry on a litigation against termination of his services. In the case in hand, the two documents relied upon by the petitioner are Annexures 'E' and 'F'. Annexure 'E' is the report prepared by the Accountant of the petitioner relieving the respondent No.
1. What an employer does in his office that will obviously not create a disadvantage for the employee. As regards Annexure "F', about which the learned counsel for the petitioner states that by signing this, the respondent No. 1 has settled his accounts and said that there was nothing due to him from his employer and that amounts to acceptance of dismissal, thereby debarring him from petitioning the Labour Courts against the order of dismissal, the following facts may be noted: Firstly, it is a printed receipt prepared by the petitioner on which the respondent No. l's signatures are affixed. The learned appellate Tribunal has said that the document does not show the details of the payments made and, therefore, does not operate as estoppel. He is quite right. Secondly, this document by no means gives an impression or idea that the respondent No. 1 had accepted the fact of his dismissal from service or its validity. Further, if it be recapitulated for what reasons the respondent No. 1 was dismissed, it will be recalled that the petitioner had dismissed him for not accepting the order of termination of his service, by saying that it was disobedience amounting to misconduct. It is like saying that if an employer issues an order to an employee to cut his throat and the latter refuses to accept the order, it will amount to that the employee had disobeyed the order and therefore, committed misconduct and consequently liable to be dismissed from service.
This will be perversity of the highest order. In the circumstances of the case as given above, there was no justification for the petitioner to have dismissed the respondent No. 1 and the latter was not debarred to bring his grievance before the Labour Courts under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The decisions impugned in this petition were within the jurisdiction of the special Tribunals and cannot be said to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction is not called for at all. The petition is totally without merit or force. It is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.