MUHAMMAD HALEEM, C.J.--Leave to appeal was granted to consider the question of law as to whether the Court hearing a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can allow an objector to claim increased compensation for the acquired land by making an amendment in the original application filed by him before the Collector requiring a reference under the said section.
2. Certain lands belonging to the appellant were acquired for respondent No. 1 by the Collector by his award, dated 1st December, 1974 after the issuance of relevant notifications under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called the "Act").
The compensation awarded was as follows:-- NehriRs.4,000 per acre.
ChahiRs.5,000 per acre.
BaraniRs.1,000 per acre.
Banjar JadeedRs. 750 per Acre.
Banjar Qadeem. Rs. 500 per Acre.
This was after considering the claim of the Appellant in response to the notice issued under section 9 of the Act.
3. Not being satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded, the appellant filed an application before the Collector for referring the matter to the Court for decision. In that application he claimed compensation at a flat rate of Rs.6,400 per Acre without any reference to the classification of soil.
The Collector, accordingly, referred the matter to the Civil Court for its decision. During the pendency of the said application which was registered as a suit, the appellant moved an application under Order VI. Rule 17 and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking to enhance the amount claimed in the application. Instead of the flat rate of Rs.6,400 per acre as was claimed earlier the amount now claimed was Rs.100 per Maria for the rural land and Rs.500 per Maria for urban land.
4. The Senior Civil Judge, Sheikhupura, by order, dated 14th of December, 1967, disallowed the prayer for amending the claim for rural land, but the claim for the urban land was allowed to be enhanced as under:-- "That the compensation for the urban area is worth Rs.100 to Rs.500 per Marla, according to the transaction made in the vicinity, as recorded in the mutations' register of the circle."
This was the same rate of compensation as claimed in response to the notice issued under section 9 of the Act. The first respondent went in revision to the High Court against this order and succeeded as it was allowed by judgment, dated 7th of April, 1972.
5. The High Court while holding that there was a conflict of judicial authority on this point referred to amongst others the cases reported as R.I Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v . Secretary of State AIR 1930 P C 64; Umar Bakhsh and another v. The Secretary of State 46 I C 906; Secretary of State v. C.R.
Subramania Ayyar AIR 1930 Mad. 576; Rev. Divisional Officer v. Sri Rajah Vyricherla Narayana Gajapathiraju Bahadur Garu AIR 1937 Mad. 902; Province of Bengal v. Ram Chandra Bhotika and others AIR 1944 Cal. 247 and Collector Peshawar v. Sher Ahmad Khan and others PLD 1966 Pesh.
193 and distinguished the contrary view taken in the Province of Bengal v . P.L. Nun AIR 1945 Cal. 312.
6. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the proceedings before the Civil Court on a reference by Collector by reason of section 53 of the Act except when there is inconsistency between any provision of the Code and the Act. Obviously, therefore, Order VI, rule 17 will be applicable to the proceedings but sections 18, 20, 21 and 25 of the Act indicate to what extent it can be pressed into service for allowing an amendment. These provisions read as under:-- "18. Reference to Court.--(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made,--
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the the when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award.
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, subsection (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire."
"20. Service of notice --The Court shall thereupon cause a notice specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons namely:-- (a)the applicant;
(b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded; and
(c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Collector."
"21. Restriction on scope of proceedings.--The scope of the inquiry in every such proceeding shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection "
"25. Rules as to amount of compensation.--(1) When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall 'not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under, section 11.
(2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector.
(3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector."
7. Subsection (1) of section 18 enumerates the matters which can form the subject-matter of reference by the Collector for the determination of the Court and one such matter is the "amount of compensation". Subsection (1) of section 25 lays down the "minimum" and the "maximum" within which the Court must limit its award, that is, when the objector has put in his claim for compensation under section 9 of the Act, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11 of the-Act Subsections (2) and (3) of section 25 will not be applicable to the case of the appellant as the situation envisaged in either of the to subsections is not present in the instant case. Section 20 requires service of notice on the applicant, at persons interested in the objection and the Collector if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of compensation. Section 21 of the Act again restricts the scope of the inquiry to the consideration of interests of the persons affected by the objection. Again the word "objection" in this section has the same connotation as in section 18 of the Act.
