1. ' This is Second Appeal against the orders, dated 3-10-1977 and 10-3-1979 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Jacobabad and learned District Judge, Jacobabad, respectively in Rent Application No, 12 of 1975 and Rent Appeal No, 24 of 1977, respectively.
2. ' The brief facts leading to the filing of the above second appeal are that the present respondent filed the aforesaid rent application on three grounds namely, causing damage to the property, personal requirement and reconstruction. The above application was resisted by the present appellant. In support of the above application the respondent examined himself and one Atiq Exhs.
3. 28 and 33, respectively. Whereas appellant examined himself and one Dhano Exhs. 38 and 39, respectively. The learned Rent Controller disallowed the ground of causing damage to the property but allowed the rent application on the grounds of personal requirement and reconstruction. Being aggrieved by the above order the appellant filed aforesaid appeal which was dismissed by the learned District Judge by his aforesaid order. Dated 10.3-1979. The appellant being aggrieved by the above two orders has filed the above second appeal.
4. ' In support of the above Mr. Wahid Bux Baloch learned counsel for the appellant has urged as follows:-
(1) That since before the appellate Court the certified copy of the compromise arrived at between the respondent and the other tenant Bansilal in another rent application filed on the same day on the same ground was filed but learned District Judge failed to take into consideration the effect of the same.
(2) That if personal bona fide requirement is to be disbelieved then the ground of reconstruction would also be adversely affected. On the other hand Mr. Daud Baloch learned counsel for the respondent has urged as follows:-
(1) That since respondent required only one shop he had compromised in the above rent application on the day when the ejectment order was passed in the present rent application and that above fact shows the bona fide on the part of the respondent and not mala fide.
(2) That even if the ground of personal requirement is to be disbelieved, the ground of reconstruction is independent and since requisite sanction of the competent authority for reconstruction has been produced the two orders can be maintained on the above ground.
5. As regards the first contention, it may be observed that the respondent in his cross-examination admitted the fact that he had filed another rent application against one Bansilal on the ground of personal requirement on the very day when the present rent application was filed. It is an admitted position that this rent application was compromised on the day when the order of ejectment was passed in the present application by enhancing the rent from Rs, 18 to Rs, 100, per month. In my view the learned District Judge has erred in not taking into consideration the subsequent event which had taken place after the passing of the ejectment order which was very much material which he was entitled to take into consideration. It is true that a landlord has a choice to pick up any of his property for the purpose of his personal requirement but once he picks up two shops for his personal requirement simultaneously the compromise in one rent application by enhancing rent would adversely reflect on the bona fide of the landlord. It was urged by Mr. Daud Baloch that the respondent could not have been sure that he would obtain the possession of both the shops and therefore he had filed two cases so that he might obtain possession on shop. In my view, if a landlord owns one hundred shops he cannot file ejectment cases against all the one hundred tenants on the ground of personal requirement on the reasoning advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent. Furthermore, I have noticed that both the Courts below have erred in not taking into consideration the factum that the respondent is a man of about 55 years. He has admitted that his sons and sons-in-law are in possession of other shops and are doing business in those shops. The respondent has not brought anything on record to indicate the reason which prompted him the filing of the two rent applications on the ground of personal requirement at the above age.
6. If the respondent would have been in service or would have been doing some other business which he had discontinued for some reason, he might have a good case for personal bona fide requirement. However, he has not brought any material on record. The burden to prove was on the respondent to show his personal bona fide requirement. In my view there was not sufficient material before the two Courts below on the basis of which a finding on the question of personal requirement could be recorded by the two Courts below. In this view of the matter I set aside the finding of the two Courts and hold that the respondent has failed to make out a case of personal requirement.
7. As regards the question of reconstruction, it is true that a landlord may apply for reconstruction independently from his personal requirement but once the landlord links reconstruction with his personal requirement and if the Court disbelieves the ground of personal requirement, it would adversely affect the bona fide of the landlord in relation to the reconstruction. The instant case was decided under the late West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which provided that the reconstruction should be bona fide. Simpliciter obtaining of sanction from the competent authority for reconstruction of a building will not be sufficient compliance of the relevant provision of the late Ordinance. In this regard a reference may be made to the case of Ghulam Arabi v.
8. Mushtaq Ahtnad (1), in which the Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to hold that a landlord cannot evict the tenant merely for reason of his desire to rebuild property but landlord is bound to prove his requirement being not only reasonable but also bona fide. In this view of the matter finding of the Iwo Courts on the ground of reconstruction is also not sustainable and, therefore, it is reversed.
9. ' For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is allowed, the two orders are set aside but there will be no order as to costs.