1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.--The petitioner became a civil servant in undivided India having been appointed as a temporary stenographer on 26-7-1946. He also qualified in the proficiency test for stenographers conducted by the Public Service Commission, India on 18-12-1946. On the establishment of Pakistan, he opted for service in Pakistan and was absorbed in the Ministry of Finance of the Government of Pakistan.
2. In 1950 he submitted several representations to the Ministry of Finance that as he had passed the examination conducted by the Public Service Commission, India, he should be placed senior to those optee temporary stenographers who had not qualified in the said examination. These representations were, however, rejected by the Ministry of Finance vide Memorandum No. D.5366- Est. 1/5.D, dated 17-2-1951.
3. The petitioner appears to have reconciled himself to this decision and did not agitate against it for nearly 30 years. However, in the meantime, one of his former colleagues namely, Mr. M.H.
4. Ashrafullah, who felt aggrieved with the seniority assigned to him and had agitated against it, was -granted ante-dated seniority by the Ministry of Finance. On the analogy of this case, the petitioner again represented his case to the Secretary of Finance on 22-9-1980 but this representation was rejected on 28-2-1982 with the remarks that a similar representation having been finally rejected as long ago as 17-2-1951 there was no rule which permitted the re-opening of his case after a period of 30 years.
5. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by this decision filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad. However a preliminary objection was raised by the counsel for the State that as the final decision of the departmental authority was made on 17-2-1951 the appeal was liable to be- dismissed on the ground that it was barred under the provisio (c) of subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. This provides: "no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority made at any the before the 1st July, 1969."
6. The Tribunal held that in view of the above provision of law it was not competent to entertain' the appeal, which was accordingly rejected without adverting to the merits of the case. Hence this petition for leave to appeal in this Court.
7. Mr. Aziz Ahmad, who argued this case in person, feels very strongly about the righteousness of his cause and referred to the merits of his case again and again before us. He was, however, unable to show how he could overcome the obstacle of limitation even if his assumption about the righteousness of his cause was correct.
8. In this connection, all that he could urge was that the Establishment Division had issued a circular in 1982 to the effect that the Departments should not raise any technical objections to the maintain--ability of an appeal such as objections relating to bar of limitation but should allow the matter to be decided on the merits.
9. This instruction may be binding on the Establishment Division but it is not binding on the Service Tribunal. In this case, the final decision having been made by the departmental authority on 17-2- 1951 could not be challenged before the Service Tribunal in 1982 on account of the bar contained in the proviso (c) of section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act. No law was shown to us permitting the petitioner to file a fresh representation to the Department in 1980 to challenge the earlier decision taken on 17-2-1951. It is only if such a representation was permissible in law that the order refusing to entertain the said representation which was passed on 28-2-1982, could furnish him with a new cause of action and take his case out of the mischief of proviso (c) of section 4(1). In the circumstances, the Tribunal was justified in treating the order that was being challenged in reality before it was the order passed against him way back on 17-2-1951 and not the subsequent order passed on 28-2-1982, which merely indicated the inability of the Department to re-open, the matter.
10. The upshot is that no ground for interference with the order of the Service Tribunal is made and, therefore, this petition must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed hereby.