8. The trial Court while allowing the Civil Revision held as under:-- "Even if it is assumed that Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C. Was attracted to the facts of the present case the learned Court has acted with material irregularity and illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction by allowing the amendment. The respondents should be taken to have waived their claim at the rate ranging from Rs.16,000 to Rs.18,000 and to have reduced it to a sum of Rs.6,400 per Acre. Apparently this cannot be termed as a mere clerical error. The amendment claimed introduced a totally inconsistent plea which should not have been allowed even on the general principles of Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C. It could not also be said that this amendment was necessary for deciding the real dispute in controversy between the parties."
9.A reading of the above sections shows to what extent the power to allow an amendment under Order VI, rule 17, C.P.C. Is curtailed. An illustration in hand can be where a reference under section 18 of the Act relates to a dispute regarding apportionment between A and B. The Court cannot allow C and D to be added on their own application to contest the award on a ground not raised in the reference. The point altogether is not free from difficulty as there is divergence of opinion between different High Courts and not only this there is also difference of opinion in the same High Courts.
The starting point is the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secretary of State. AIR 1930 P C 64. In that case although the award of the Collector was based on measurements but no question as to their correctness was raised in the application filed for referring the dispute under section 18 to the Court for determination. The objection taken was to the valuation of the land only. In the Court a plea was taken that either the Government should admit a larger area or in the alternative there should be a fresh measurement. The trial Court disallowed the prayer and so did the High Court but again on appeal from the order of the trial Court this ground was taken which was repelled. It was this refusal which was the subject- matter of decision by the Judicial Committee. The Judicial Committee referred to sections 18, 20 and 21 and held as under:-- "Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once, therefore, it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the "matter" referred, and the Court has no powers to determine or consider anything beyond it."
What appears to be the ratio decidendi of this case seems to me to be that; the jurisdiction of the Court in dealing with the reference under section 1E is restricted by the terms of section 18 as enjoined by sections 20 and 21 of the Act.
10. As said earlier there is difference of opinion on this question, and so also the above dictum of the Judicial Committee has been construed differently by the High Courts. In Secretary of State v.
C.R. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1930 Mad. 576, the objector lodged the claim by the addition of to new items. e.g., the cost of constructing new walls and the cost of erecting latrines before the Court. This was objected to on behalf of the Government, and it was argued that the Court had no power to entertain such newly-preferred claim. The trial Court allowed the claim in respect of the latrines, but disallowed it in respect of the walls. A revision was taken to the High Court against the allowing of the claim in respect of the latrines. In this context, Curgenven, J, while holding that the trial Court had no power to allow a supplementary claim to compensation, observed:-- "In all ordinary circumstances, therefore, a claimant can and should present his case fully before the Collector, and should be held bound throughout the proceedings by what may be termed his pleadings. Turning then to S, 18, it enables a person interested to require the Collector to refer the matter for the determination of the Court: ---Whether the objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation amount to the persons interested.--- Under subsection (2) he has to state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. The proceedings before the Court are thus of the nature of objections to the Collector's award, and not a judicial inquiry independently undertaken into such questions as the claimant may raise. On this view, it would not be open to a claimant to make out a fresh case, whether by way of supplementary claims to compensation, or otherwise. The point is practically bare of authority, the only opposite case cited to me being a decision to this effect by a Judge of the Punjab Chief Court in Umar Bakhsh v. Secretary of State." Two points emerge from the decision, which limit the jurisdiction exercised by the Court. The first is that the objector should fully present his case before the Collector and that he should be confined to his claim throughout the proceedings as if it was his pleadings; and the second is that the proceedings before the Court are not a judicial inquiry independently undertaken as apart from the specific objection referred to. Accordingly, this judgment follows the ordinary rules of pleading that the litigant should be bound by his own pleadings. There is no reference to Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur's case, but the decision turns on the interpretation of section 18 of the Act, and in that context there is emphasis on the rigidity of pleadings.
