1. ' The petitioner has challenged two orders passed by respondents Nos. 2 and 3, dated 12-9-1967 and 3-6-1968 respectively in this petition which is filed under Article 9 of the P.C.O. The following facts which are relevant for the purposes of disposal of the present petition may be stated here.
2. ' It is alleged in the petition that 27 Ghuntas of land out of Survey number 59 Deh Panoakil were allotted to one Nazar Khan a claimant displaced person in the year 1960 in satisfaction of his claim.
3. The present petitioner allegedly purchased the said 27 Ghuntas of land from Nazar Khan through a registered sale-deed on 2-9-1963. The land was mutated in name of petitioner on 10-9-1963 on the basis of above sale and since then the land stood in his name. It appears that respondent No. 4 filed an application in the year 1967 before the Deputy Commissioner and Additional Settlement Commissioner (Lands) Sukkur (respondent No. 2) praying that 10 Ghuntas of agricultural land out of Survey number 59 be cancelled from the allotment of Nazar Khan and same may be allotted to him, as transfer of these 10 Ghuntas of land was obtained by said Nazar Khan by fraudulent means, namely by making interpolation in the Khatooni issued in his favour. It is alleged in the petition that respondent No. 2 without issuing any notice to the petitioner and without holding any inquiry cancelled 10 Ghuntas of land from the allotment of Nazar Khan and allotted the same to respondent No. 4 by order, dated 11-9-1967. It is further alleged that Nazar Khan claimant through petitioner filed a revision petition before respondent No. 3 against the order of respondent No. 2 but the same was dismissed on 3-6-1968. The petitioner then allegedly filed a suit on 24-3-1972 challenging the validity of the order, dated 12-9-1967 in the civil Court but the plaint in the suit was returned to the petitioner by order, dated 17-6-1980. It is alleged that the petitioner could not pursue the matter as he was not kept informed by his Advocate. However, the petitioner is alleged to have filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sukkur, for cancellation of allotment of 10 Ghuntas of land in favour of respondent on 6-3-1983. It is in these circumstances that the present petition was presented in this Court on 1-3-1984. The learned counsel for the respondents have jointly raised a preliminary objection that the present petitioner suffers from laches and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand contends that the order, dated 12-9-1967 being an order wholly without jurisdiction having been passed in utter disregard of the principle of natural justice it could not come in his way. It is also contended that the subsequent order of respondent No. 3 only confirmed the order of respondent No. 2 and as the final order is void the subsequent order also suffered from the same defect and as such the subsequent order of respondent No. 3, dated 3-6-1968 also could not be pressed against the petitioner, in view of the decision in the case of Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslarn Zia PLD 1958 SC 104. It is alternately contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the delay in the case has been sufficiently explained by the petitioner and, therefore, the petition could not be dismissed on the ground of laches. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length we are of the view that the present petition must fail on the ground of excessive laches. It is true that the order, dated 12-9-1967 was passed by respondent No. 2 without hearing the petitioner and the original allottee and therefore, for that reason it is an order which is invalid and void in the eye of law. However, appeal was filed against this order before the Settlement Commissioner (Lands)
4. Khairpur by the petitioner which was dismissed on 3-6-1968 and in spite of dismissal of that appeal (though the reasons given in the order of dismissal may not be correct) the (petitioner slept over his right for a long period of about 16 years and during this period the land was sold by respondent No. 4 on 7-12-1967 in favour of one Noor Muhammad son of Rora and the said Noor Muhammad again sold this land in favour of respondent No. 5 on 24-5-1968 and respondent No. 5 further sold the land to one Dr. Abdul Rashid on 12-1-1983. The last named persons whose name is disclosed in the objections filed by respondents 4 and 5 in the case has not yet been impleaded as a party in these proceedings since the petitioner did not challenge the two orders mentioned above within a reasonable period and during this period third parties rights were created. It cannot be disputed that the relief granted by this Court in exercise of its power under the constitution (which is known as writ jurisdiction) is discretionary and the Court can refuse to interfere with an order if it is found that the petition suffered from excessive laches. It has been held in the case of Ghulam Mohiud Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1964 SC 829 that the Court may refuse to interfere in the writ jurisdiction even with a void order if such writ enables petitioner to circumvent the provisions of statute of limitation. Such remedy can also be refused to the petitioner if the conduct of the petitioner is such that he is estopped from challenging it on account of laches. In the present case the first order was passed by respondent No. 2 on 12-9-1967 and appeal against that order was dismissed by respondent No. 3 on 3-6-1968. From 1968 to the filing of the present petition which was filed on 1-3-1984, there is no plausible explanation from the petitioner to explain this unusual and excessive delay. We are not unmindful of the fact that in the meantime the property has changed hands more than twice and the last transferee who is stated to be Dr. Abdul Rashid and who allegedly purchased the property on 12-1-1983 has not been impleaded as a party in the case. In the case of S. Sharif Ahmed Hashimi v. The Chairman Secreening Committee, Lahore and another 1980 SCMR 711 writ was refused where it was found that there was delay of about 10 to 12 years in challenging the impugned order and other persons had acquired right in the meantime. Yousaf Ali's case relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been considered in S.Sharif Ahmed Hashimi's case and following observations were made by the Court while distinguishing Yousaf Ali's case: "It is true that a writ was issued in Yousaf Ali's case, and the void order was set aside "together with the superstructure of rights and obligations" built upon it. But there were no equities in that case against the appellant because the void order related to a dispute about property and was one of a series of orders in the continuous litigation between the parties, therefore, no equities had accrued either in favour of the respondent or in favour of third parties. But, in the instant case, even on the footing that the impugned order is void, the petitioner failed to challenge it for more than a decade, therefore, it must have led to consequences, such as the promotion of other people to the appointment held by the petitioner. Additionally, to allow the writ after such gross laches would be to throw on the tax-payer the consequences of the petitioner's gross negligence in pursuing his remedies. But as the petitioner relied upon the judgment in his favour by the letters Patent Bench, I would recall here that the letters Patent Bench had relied on this Court's Judgment in Abdul Qadir's case, but the delay in filing the writ petition in this case was three years, and there can be no comparison between a delay of three years and a delay of twelve years. I may, however, point out that this Court had condoned a delay of about eight years in Pakistan v. Sheikh Abdul Hamid PLD 1961 SC 105. But this was an extreme case. In any event, the law has to draw a line somewhere between delay which can be condoned and delay which cannot be condoned, and as the delay in the instant case was too gross to be condoned, the writ petition of the petitioner had to be dismissed on this ground, irrespective of the question whether the impugned order was void or voidable."
5. ' In view of the above discussed legal position we are of the view that the present petition suffers from excessive laches and we accordingly dismiss this petition on that ground. There will, however be no order as to costs.