' This civil revision is directed against the appellate judgment dated 3-7-1984 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Kasur, upholding order dated 5-4-1976 of learned Civil Judge ordering rejection of plaint under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, for non-deposit of 1/5th of probable sale price within the period fixed by the Court.
2. Facts, so far as material and relevant, briefly stated, are that the land measuring 242 Kanals 3 Marlas comprised in various field numbers owned by Muhammad Ramzan, Muhammad Rashid, Muhammad Hamid sons of Muhammad Ismail was purchased by Nizam Din and four others/ vendees, for an ostensible sale price of Rs, 70,000 vide registered sale-deed dated 20-3-1975.
Chiragh Din and others pre-empted the sale of the suit land on the grounds of being a non- occupancy tenant-in-occupation of the land, subject-matter of pre-emption suit, and also owner of the estate. On 19-3-1976, the trial Court, directed the plaintiffs pre-emptors, to deposit a sum of Rs, 14,000 1/5th of the probable pre-emption money before 5-4-1976. Necessary deposit of zar-e- panjum was not made by the plaintiffs within the stipulated period. Consequently, on 5-4-1976, the trial Court rejected the plaint in exercise of its powers under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre- emption Act by the following order recorded in Urdu :- {{URDU TEXT}} ' Correctness of order rejecting the plaint was assailed in appellate jurisdiction before learned District Judge, Kasur. Vide judgment dated 18-11-1976, the plaintiffs' appeal was accepted, order dated 5-4-1976 rejecting the plaint was reversed and the case was remanded with the following direction :- "For the reasons stated above the appeal is accepted and the impugned order is set aside leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The suit filed by the appellants is restored. The case is remanded to the Court of Rana Muhammad Jhangir Khan, learned Civil Judge, Chunian, with the direction that he shall pass a fresh order about the deposit of 1; 5th of the pre-emption money by the appellants and shall then decide the case afresh, on merits and in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear in the above-said learned Court on 25-11-1976."
' Reasons which weighed with learned District Judge in accepting the appeal are contained in paragraph 3 of his judgment which, for facility of reference, are reproduced below :- "3. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the relevant record of the case. It has already been stated above that the appellants were ordered to deposit 1/5th of the pre-emption money before 5-4-1976. It is an admitted fact that the Courts were closed on 4-4- 1976 on account of Sunday. In the circumstances, the appellants could not deposit 1/5th of the pre- emption money on the date ordered by the Court. The appellants filed an application on 5-4-1976 in the learned trial Court praying extension in time for depositing 1/5th of the preemption money but the record of the file shows that no order was passed on this application. As the appellants could not deposit I/5th of the pre-emption money before the date ordered by the Court as it was Sunday on 4-4-1976, the learned trial Court had erred while passing the impugned order."
' In pursuance to the remand order made by the learned District Judge, learned counsel states that a fresh order under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act directing deposit of zar-e-panjum was made by the trial Court and plaintiffs, then, deposited the requisite amount of Rs, 14,000 in Court on 6-12-1976, within the extended period.
2. Order passed by learned District Judge on 18-11-1976 was further assailed in provisional jurisdiction in the Lahore High Court, Lahore, through Civil Revision No, 190 of 1977. Vide order, dated 21-1-1980, a learned Single Judge of this Court set aside the remand order of the learned District Judge and directed the learned appellate Judge to examine the sufficiency of the cause as disclosed in the application and then to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. Learned District Judge was also directed to consider the effect of the amendments made in paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 by virtue of the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1976 published on 19-7-1976. It has been observed by the High Court that the learned District Judge, Kasur had accepted this appeal solely on wrong assumption that the learned trial Court had not passed any order on the said application and had straightaway rejected the application. The learned Judge then quoted the relevant observations of the learned District Judge as follows :- "The appellant filed an application on 5-4-1976 in the learned trial Court praying extension in time for depositing 115th of the preemption money but the record of the file shows that no order was passed on this application."
' In paragraph 2 of the judgment of the High Court it is observed :-- "It seems that the learned District Judge did not advert to the contents of the application nor did he peruse the record and accepted the appeal without any sufficient grounds. As the very assumption of the order that no order had been passed by the learned trial Court on the application has been found to be incorrect on account of certified copy of the order (Annexure 'B') placed on record, I have no option than to accept the revision and direct the learned District Judge to examine the sufficiency of the cause as disclosed in the application and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law."