11. In Umar Bakhsh and another v. Secretary of State, 46 1 C 906, although there is no discussion in the judgment but it is clearly laid down that the claim for damages for severance if not claimed before the Collector in pursuance of the notice under section 9 of the Act, cannot be entertained by the Civil Court. Obviously this has a reference to the jurisdiction exercised by the Civil Court in regard to the specific objection referred to for decision, and anything beyond it could not be taken notice of. In Revenue Divisional Officer v. Sri Rajah Vyricherte Narayana Gajapathiraju Bahadur, AIR 1937 Mad. 902, out of six questions framed for consideration only to need to be mentioned, which are firstly, whether the compensation for the value of the 'special adaptability' of the land acquired for supplying drinking water otherwise than to the unacquired lands of objector was, in fact, claimed either under section 9 of the Act or in his objection to the award; and, secondly, if no such claim was made before the Collector then could this be awarded by the Civil Court. In answering these questions, it was said that the claim fell under the second head in section 1801) namely, compensation and that by reason of section 53 which makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to all proceedings before the Court the allegations of Pleaders if they are not inconsistent can be taken into consideration in framing the issues as provided under Order XIV, rule
3. From this as was held it would follow that the Courts have jurisdiction to frame an issue which does not directly arise from the objection taken provided that it was not totally inconsistent with it.
Additionally, the Court also held that it was also permissible if Order VI, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the proceedings to grant leave at the the of framing the issues to amend the statement of objections by including in it a claim for the value of the natural suitability for water supply of the land acquired subject, of course, to such terms as might be proper. In holding so, the learned Judges of the Court observed that the import of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur's case was nothing more than to emphasize that the objection considered must fall under the same category in section 18(1) of the Act as the objection pleaded.
Having said so, the decision of Curgenven, J. , in Secretary of State vC. R Subramania Ayyar, was commented upon as having gone to far if it was taken to mean that the Court has no jurisdiction in a proper case to allow the claimant to vary the basis of his objection or to frame an issue relating to the same head of petition, but not arising precisely out of the pleadings. Accordingly, it was held that it was sufficient if the claim had fallen in the same category, i.e. , compensation in section 18(1) of the Act. An appeal was taken against the decision of the High Court to the Privy Council which is reported as Vyricherla Narayana Gajapartharaju v . Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam AIR 1939 P C 98. As the appeal of the Revenue Division Officer, Vizagapatam had succeeded in the High Court, the appellant challenged the legality of the valuation on the ground that the High Court was in error in not awarding the compensation on a proper consideration of sections 23 and 24(5) of the Act. For a better understanding of the judgment of the Privy Council it would be necessary here to refer to the finding of the High Court.
"Let us apply the law as laid down in these rulings to the facts of the present case. It has been shown that there was at the the of the notification no other purchaser besides a harbour who was reasonably possible as a purchaser for the drinking water supply on the respondent's land. That being so, this special adaptability has no value apart from the value created by the scheme for the purpose for which it is acquired. Even if we are to take into account the speculative rise of price which might have taken place by reason of the owner conceiving the possibility of the development of some such scheme as has been put forward, it is on the evidence apparent that no one fore saw this scheme until the actual investigation began and there is no evidence whatever to any speculative rise of price until after the scheme had resulted in the notification.
Though the special adaptability existed, it had no prospect of becoming an element of value apart from the scheme; its value, therefore, was the result of the scheme and to award compensation for it is to do that which cannot be done with reference to S. 24(5) of the Act, i.e. To take into account the increase to the value of the land acquired likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired. It follows that the learned subordinate Judge erred in awarding compensation for the special adaptability of this land to supply drinking water to persons outside the respondents' estate."
