1. ' NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-This order will dispose of Civil Petition No, K-317 of 1984 and Civil Petition No, K-318 of 1984, as both of them are directed against a common judgment pronounced on 19-4-1984.
2. ' The facts, which from the background, are that Begum Nazrul Askari, respondent herein, is the owner of house bearing No, 5-C-5/15, Nazimabad, Karachi. The ground-floor of her said house was let out by her to Arshad Umer (Petitioner in C. P. No, K-317/84) and the first-floor was let out by her to Muhammad Fazal (petitioner in C. P. No, K-318/84). On 15-7-1979, she filed two rent applications in the Court of the Rent Controller seeking ejectment of the said two tenants Arshad Umer, occupant of the ground-fiber portion (viz. Case No, 3442 of 1979) and Muhammad Fazal, occupant of the first-floor protion (viz Case No, 3441 of 1979) on the ground that she required both the portions of the house bona fide for her personal use and occupation. Her case was that she was presently residing at Quetta with her son and had decided to shift to Karachi where she had no other house to live except the house in question and, therefore, required the premises in dispute for her own use and for the use of her children. In the proceedings before the Rent Controller, her attorney, Major (Ketd ) Dr. S. Hashmat Ali, who was also her son-in-law, appeared and gave evidence in both the cases. Besides affirming the above facts he further elaborated, in the course of his cross-examination, that whereas the landlady, along with her daughters, would reside on the ground-floor portion; her son, who is married, would be living in the first-floor portion. He also stated that the aforesaid married son had no other accommodation and was presently living with him at Karachi as he was employed in Karachi as an Accountant in the National Construction Company. In reply to other questions he deposed that the landlady had three daughters, out of which two were married and one was unmarried, who was living with her mohter at Quetta; that the husband of the landlady had died in 1969 and that there was no other male member of the family at Quetta where for she wanted to shift at Karachi. In view of these circumstances her house at Karachi was needed by her; the ground-floor for her own personal occupation and that of her unmarried daughter and the first-floor portion for the occupation of her married son and his family.
3. The case of the tenants, on the other hand, was that the landlady did not bona fide require the premises for her personal use and for the use of her children. However, before the Rent Controller they appear to have contested the rent applications mainly or the ground that since neither the land lady nor her son, for whom the first-floor portion of the house was allegedly required, had appeared before the Rent Controller to give evidence and subject themselves to the test of cross- examination in regard to the alleged need, their plea that the premises was required bona fide for their personal use and occupation could not be held as established. The above contention was viewed with favour by the Rent Controller who upheld this contention. In this connection, he observed that "it is always the statement of the landlord as well as of the person for whose benefit premises are sought to be vacated, which is most relevant to determine the point in issue". On this view of the matter he proceeded to dismiss, by separate orders passed on 25-7-1981 and on 27-7- 1981, both the rent applications.
4. ' Feeling aggrieved, the respondent-landlady challenged the correctness of both the above orders by filing two separate rent appeals in the High Court of Sind. These appeals were heard by a learned Single Judge of the said Court at Karachi and disposed by a common judgment, because the tenants were only occupying portions of one and the same house and a common point of law regarding the personal requirement of the landlady for the same premises was involved in both the appeals. The main question agitated before the learned Judge in the High Court in both appeals was the same which had earlier been agitated before the Rent Controller, namely, whether the failure of the landlady and her son to appear before the Rent Controller and offer themselves for cross-examination was not fatal to their plea that they required the premises in good faith for their personal occupation and use?. The learned Judge, after a careful examination of the relevant case law, for and against this question, which was produced by the parties before him, came to tie conclusion ,that the omission by the landlady and her son to appear in the witness-box and subject themselves to cross-examination by the tenants was not fatal to their case. He observed that, in the evidence led before the Rent Controller, it was proved that the landlady had no other house at Karachi; that one of her sons (who was also married) was employed in Karachi had no separate house to live and was constrained to reside with her son-in-law, that the landlady desired to shift to Karachi and that, in view of these circumstances, the landlady was justisfied in wanting to live in her own house. He, therefore, held that she had proved her case of bona fide personal requirement for herself and her children. He accordingly, set aside the orders dated 25-7-1981 and 27-7-1981 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, dismissing the rent application filed by her and was pleased to allow both the appeals. Hence, these petitions for leave to appeal in this Court.
5. ' We have heard Mr. Abdul Wahab on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Nasrullah Awan, Advocate, for the landlay, who appeared in support of the caveat filed in these petitions by her. Before us too the question, which was debated before the two Courts below, namely, as what was the effect of the commission of the landlay, who claimed to require the house for her personal occupation and for that of her son, upon to her case namely, whether this omission was not fatal to her case, as held by the Rent Controller or whether the learned Judge in the High Court was right in holding otherwise.
6. ' Mr. Abdul Wahab, learned counsel for the petitioners, presented a vigorous argument in support of the above plea, but, despite his enthusiasm for it, we are not persuaded to agree with him. We note that subsection (2) of section 15 of the Sind Rented Ordinance, l9 9, provides that the Rent Controller can direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession or the premises if he is satisfied, inter alia, that the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children. No limitations are prescribed in the law to fetter the discretion of the Rent Controller in this connecti3n nor is there any prescription with regard to the nature of the evidence which must be produced before him to satisfy him on this point. 1His satisfaction is to rest on the material placed before him by the parties and no conditions are laid down as to the exact nature of the evidence which must be produced before him so that he can be satisfied. In this case, the son-in-law of the landlady had appeared before the Rent Controller. He is a retired Major in the army and the eldest son-in-law of the landlady. As he was living in Karachi, it was convenient for him to appear before the Rent Controller, rather than the landlady who was residing at Quetta. As for the son, though living at Karachi he is working in the National Construction Company, while the son-in-law of the landlady being a retired person had more time at his disposal. Even otherwise he too is a member of the family having knowledge of all the relevant facts. Moreover, the facts deposed by him, namely, that the landlady was the owner of the premises ; that she was presently living at Quetta ; and that she now wanted to shift to Karachi where near other members of beer family were residing ; that her son was employed at Karachi and had no separate accommodation but was living in his house ; that the landlady too had no other house in Karachi, were not seriously contested. In these circumstances, we cannot appreciate why the Rent Controller was not satisfied about the bona fide need of the landlady to get possession of her house and the learned Judge in the High Court was, therefore, fully justified in setting aside the erroneous view taken on this point by the Rent Controller. In fact, this Court has, in several cases held that the order of eviction of a tenant cannot be challenged on the ground of failure of the child to appear in Court for whose benefit the landlord is seeking eviction of the tenant and his omission to appear before the Rent Controller to depose about the said need is not fatal. See, for instance, M. Muhammad Sharif v. M. S. Sultan (1) and Dilshad Muhammad v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (2).
7. ' The upshot is that there is no force in these petitions which are, accordingly, hereby dismissed.
(1) 1981 SCM R 844 (2) 1981 SCM R 895 10110