' With this order, the appeal earlier disposed of was resurrected to be disposed of afresh by the learned District Judge in accordance with the directions of the High Court. Vide impugned judgment dated 3-7-1984, learned Additional District Judge, Kasur, after taking due note of the contentions, raised by the plaintiffs/pre-emptors, did not see merit in the appeal and proceeded to dismiss it and consequently, order of the trial Court rejecting the plaint for non-deposit of zar-e- panjum was maintained and upheld: Both these orders, one rejecting the plaint under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and the other passed on appeal upholding the order of the trial Court, have been challenged in revisional jurisdiction by the plaintiffs/pre-emptors.
3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and examined the available material on record.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the object of deposit of zar-e-panjum is to guarantee the vendee against frivolous proceedings on the part of possible pre-emptors. The deposit is a token of good faith only and is meant to test the bona fides of a pre-emptor. The section as enacted by the Legislature, according to learned counsel for the petitioners, is not to be used as a vehicle of oppression but only to ensure that bona fide claimants only knocked at the doors of Courts for relief. In this view of the matter, it was contended that discretion and power rested with Court, in case of lapse, to extend the time to enable the pre-emptor to make the deposit. IL has been contended by learned counsel that, in several cases, the superior Courts have granted extensions under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act to pre-emptors to deposit zar- a-panjum. To support his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the following precedent cases :-- "(1) Inayat v. Darbara Singh and another 55 I C 621.
(2) Sardar Ghulam Sarwar Khan and 2 others v. Sardar Muhammad Anwar Khan and 2 others PLD 1971 Pesh.
170.
(3) Mst. Rasham Jan v. Khan Nawab Khan and others PLD 1970 Azad J & K 66.
(4) Muhammad Azam and another v. Ditta and others PLD 1967 Lab.
1068.
(5) Ch. Zulfiqar Ali v. Mian Akhtar Islam and another PLD 1967 SC 418.
(6) Elahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Sardar Begum PLD 1967 B J 5.
(7) Malik Hidayat Ullah and 2 others v. Murad Ali Khan PLD 1972 SC 69.
(8) Muhammad Bashir and others v. Bashir Ahmad 1974 SCMR 24.
(9) Umar Hayat v. Aziz Ullah Khan etc. PLD 1956 Lah.
297."
4. Since the decision of this civil revision depends on the construction to be placed on section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, it will be profitable to reproduce the above-stated section in extenso "22. Plaintiff may be called on to make deposit or to file security.- (1) In every suit for pre-emption the Court shall at, or at any time before, the settlement of issues require the plaintiff to deposit in Court such sum as does not, in the opinion of the Court exceed one-fifth of the probable value of the land or property, or require the plaintiff to give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the payment, if required, of a sum not exceeding such probable value within such time as the Court may fix in such order.
(2) In any appeal, the Appellate Court may at any time exercise the powers conferred on a Court under subsection (1).
(3) Every sum deposited or secured under subsection (1) or (2) shall be available for the discharge of costs.
(4) If the plaintiff fails within the time fixed by the Court or within such further time as the Court may allow to make the deposit or furnish the security mentioned in subsection (1) or (2) his plaint shall be rejected or his appeal dismissed as the case may be.
(5)(a) If any sum so deposited is withdrawn by the plaintiff, the suit or appeal shall be dismissed.
(b) If any security so furnished for any cause becomes void or insufficient, the Court shall order the plaintiff to furnish fresh security or to increase the security, as the case may, be, within a time to be fixed by the Court, and if the plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the suit or appeal shall be dismissed.
(6) The estimate of the probable value made for the purpose of subsection (1) shall not affect any decision subsequently come to as to what is the market value of the land or property."