And the decision of the Privy Council turns on the consideration of the legal question as to the amount of compensation receivable upon an interpretation of these provisions of the Act. It was the respondent before the Privy Council who had taken the objection in the High Court as to the impropriety of the claim for compensation for value of the special suitability of the land acquired for supplying drinking water as it was not taken in the application before the Collector, and no question arose before their Lordships of the Privy Council as to the correctness of the High Court in distinguishing the case of the Secretary of State v. C.R. Subramania Ayyar, as leave was only granted to consider the error of the High Court in not following the correct principle for determining the compensation. Accordingly, this question was res integra and open for review. I may here observe that in Secretary of State v. C.R. Subramania Ayyar, the facts were altogether different as a claim for the costs of constructing walls and latrines was freshly made before the Court and entertained. It was in that context that emphasis was laid on the fact that the objector should fully make out his case before the Collector and having once taken a position he should be made to be bound by it as his objection to the award in regard to the quantum of compensation receivable by him. The line of distinction drawn from the observations in Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur's case does not seem to follow as it then would not be a specific question referred for decision nor can it be regarded as a basis of valuation as it was a supplementary claim made for the first the in Court and not taken as an objection to the award before Collector. Again if according to the Privy Council case the jurisdiction only arises to answer the specific question then this could not be a matter of procedure only which could readily be included either by way of amendment to the claim or otherwise for decision.
12. In Province of Bengal v. Ram Chandara Bhatik and others, AIR 1944 Cal. 247, the objector before the Collector claimed Rs.1,500 as compensation for the trees whereupon this question was referred to the Court for decision under section 18 of the Act. Thereafter, he was allowed to enhance his claim from Rs.1,500 to Rs.10,000, and he was accordingly awarded Rs.3,650 as being the fair market value of the trees. An appeal was taken to the Calcutta High Court and it was contended on behalf of the Province of Bengal that the Court had no jurisdiction to allow the objector to amend his application after the matter had come before the Court. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, relying on the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur, held:-- "That the only matter which was referred for the determination of the Court was whether the trees should be valued at Rs.400 or at Rs.1500; and on the principles laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 57 Cal. 1148, the Court had no power to consider anything beyond what had actually been referred to it. In these circumstances, I do not think that it was open to the Court to allow the claimant to amend the application after the matter had come before the tribunal, because the amendment had the effect of placing before the Court for consideration a matter which had not actually been referred to it within the meaning of S. 18(1), Land Acquisition Act."
Further in holding so, the language of section 18(1) was considered and it was held that the words "require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court" merely mean that the point on which the Collector's award is disputed may be referred to the Court at the instance of a claimant, and when such a dispute has been referred to the Court the scope of the inquiry is limited within the bounds of the dispute which had actually arisen before the Collector.
This is how section 18(1) has been construed as following the dictum laid down in Pramatha Nath Mullick's case. Here I may also highlight that the opinion of the Division Bench in the case of Revenue Divisional Officer, (supra), was canvassed against this proposition but it was distinguished on the ground that the decision in that case rested on the plane that in a proper case the Court had jurisdiction to consider the effect of evaluation made on a different basis from that which had been adopted before the Collector which is not the case here. The decision in this case is in line with the view taken by Curgenven, J. , in Secretary of State v. C.R. Subramania Ayyar. However, a contrary view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Province of Bengal v. P.L. Nun AIR 1945 Cal.
312. In this case what happened was that the objector claimed Rs.80,000 as compensation for the land and building under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector awarded a sum of Rs.47,765 as compensation. In this objection to the award, the objector contended that the compensation awarded was far below the market value of the property which should have been at least Rs.56,000. It was also urged in the objection that the Collector had not taken into consideration special advantages and the disposition of the land while awarding the sum of Rs.47,765. After reference to the Court, the objector made an application for the amendment of the petition of reference and sought enhancement of the amount to Rs.74,666 in places of Rs.56,000, which was said to have been mentioned by mistake. This application was resisted, but the Court allowed the objector to amend the petition of reference as prayed. The precise objection taken against the amendment was that the sum of Rs.56,000 on the petition of reference was an integral part of the matter under reference and hence a change in that figure would make the matter of the reference quite different from the matter originally referred to the Court and hence the Court had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment. While rejecting this submission, the Division Bench observed:-- "The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant is supported by the judgment of Division Bench in I L R 1 Cal. 69, which on the facts is on all fours with the case before us. There the claimant in his statement of claim before the Collector made under section 9 of the Act claimed Rs.2,800 as compensation for the trees standing on the acquired land. The Collector awarded Rs.400 only. In the petition of reference under section 18, the claimant valued the claim at Rs.1,500. The claimant thereafter applied to Court to amend his petition of reference by substituting a higher figure for Rs.1,500. The amendment was allowed by the lower Court, but' the Division Bench held that the lower Court had no power to allow that amendment. We, however, respectfully dissent from the judgment."