5. Deriving support from the precedents above-cited and the provisions of section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, learned counsel contended that the District Judge did not examine the case of grant of extension in period in its true perspectives. Discretion did vest in both the Courts i,e, trial Court and the appellate Court to grant extension. In the case under consideration, the plaintiffs/pre-emptors' conduct was absolutely fair inasmuch as instead of making false lame excuses, they put forth a truthful version stating that they bad not succeeded to arrange for necessary funds to deposit the requisite amount in Court. This straightforward version, according to learned counsel, should have been accepted by the Court for the purpose of granting extension to them. Conversely it has been used to penalise them. It was further contended that before ordering rejection of plaint, plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity of hearing to show cause as to why the necessary deposit was not made in time. The Court should have framed an additional issue on the point with an opportunity to the plaintiffs to adduce evidence in support of the averments made in the application seeking extension of time. Straightaway rejection of plaint under section 22(4) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 without looking or adverting to the grounds advanced in support of the plea seeking extension of time was an improper exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts below. It has further been emphasised that in pursuance to the earlier remand order of learned District Judge, the plaintiffs did deposit the amount which clearly showed their bona fide interest in prosecuting their pre-emption suit. Learned District Judge should have taken note of this factor also when deciding the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause.
6. I have .Carefully attended to the contentions advanced at the Bar by learned counsel for the petitioners. No doubt under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, powers rest with the Court to grant extension of time either on an application (oral or written) or even suo motu where justness of the cause so demands but then it is only for a sufficient cans that time for deposit can be extended. This discretion is to be exercised judicially, if sufficient reasons are shown to exist for its exercise. Order granting extension has not to be passed/made in routine without judicial attending to the circumstances nahated in support of the application for grant of extension. Non- deposit in time as directed by the Court vests a valuable right in the vendee of which he cannot be lightly deprived of.
7. In Inayat v. Darbara Singh (1), Darbara Singh adult with two minors, sued to pre-empt the sale.
Suit was instituted on the last date of limitation i,e, 3-12-1918. On 5th of December, 1918, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to deposit 1/5th of the sale price, on or before 10-1-1919. On the date fixed, the plaintiffs tried to persuade the Court to accept security in place of cash deposit. Prayer was refused. Time was, however, extended until 6-2-1919. The plaintiffs failed and the plaint was rejected under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. Against this decision, the minor plaintiffs filed appeal while Darbara Singh was impleaded as respondent. It was stated before the appellate Judge while explaining the cause for non-deposit that one Phuman Khan backed out of his promise to lend the required amount at the last moment. District Judge, however, did not attach any importance to this in his judgment. However, he observed "I hold that the first Court's order is perfectly correct, legal and just but nevertheless as the plaintiffs are minors I will give one more opportunity on the condition that Rs, 50 be paid as compensation for the defendants."
' Mr. Justice Abdur Rauf of the Lahore High Court, after consideration of the precedent case law and the peculiar nature of the pre-emptive rights, observed :- "That in my opinion the learned Judge of the Court below exercised his discretion in an arbitrary manner in accepting the appeal and thereby extending the time for deposit of 1/5th of sale price.
The mere fact that the appellants were minors was absolutely no ground for interference. In a suit for pre-emption, for which minors have
(1) 55 I C 621 been treated with leniency as regards limitation, with respect to other matters, no exception has been made in their favour in matters of claims for pre-emption,"
' Precedent relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner instead of advancing his case goes against him. In Muhammad Azam Khan v. Ditta and others (1), in a pre-emption suit, trial Court ordered under sec- . Lion 22(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, the plaintiff to deposit 1/5th of the sale price by 17-1-1963. Plaintiff failed to deposit the amount. The deposit was made on 19-1-1963 which was accepted by the trial Court at the risk of the plaintiff. One of the vendees made an application on 6-2-1963, whereupon the Court framed an additional issue : "Whether Ditta, the plaintiff, has deposited 1/5th of the sale price in time ?, if not, what is its effect on the suit". Same day the plaintiff/pre-emptor moved a petition for condonation of two days delay attributing the lapse to the negligence of his own counsel. The delay was not condoned by the trial Court and the petition was consequently rejected. On merits, the plaintiff was found to have superior right but his plaint was rejected on the ground that he had failed to deposit zar-e-panjum within the time fixed by the Court. District Judge accepted the appeal on the ground that the trial Court, by inviting evidence on merits, had condoned the default. In these circumstances, the appeal came to the High Court of Lahore. Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, J. (as his Lordship then was) repelling the contentions advanced observed :- "It was next contended that the delay was caused due to the negligence of the counsel for the respondents and, therefore, the delay should be condoned in these proceedings. There is nothing on the record to show that his counsel was in any way at fault. Doubtless, in the application which the respondent made on the 19th of February, 1963, for the condonation of the delay and the extension of the time, he made a reference to the fact that his counsel, Mr. Abdul Wahid had failed to deposit the money, but he did not support the allegation by his affidavit, nor did he bring any other fact on the record to substantiate it. The allegation having not been proved, the reason put forth for the condonation of the delay in the deposit, therefore, does not exist. It is only for a sufficient cause that a time for making the deposit under section 22 can be extended ; because the object of an order under clause (1) of section 22 is to guarantee vendees against frivolous proceedings on the part of the possible preemptors. The deposit is a token of good faith. The intention of law is that the pre-emptor should deposit the amount under clause (1) of section 22 by the date fixed for the purpose, and the Court can extend the time of deposit, but it is not to act mechanically, and has to objectively consider the circumstances which led to the delay. The respondent has failed to make out any good ground for the condonation of the delay. An appellate Court has the power to grant a pre-emptor an extension of the period for payment fixed by the Court of first instance but it exercises that power only in favour of the pre-emptor whose conduct has been bona fide."
8. This case too, like the earlier one, does not help the petitioners. The case of Elahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Sardar Begum (2), proceeds on entirely distinguishable facts and is not helpful to the point requiring
(1) PLD 1967 Lah. 1068 (2) PLD 1967 13 J 5 decision in the case under consideration. Sardar Ghulam Sarwar Khan and 2 others v. Sardar Muhammad Anwar Khan and 2 others (1) does not support the cause of the petitioners. In the above precedent, extension granted by the Court fir deposit of Zar-e-Panjum under section 23 of N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act was not approved by the Peshawar High Court and it was observed :- "Consequently, I am of the view that the order of the trial Court in respect of extension of time for the deposit is illegal without good or sufficient reasons and without jurisdiction. Such an order mandatorily entails the rejection of the plaint. I, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside judgment and decrees of the Courts below and reject the plaint of the plaintiffs."
9. In the above-said Peshawar case, reliance was placed on :
(1) PLD 1952 Pesh.
26.
(2) PLD 1954 Pesh.
64.
(3) PLD 1966 B J 8.
Case of Mst. Rashman Jan (2) deals with altogether different set of circumstances and is not helpful for the decision of the point raised in the case under consideration. It is correct that Mr. Yousuf Saraf J. Made certain observations on the nature of right of pre-emption at page 73 of the report on which reliance was heavily placed by the petitioners but then the observations so made have to be appreciated in the context of the facts of the case under notice of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Muhammad Shabbir and others v. Basliir Khan (3) was not a case under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. In the precedent above noted, pre-emption suit was decreed conditionally upon the payment of Rs, 20,000 after adjustment of Zar-e-Panjum already in deposit in Court. Pre-emptor challenged the accuracy of the price fixed by the Court, in appeal.. First appellate Court through an interim order extended the date for deposit until 21-6- 1965. In these circumstances when the controversy was brought before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, it was contended that the District Judge was not competent to extend the time in respect of pre-emption money, through an interim order. Supreme Court observed :- "Punjab Pre-emption Act (1) of 1913, Section 22 read with C. P. C. (V of 1908), Order XX, rule 14 and section 148 -Pre-emption suit-Time for payment of pre-emption amount fixed by the trial Court- Can be extended by the District Judge by an interim order-Appeal being continuation of the suit, District Judge can in appeal pass interim order."
' In Malik Hidayat Ullah (4), the trial Court, in a pre-emption suit, on 17-11-1967, passed an order under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act that Zar-e-Panjum i. e. 1/5th of probable sale price, amounting to Rs, 1,400 should be deposited by 6th of January, 1968. However, on 5-12-1967 pre- emptors applied to submit security in place of cash deposit on 6-12-1967. The Court instead of disposing of the said petition directed that it should come up along with the main suit on 6-1-1968.