And further:-- "In our judgment, the judgment of the judicial Committee was --misread and misapplied."
In the view of the learned Judges the word "matter" occurring in section 18 only meant the category of objections extending to four heads. And in support of this opinion, they approvingly referred to the decision of the Madras High Court reported as Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam, for the reasons it distinguished the Madras case as it went further than what was held to have been decided. Again the learned Judges did not consider it necessary to refer this question to a Full Bench as in their opinion the decision went against the to judgments of the Judicial Committee reported as Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur vSecretary of St-ate, AIR 1930 P C 64 and Vyricherla Narayana Gajapathiraju vRevenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam AIR 1939 P C 98. I may here respectfully point out that the decision of the learned single Judge in Secretary of State v. C.R.
Subramania Ayyar AIR 1930 Mad. 576, turned on the interpretation of section 18 of the Act and applied to the facts of the case as they existed which, to the learned Judge appeared to be having restricted meaning so as to exclude a higher claim not preferred before the Collector as an objection to the award. If the Division Bench in the Province of Bengal v. P.L Nun AIR 1945 Cal. 312, had differed from the decision of another Division Bench of the same High Court then it should have referred the matter to the Full Bench without stating that the observations of the Judicial Committee were misread or misapplied. It was then that an authoritative decision could have been given as to which view was correct. However, one thing is clear that the Division Bench while deciding the case of Province of Bengal v Ram Chandra Bhotika and another AIR 1944 Cal. 247 had distinguished the case of Revenue Divisional Officer v . Sri Rajah Vyricherla Narayana Gajapathiraju Bahadur Garu, AIR 1937 Mad. 902 on the precise ground that the Court had jurisdiction to determine the effective valuation on a different basis which had, in fact, become the subject- matter of decision by the Privy Council in the appeal taken before it. So what is now before us are to conflicting decisions of the Calcutta High Court.
13. Next I would refer to the case of Land Acquisition Officer, Karachi v. Hirananad Lilarem AIR 1941 Sind 152 in which Davis, C.J., refused to allow a claim for compensation on the ground of injurious infection raised for the first the in a reference under section 18 of the Act. In holding so his Lordship followed the case of Secretary of State v . C . R . Subramania Ayyar AIR 1930 Mad. 576 and Secretary of State v . Tikka Jagtar Singh AIR 1936 Lah. 733. In the Sind case the refusal to allow compensation again was based on the pleadings of the objector before the Collector in acquisition proceedings and upto the stage of the application for referring the matter to the Court for decision with an emphasis as to the binding nature of the pleadings. In the Lahore case which turned on the interpretation of sections 9 and 25, it was held that under section 9 of the Act an objector must give particulars of his claim and if an item is not specified he will not be awarded compensation on that score. The basis for decision is also the sanctity of the claim preferred by the objector as binding on him. I have noticed that in that case the Madras case was not cited yet in effect it goes to support the view of Curgenven, J.
14. In Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1967 SC 191, this Court has commented on the purport of section. 18 while laying down the distinction as between it and section 30 of the Act. The point for consideration as has arisen now was not dealt with in that case, and to this extent the decision is not helpful for resolving the controversy. Similarly in Collector, Peshawar District v. Sher Ahmad Khan PLD 1966 (W.P.) Pesh. 193, the Court awarded a claim higher than what was claimed by the objector which was held to be invalid as it was hit by the prohibitions in section 24 of the Act. This case is also not helpful. In Sh. Muhammad Saeed v. Deputy Commissioner, Karachi PLD 1969 Kar.. 314, after a review of case-law a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan held; firstly, that section 18 permits a reference to be made to the Court at the instance of a person interested who has not accepted the award on the grounds specified under the heads namely, the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, or the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested; and, secondly, that the Court while dealing with a reference under section 18 of the Act, acts not as a Court of general jurisdiction but as a Tribunal of special jurisdiction restricted to the matters enumerated in subsection (1) of section 18 as enjoined by section 21 of the Act i.e., the scope of inquiry is limited to the consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objections. This summing up follows the dicta laid down in Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan, Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secretary of State, Secretary of State v. C.R.