On this date, taking up the application for security, first, rejected it and thereafter in exercise of suo motu jurisdiction extended the time for making cash deposit
(1) PLD 1971 Pesh. 170 (2) PLD 1970 Azad J& K 66
(3) 1974 SCMR 24 (4) PLD 1972 SC 69 on 5-2-1968. Vendees' application under section 22(4) was rejected. The order of Civil Judge was brought under challenge in revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. High Court was pleased to set aside the order of Civil Judge, saying "in the absence of any prayer or application for extension of time on the part of the plaintiffs/respondents, the Court had no jurisdiction to extend time of its own. Extension of time can be granted when there is a sufficient cause for the purpose of a plea which must first be raised and then put to proof. No such cause was adopted in the instant case and learned Civil Judge of his own extended the time which was beyond his jurisdiction". Supreme Court after referring to the provisions of section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act observed :- "It will be apparent from the language of subsections (4) and (5) (b) of section 22 that the rejection of the plaint or the dismissal of the suit will be ordered if the plaintiff fails to make the deposit within the 'time fixed by the Court' or 'within such further time as the Court may allow to make the deposit or furnish the security'. This clearly contemplates that the Court has the power to extend the time.
This is no doubt a discretionary power, which like all other judicial discretions, must be exercised upon sound judicial principles, but it can, by no stretch of imagination, be said that the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time at all.
' The Punjab Pre-emption Act does not prescribe any procedure for obtaining such extension of time but upon general principles a Court has normally to be moved by an application of some kind, either oral or written. This does not, however, mean that the Court has no jurisdiction, in the absence of any such application, to grant a discretionary relief where the justice of the case so requires. In the absence of any provision in the Statute or in the rules made under the Statute expressly providing that the Court shall act on the application of a party it cannot be said that such an application is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. The power does not become nugatory, if no application is made for invoking that power. If the Court could we are clearly of opinion that it could under subsection (4) of section 22 extend time, then it could do so either on the application, written or oral, of a party or even suo motu where the justice of the cause so demanded.
' In the present case, the learned Judge of the High Court thought that there was no ground at all for granting such an extension although it was argued before him that in the present case the Court had made it practically impossible for the appellants, who were plaintiffs in the pre-emption suit, to comply with the order for making the deposit within the time originally fixed by the Court by its own action, namely, the adjournment of the application for furnishing security instead of making the deposit in cash from the 6th of December 1967 to the 6th of January, 1968, on which date the preemption suit itself was fixed for hearing. If the Court had not done so but had disposed of the application soon after it was filed the present difficulty would not have arisen. The pre-emptors would have had sufficient time to make the deposit in cash.
' The extension of time in the present case was granted before the time originally fixed for making the deposit had expired and before the disposal of the suit. No objection could, therefore, be taken on this ground either. If the Court had the power to extend time it could do so even after the expiry of the period originally fixed unless the statute prohibited this or unless the order had become final and rendered the Court functus officio. The - general principle- is that where by an order time is fixed by a Court for doing any act the Court can grant extensions from time to time till it ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter or loses season of the matter.
' In the circumstances, we are clearly of the view that the High Court grievously erred in holding that the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction at all to grant the extension of time. At worst, all that could be said was that perhaps the Civil Judge had not exercised his discretion in a proper manner in granting the extension but then the matter would not have been revisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Before the High Court could interfere under this latter section, it had to be satisfied that the Court below had acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction or exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested."
10. In the last but one paragraph the Supreme Court also observed :- "There was, as we have already pointed out, a very good and substantial reason for the extension of time, because, even assuming that no application was made by the appellants for such extension of time, the Court, in the interest of justice, was fully competent suo motu to extend the time when it had by its own act made it practically impossible for the appellants to comply with its original order by adjourning the application for furnishing security to the 6th of January, 1968."
11. This brings me to an end of the discussion of the precedent case law, cited and relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners.
12. A bare reading of section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 shows that the Court which term includes the primary as well as the appellate Court does possess power to extend time in the matter of deposit of 1/5th of probable sale price. Power thus to extend time lies within the discretion of Court which like all other powers vested in Court must be B exercised on sound judicial principles regulating the exercise of discretion. Exercise of discretion by the Court is liable to correction by th superior Courts, if this exercise has been regulated on erroneous premises. Therefore, the pre- emptor in order to justly qualify for extension must show sufficient ground explaining the cause of his failure to comply with the mandate of the Court. In the absence of the sufficient cause, time C cannot and should not be extended in a routine and mechanical manner. Pre-emptor's lapse entails rejection of the plaint under section 22 (4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. This gives a valuable right to the vendee who also then becomes interested and is entitled to be heard. The answer to the question whether in given circumstances, the time should or should not be extended, depends upon appreciation of particular circumstances of each case. Pre-emptor's suit is not entitled to a differential treatment on the supposed ground of its being predatory in nature, but then a pre-emptor in order to succeed in his right of substitution must comply with all the legal requirements including deposit of Zar-e-Panjum. If he fails and does not show vigilance and in case of default, convincing sufficient cause is not forthcoming in the matter of deposit of Zor-e- Panjum, he alone must suffer. In the case under consideration, only ground urged was inability to arrange necessary funds. This, I think, is not a valid legal ground for granting extension to him. He is coming to Court to seek the enforcement of his D right of substitution in place of a 'vendee. He had full one year at his disposal and even then if he had no funds to deposit Zar-e-Panjum, he is himself to blame and no other. He could not be allowed more time to run about for purposes of collecting funds to dislodge a vendee from the field. Learned District Judge in pursuance to a remand order did discuss the matter and found the cause assigned to be clearly insufficient.
Consequently rejection of plaint was ordered. Such an order passed in proper E exercise of jurisdiction is not open to any criticism in revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reference may be made to S. Zafar Ahmad v. Abdul Khaliq (1).
13. Learned counsel then contended that the Court should have framed an issue on the point and allowed the plaintiff to lead evidence in support thereof. It has also been contended that security could have been ordered in place of cash deposit by the Court. I am afraid the contention has no serious merit. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff did not claim any issue or right to produce evidence at the opportune time, it would not have served any useful purpose either. Ground taken in support of plea of extension ex facie was not sufficient in law.
14. Learned counsel lastly contended that the High Court in its order dated 29-1-1980 had also directed learned District Judge to consider the effect of amendments made in paragraph 25 of Land Reforms Regulation 115 of 1972, by (Land Reforms Amendment) Act, 1976 (which came into force on 19-7-1976) and being clearly bound by remand order, learned appellate Judge was obliged to record his views thereon. Absence of any finding on the point remanded for consideration by the High Court renders the judgment legally infirm and defective. In the case under consideration pre-emption suit was instituted much before the enforcement of the above- noted amendment. The plaint was rejected on 5-4-1976. It was during the pendency of the first appeal before the District Judge when the amendment was enforced, conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Collector to entertain, hear and adjudicate pre-emption suits based on tenancy rights. Vide order dated 18-11-1976, appeal was accepted and the suit remanded. However, order dated 18-11-1976 was reversed by the High Court and appeal of the pre-emptor was ordered to be heard by the learned District Judge afresh. The said civil appeal was dismissed on 3-7-1984. Plaint did contain a ground for pre-emption based on tenancy rights. Para. 25(5) of Land Reforms Regulation as amended did not at all affect the civil appeal pending before the learned District Judge which had to be decided by him on its own merits unaffected by the said amendment. In Abdur Rashid v. Khurshid Ahmad (2) this Court observed :- "Sub-paragraph (5) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Collector to decide suits in which right of pre-emption is claimed on the basis of tenancy. Sub-paragraph (6), which was also inserted by the said amendment, provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed by a Collector under sub-paragraph (5) may within thirty days of such order prefer an appeal to the Commissioner.
Thus, while enacting sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) the makers of the law were
(1) PLD 1964 (W. P.) Kar. 149 (2) 1980 CLC 977 fully conscious of difference between the two categories of proceedings they were dealing with, namely, suits and appeals. Since they did not make an express provision ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in regard to the appeals pending before them at the time of the amendment under examination, it would follow that they intended the pending appeals to be heard and decided by the appellate Courts on the civil side and not by the Commissioners. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that in consequence of the above amendment in the Land Reforms Regulation this Court has no jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal in hand."
' Same view has been adopted in 1980 CLC 977.
14. For what has been stated above, present civil revision has no legal force and is dismissed in limine.