Subnamania Ayyar and other cases of the Karachi Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, which were cited in support of the proposition.
15. Stricto jure, the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court under sections 18 to 28 of the Land Acquisition Act is confined to the matter referred for determination, that is, to inquire into the objections to the Collector's award and to make an award upon the evidence before it. Sections 23 and 24 provide a criteria for determining the compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the Act. These criteria also bind the Collector while assessing the amount to be awarded for the land acquired and it is for this purpose that subsection (2) of section 9 enjoins that all persons interested in the land should state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests, and their objections, if any, to the measurement made under section 8 of the Act.
16. Section 11 of the Act provides for an inquiry by the Collector into the objections made by a person interested pursuant to the notice given under section 9 of the Act in respect of the interest in the land, the measurements made under section 8 and the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. The inquiry is of an administrative nature and the award made is a decision conclusive qua the Collector under section 12 of the Act.
It is only if a judicial ascertainment of value is desired by the owner that he can obtain it by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Court under section 18 of the Act.
17. Reading sections 9, 11, 18 and 21 together what is imperative is that the claimant must give out the particulars of the claim as to the nature of the interest and the amount of compensation desired for it. In other words he should fully present his case before the Collector as this in terms is his in pleadings to which he remains confined till the decision of the Collector in regard to the compensation payable. Necessarily, therefore, he is precluded from making out a fresh case either by way of supplementary claim to compensation or otherwise at the stage of judicial determination. This is what is emphasized by Curgenven, J., in Secretary of State v. C.R. Subramania Ayyar, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 576, and I see much substance in it as the pleadings are a foundation for the grounds on which an objection is taken to the award while seeking a judicial determination under section 18 of the Act. In effect, therefore, it alone becomes a matter referred under section 18 of the Act and the Court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it.
18. In the present case a higher amount was claimed pursuant to the notice issued under section 9(2) but in the written application filed before the Collector a flat rate of Rs.6,400 per acre was claimed as the value of the land acquired which to all intents and purposes had not been pleaded and did not become the subject-matter of inquiry under section 11 of the Act. This being so it was a case where he had intentionally waived his right to claim a higher amount with the full knowledge of his existing right which, in law, amounted to an implied agreement not to claim a higher amount.
Therefore, he could not later be allowed before the Court to which the matter was referred to re- assert his existing right to a higher amount as the matter referred for determination was his specific objection to the award, that is, the value per acre of the land, as its market price, irrespective of classification, and, accordingly, the amount claimed was its integral part. A case directly in point is the Province of Bengal v. Ram Chandra Bhutika and others AIR 1944 Cal. 247.
Support is also available as from the review of other cases such as the Land Acquisition Officer, Karachi v. Hiranand Lilaram AIR 1941 Sind 152. Secretary of State v. C.R. Subramania Ayyar AIR 1930 Mad. 576, and Secretary of State v. Tikka Jagtar Singh, AIR 1936 Lah. 733. And as held by the Judicial Committee in Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur's case, the jurisdiction of the Court did not extend beyond the determination of this question, as that was the specific matter. In this view of the matter, it could not be the case where the Collector had failed to consider any relevant criterion for assessing the market value of the land as provided in sections 23 and 24 of the Act as was the case in the Province of Bengal v. P.L. Nun AIR 1945 Cal. 312. Therefore, this was not a case in which an amendment should have been allowed. However, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as each case has the decided on its own facts and to what extent an amendment can be allowed is again a matter which has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of that case.
19. Concluding I hold that the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the trial Court which I uphold for reasons not altogether the same.
20. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.